The  Genesis  of  the  Open  Door 
Policy  in  China 


G.  ZAY  WOOD,  B.A.,  M.A. 

Curtis  Fellow  in  International  Law  and 
Diplomacy,  Golunibia  University,  1919-1921; 
formerly  Editor  of  The  Far  Eastern  Repub- 
lic; President  of  The  Chinese  Political 
Science  Association,  1919-1921. 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT 
OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE 
DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILO- 
SOPHY IN  THE 

FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


New  York  City 
May,  1921 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Columbia  University  Libraries 


https://archive.org/details/genesisofopenOOwood 


The  Genesis  of  the  Open  Door 
Policy  in  China 


G.  ZAY  WOOD,  B.A.,  M.A.  / 

Curtis  Fellow  in  International  Law  and 
Diplomaey,  ColumMa  University,  1919-1921; 
formerly  Editor  of  The  Far  Eastern  Repub- 
lic; President  of  The  Chinese  Political 
Science  Association,  1919-1921. 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT 
OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE 
DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILO- 
SOPHY IN  THE 

FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


New  York  City 
May,  1921 


M 


TO 

E.  A.  H. 


i'a  '45  L ■ .1. 


FOREWORD 


Though  complete  by  itself,  this  monograph 
constitutes  but  one  fourth  of  a larger  vol- 
ume, which  is  soon  to  appear.  As  implied  in 
the  title,  only  the  genesis  of  the  Open  Door 
policy  in  China  is  dealt  with,  and  its  later 
developments  are  reserved  for  treatment  in 
the  larger  volume. 

The  author  wishes  to  take  this  opportunity 
to  express  his  gratitude  to  John  Bassett 
Moore,  Hamilton  Fish  Professor  of  Interna- 
tional Law  and  Diplomacy,  Columbia  Uni- 
versity, for  his  reading  of  the  manuscript 
and  for  his  numerous  suggestions,  without 
which  this  monograph  will  not  be  what  it  is. 

G.  Z.  W. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Chapter  I.  Introduction 1 

The  Open  Door  policy  as  a diplomatic 
fiction— its  origination  erroneously  at- 
tributed to  the  United  States — the  Open 
Door,  an  old  principle  revived  by  Sec- 
retary Hay — the  effects  of  Mr.  Hay’s  cir- 
cular note — the  Open  Door  policy  as  a 
factor  in  international  politics  in  the 
Far  East — its  prominence  due  to  its  fail- 
ure— subjected  to  variant  and  contradic- 
tory interpretations — the  attitude  of 
Russia  towards  the  policy — of  France — 
of  Germany — of  Japan — of  Great  Britain 
— and  of  the  United  States. 

Chapter  II.  The  Opening  Up  of  China.  I8 

The  “closed  door”  policy  of  China — 
her  early  intercourse  with  the  West — 
the  Opium  War  and  the  Treaty  of  Nan- 
king— the  opening  up  of  China,  “a  drama 
in  five  acts”— the  “Arrow”  War,  1856- 
1860,  the  second  act — the  Treaty  of  Tien- 
tsin, 1858 — the  Treaty  of  Peking,  1860 — 
the  murder  of  Margary,  the  third  act — 
British  exploring  expedition  to  Yunnan 
— the  Chefoo  Convention,  1876 — a tri- 
umph of  peace — French  attempt  to  open 
a trade  route  from  Annam  to  Yunnan — 
the  Fournier  Convention,  1884 — -the 
fourth  act,  the  Franco-Chinese  War — its 
results— difficulties  between  China  and 
Japan  over  Korea — the  fifth  act,  the 
Chino- Japanese  War — the  causes  of  the 
war — the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki — the 
outbreak  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion — the 
epilogue. 

Chapter  III.  The  Early  Practice  of  the 
Open  Door  Principle 43 

The  most-favored-nation  clause — its 
upholding  as  a necessary  condition  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  Open  Door  pol- 
icy— irregularities  of  early  commercial 
intercourse — conduct  of  the  early  trad- 
ers in  China — a new  commercial  era  ar- 
rived with  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty 
of  Nanking — Queen  Victoria  of  England 
IX 


favored  equal  treatment — The  Anglo- 
Chinese  treaty  of  1843 — the  first  treaty 
stipulation  for  most-favored-nation  treat- 
ment— other  instances  of  the  early  prac- 
tice of  the  Open  Door  principle — addi- 
tional provisions  for  most-favored-nation 
treatment  — their  importance  — British 
statesmen  quoted  — equal  opportunity 
threatened  by  the  international  scram- 
ble. 

Chapter  IV.  The  Break-Up  of  China.  . . 62 

The  break-up  of  China  synchronous 
with  her  opening  up — Great  Britain  led 
the  game — the  annexation  of  Hongkong 
— of  Kowloon — the  Burmese  wars — the 
annexation  of  Burma — Russian  expan- 
sion in  China — the  Treaty  of  Nerchinsk, 
1689 — the  Treaty  of  Aigun,  1858 — the 
Treaty  of  Peking,  1860 — the  Treaty  of 
St.  Petersburg,  1881 — French  expansion 
— annexation  of  Annam — Portuguese  oc- 
cupation of  Macao — the  Treaty  of  Lis- 
bon, 1887 — Japanese  expansion — seizure 
of  Loo-chow  Island — the  annexation  of 
Formosa  and  Pescadores — three  Powers 
intervention — seizure  of  Kiao-chow  Bay 
by  Germany — the  story  of  the  affair — its 
diplomatic  background — lease  of  Port 
Arthur  and  Talienwan  to  Russia — of 
Kwang-chow-wan  to  France — of  Wei-hai- 
wei  to  Great  Britain — Italian  attempt. 

Chapter  V.  The  Regime  of  Spheres  of 
Interest. 85 

The  demarcation  of  Chinese  terri- 
tories into  spheres — the  difference  be- 
tween spheres  of  interest  and  spheres  of 
influence — two  ways  in  which  the 
spheres  were  created — the  Burma  Con- 
vention of  1894 — France  in  Yunnan — the 
Hainan  Island — the  Yangtze  valley  as 
British  sphere — Great  Britain  in  Thibet 
— Japanese  reservation  on  Fukien — The 
“Twenty-one  Demands”  — railway  ar- 
rangements among  the  Powers — Anglo- 
French  declaration  concerning  their  mu- 
tual advantages  in  the  provinces  of  Yun- 
nan and  Szechuan  — Anglo  - Russian 
agreement  of  1899 — struggle  for  railway 
concessions  in  China — the  text  of  the 
agreement — the  effects  of  such  an  agree- 
ment — partition  of  Anglo  - German 
spheres  in  China — the  text  of  the  Anglo- 
German  railway  arrangement — virtual 
X 


recognition  by  Great  Britain  of  Shan- 
tung as  German  sphere — Great  Britain 
and  Wei-hai-wei. 

Chapter  VI.  The  Hay  Notes. 110 

The  United  States  and  the  interna- 
tional scramble — the  question  of  her 
commercial  interests  in  China — means 
of  protections — Secretary  John  Hay’s 
circular  note  of  September  6,  1899 — the 
attitude  of  Great  Britain — of  France — of 
Japan — of  Russia — Russia’s  reservations 
— the  unconditional  acceptance  by  Italy 
— the  reply  of  Germany — the  real  sig- 
nificance of  the  “acceptance” — Secretary 
Hay’s  second  circular  note — administra- 
tive entity  and  integrity — Professor 
John  Bassett  Moore  quoted — the  mean- 
ing of  “entity.” 

Chapter  VII.  The  Open  Door  Policy  De- 
fined.   130 

The  true  meaning  of  the  Open  Door 
enigmatical — need  of  a clear  definition 
— what  the  Open  Door  policy  is  not — 
the  Open  Door  not  of  American  origin — 
how  the  phrase  was  originated — the  agi- 
tation for  the  Open  Door — apathy  of  the 
commercial  class  in  the  United  States — 
Lord  Charles  Beresford  quoted — the 
Open  Door,  an  old  principle — Great 
Britain  coined  the  phrase — the  United 
States  a new  champion  of  the  policy — 
the  Open  Door  unrelated  to  the  opening 
up  of  China. 

Chapter  VIII.  The  Open  Door  Policy  De- 
fined (continued)  146 

The  Open  Door  policy  and  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China — the  mainte- 
nance of  her  territorial  integrity  abso- 
lutely essential  to  the  execution  of  the 
policy  — different  opinions  — the  Open 
Door  and  the  tariff  in  China — the  Open 
Door  and  the  regime  of  spheres  of  in- 
terest— the  two  incompatible  with  each 
other — the  effects  of  such  spheres — the 
old  and  limited  conception  of  the  Open 
Door  policy — Dr.  Reinsch  on  the  Open 
Door  — exclusive  concessions  incom- 
patible with  the  Open  Door — different 
opinions — Secretary  Hay’s  idea — an  er- 
roneous interpretation  of  “equal  oppor- 

XI 


tunity” — Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour  quoted — Mr. 
Balfour’s  and  Mr.  Hay’s  views  on  the 
Open  Door  compared — what  the  Open 
Door  policy  does  not  mean — evils  of 
exclusive  concessions — The  Open  Door 
policy  defined. 


XII 


CHAPTER  I 


I ntroduction 

For  the  past  twenty-five  years  there 
is  nothing  in  the  politics  of  the  Far 
East  that  has  loomed  larger  or  more 
frequently  been  the  subject  of  discus- 
sion among  the  statesmen  and  diplo- 
matists of  Asia,  of  Europe,  and  of 
America  than  the  so-called  “Open  Door” 
policy  in  China ; and  yet  in  all  the  his- 
tory of  international  relations  nothing 
has  been  so  much  misunderstood,  so 
lightly  tossed  about,  or  subjected  to 
such  variant  and  often  contradictory  in- 
terpretations, as  this  catch-phrase  of  the 
stock-in-trade  terminology  of  European, 
American,  and  Japanese  diplomacy  in 
the  Chinese  Republic.  What  is  the 
Open  Door  policy?  How  did  it  origi- 
nate ? What  are  its  underlying  motives  ? 
To  what  extent  is  it  efficacious?  These 
are  questions  which  are  seldom,  if  ever, 
propounded.  Much  of  the  discussion  on 
the  subject  proceeds  on  premises  that 
are  undefined,  inaccurate,  and  often 
false ; and,  in  spite  of  the  great  impor- 
tance professedly  attached  to  the  policy, 
and  in  spite  of  the  multitude  of  interna- 
tional agreements  and  understandings 
entered  into  by  the  European  Powers, 
Japan,  and  the  United  States  with  the 
avowed  object  of  maintaining  it,  it  is 
today,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  little 
more  than  a diplomatic  fiction,  to  which 
the  chancelleries  of  Europe  no  less  than 
the  Gaimuscho  (Foreign  Office)  of 
Tokyo  pay  scant  respect. 

Popularly,  but  very  erroneously,  the 
Open  Door  policy  has  been  regarded  as 
having  some  kinship  or  analogy  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  of  the  United  States. 


1 


Among  writers  and  speakers  on  Far 
Eastern  questions  it  has  indeed  become 
the  fashion  to  attribute  to  the  United 
States  the  origination  of  the  policy,  on 
the  supposition  that  it  was  first  formulat- 
ed by  Mr.  John  Hay,  in  notes  which,  as 
American  Secretary  of  State  from  1898 
to  1905,  he  addressed,  on  two  occasions, 
to  Japan  and  to  the  European  Powers. 
Nothing,  however,  is  further  from  the 
truth,  for  “it  is  admitted  that  neither  the 
idea  of  the  ‘open  door’  nor  the  principle 
which  it  denotes  originated  in  the  United 
States.” " The  United  States  did  not 
originate  the  policy,  nor  was  M'r.  Hay’s 
proposal  in  fact  accepted  by  all  the  Pow- 
ers to  whom  his  notes  were  addressed. 
As  an  international  commercial  principle 
of  the  Western  Powers  in  China,  the  rule 
of  the  Open  Door  had,  without  specific 
mention  of  it,  been  guaranteed  by  the 
most-favored-nation  clauses  contained  in 
almost  all  the  commercial  treaties  be- 
tween China  and  the  foreign  Powers,  and 
had  been  respected  and  applied  by  them, 
either  in  their  dealings  with  one  another 
or  with  China,  long  before  Mr.  Hay  as- 
sumed the  office  of  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  United  States.  As  a political 
or  diplomatic  formula,  the  Open  Door 
bore  a family  resemblance  to  the  “policy 
of  co-operation,”  which  sought  to  “sub- 
stitute fair  diplomatic  action  for  force,” 
and  which  the  Western  Powers  had,  at 
the  suggestion  of  Mr.  Anson  Burlingame, 
the  author  of  the  policy,  long  ago  adopt- 
ed in  their  relations  with  China.  The 
inference  has  often  been  drawn  that,  as 
Mr.  Hay  was  at  one  time  President  Lin- 
coln’s private  secretary,  and  as  he  was 
personally  acquainted  with  Mr.  Sew- 
ard’s policy  in  China,  the  proposals  and 
the  principles  found  in  his  two  circular 
notes  were  suggested  by,  or  even  might 

'John  Bassett  Moore,  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  March,  1917,  p.  123. 

2 


be  “based  upon,”  the  Chinese-American 
treaty  of  1858  and  Mr.  Burlingame’s  doc- 
trine of  co-operation  and  fair  play.”  At 
any  rate,  it  may  be  presumed  that  Mr. 
Hay  would  never  have  penned  his  two 
diplomatic  circulars,  one  on  September  6, 
1899,  and  the  other  on  July  3,  1900,  had 
not  the  frenzied  struggle  for  spheres  of 
interest  or  influence  and  for  territorial 
concessions  in  China  by  the  European 
Powers  in  1897-1899,  and  the  subsequent 
outbreak  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion  in  1900, 
combined  to  threaten,  not  only  the  rule 
of  equal  commercial  opportunity,  but 
even  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  coun- 
try. What  Secretary  Hay  actually  did, 
was  to  revive,  through  the  exchange  of 
diplomatic  notes,  the  traditional  principle 
of  equal  treatment  embodied  in  the  most- 
favored-nation  clauses,  which  the  for- 
eign Powers,  particularly  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States,  had  formerly  re- 
spected in  their  economic  and  commercial 
enterprises  in  China,  and  which  the 
regime  of  spheres  of  interest  and  lease- 
holds necessarily  tended  to  nullify. 

But,  while  an  old  principle  was  re- 
called to  life  under  a new  name,  it  is  a 
fact  that  in  the  controversy  over  the  so- 
called  “Open  Door”  policy  we  find  an 
epitome  of  international  politics  in  the 
Far  East  during  the  last  twenty  or  more 
years.  Although  it  is  true  that  Secre- 
tary Hay  did  not  originate  the  policy,  it 
is  equally  true  that  it  was  only  after  he 
had  reminded  the  world  of  its  previous 
existence  that  it  became  the  paramount 
issue  of  Far  Eastern  politics.  His  first 
circular  note  to  the  European  Powers 
and  to  Japan  served  as  an  alarm-bell 
which  awakened  the  governments  of 
three  continents  to  the  serious  danger 
that  was  menacing  the  continued  and 

^ F.  M.  Anderson  and  A.  S.  Hershey,  Hand- 
book for  the  Diplomatic  History  of  Europe, 
Asia,  and  Africa,  1870-1914,  p.  245. 

3 


peaceful  observance  of  the  traditional 
principle  of  equal  commercial  oppor- 
tunity in  China.  His  second  circular  note 
was  a frank  declaration,  though  in  a 
language  none  too  specific,  of  the  Amer- 
ican attitude  and  policy  towards  China  at 
the  most  critical  juncture  of  her  life.  It 
was  fortunate  that  the  tocsin  rang  at  the 
time — at  the  psychological  moment, 
when  the  world  at  large  was  beginning  to 
forget  the  benefits  and  advantages  of  the 
Open  Door  principle,  and  when  the 
European  Powers,  in  their  struggle  for 
leases  of  territory  and  for  spheres  of  in- 
terest or  influence,  were  ready  to  discard 
it  altogether.  Still  more  fortunate  was 
the  fact  that  the  disinterestedness  of  the 
United  States  and  the  absence  on  her 
part  of  any  ambition  for  territorial  gains 
in  China  made  it  possible  for  her  to  com- 
mand a respectful  consideration  by  the 
European  Governments  of  the  case  which 
she  chose  to  represent.  It  is  true  that 
the  acceptance  of  Mr.  Hay’s  definition 
of  the  policy  was,  in  the  case  of  one  or 
two  Powers,  not  only  conditional  and 
qualified,  but  highly  ambiguous  and 
evasive ; and  that  consequently,  the  prac- 
tical result  of  his  diplomatic  representa- 
tions, as  far  as  those  Powers  were  con- 
cerned, was  quite  dubious  and  hardly  dis- 
cernible at  the  time.  Upon  the  public 
opinion  of  the  world,  however,  the  moral 
effect  of  his  representations  was  imme- 
diate and  electrifying.  There  was  an  in- 
stant and  unanimous  approval  in  the 
press  of  the  world.  In  the  United  States, 
indeed,  and  in  China  as  well,  Mr.  Hay 
was  enthusiastically  acclaimed,  in  a spirit 
of  extravagant  panegyric,  as  the  father 
of  the  Open  Door  policy  and  the  savior 
of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

To  this  view,  exaggerated  though  it  be, 
the  world  has  since  held ; and  it  is  the 
Open  Door  policy  that  has,  in  one  form 
or  another,  been  at  issue  in  all  the  inter- 
4 


national  questions  in  the  Far  East.  No 
matter  what  takes  place  internationally, 
it  is  discussed  under  that  title.  Whether 
it  is  a concession  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment for  the  construction  of  a railroad, 
or  a Japanese  demand  for  the  sole  right 
to  open  the  iron  or  coal  mines  in  this 
or  that  province  of  China ; whether  it  is 
the  attempt  by  the  United  States  to  or- 
ganize a new  international  banking  con- 
sortium, or  the  persistent  demand  by  Ja- 
pan for  the  exclusion  of  Manchuria, 
Mongolia,  and  Shantung  from  the  con- 
sortium’s sphere  of  operation,  it  is  al- 
ways reducible  to  a question  in  which 
the  principle  of  the  Open  Door  can  be 
said  to  be  involved.  Indeed,  no  event  of 
any  international  significance  takes  place 
in  the  Far  Eastern  political  world  that  is 
without  some  bearing,  in  one  way  or 
another,  upon  this  all-embracing  prin- 
ciple, whatever  it  may  be  taken  to  mean. 
It  is,  therefore,  quite  within  the  bounds 
of  truth  to  say  that  the  term  “Open 
Door”  covers  the  entire  range  of  inter- 
national political  activities  in  the  Far 
East  during  the  past  two  decades.  A 
study  of  the  one  is  a study  of  the  other. 

The  prominence  lately  given  to  the 
Open  Door  policy  is,  however,  largely 
due  to  its  failure.  Except  for  the  repeat- 
ed infractions  of  the  policy  by  Powers 
pledged  to  its  maintenance,  little  would 
have  been  heard  of  it.  The  Anglo-Ger- 
man Agreement  of  1900,  the  Franco- 
Japanese  Convention  of  1907,  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  treaties,  the  Russo- 
Japanese  conventions,  and  the  Root- 
Takahira  and  Lansing-Ishii  “agree- 
ments”— all  admitted  landmarks  of  Far 
Eastern  politics,  professing  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  Open  Door  policy  as  their 
object,  have  contributed  little  indeed  to 
the  accomplishment  of  that  end.  Why 
should  there  be  an  eternal  reiteration,  it 
may  be  asked,  of  the  simple  principle 


which  Japan,  the  United  States,  and  the 
leading  Powers  of  Europe  have  all 
pledged  their  honor  to  maintain?  In 
time  of  peace,  no  one  cries  for  peace. 
He  does  so  only  when  peace  is  menaced 
or  actually  disturbed.  The  same  thing 
may  be  said  of  the  Open  Door.  If  it 
were  faithfully  maintained  by  the  foreign 
Powers  in  China  either  in  their  dealings 
with  each  other  or  with  China,  there 
would  be  no  need  of  international 
agreements  or  special  understandings  on 
the  subject.  It  is  only  when  the  prin- 
ciple is  transgressed  or  openly  violated 
that  they  find  it  necessary  to  reaffirm  it. 
“As  for  the  famous  and  frequently  dis- 
cussed Open  Door  in  China,  what  of  it  ?”, 
asked  an  American  diplomatist  who  went 
to  the  Orient  in  order  to  study  the  Far 
Eastern  question  at  first-hand.  This  was 
his  answer.  The  Open  Door,  he  point- 
ed out,  “has  never  existed,  does  not  to- 
day exist,  and  never  will  exist  except  in 
such  parts  as  are  completely  under  the 
control  of  an  international  consortium. 
Instead  of  an  Open  Door,  China  pos- 
sesses a series  of  Side  Doors,  of  ‘Family 
Entrances,’  difficult  to  enter  save  by  mer- 
chants belonging  to  the  commercial  fam- 
ily of  the  foreign  Power  dominating  that 
district.”  " 

How  far  this  is  true,  it  remains  to  be 
seen ; but,  after  a careful  study  of  the 
history  of  the  past  twenty  years,  the  con- 
clusion is  irresistible  that,  in  spite  of  the 
diplomatic  halo  with  which  the  Open 
Door  policy  is  usually  invested,  it  is  to- 
day, as  ever  before,  more  fictitious  and 
less  real  than  has  generally  been  sup- 
posed. Although  so  constantly  discussed 
in  the  press  of  the  world,  and  so  often 
embodied  in  international  agreements 
and  understandings,  the  true  meaning  of 
the  principle  has  nevertheless  remained 

’Charles  H.  Sherrill,  Have  We  A Far  East- 
ern Policy?  p.  280. 


6 


to  a large  number  of  Powers  a political 
riddle.  Like  the  Delphian  oracle,  whose 
utterances  meant  different  things  to  dif- 
ferent inquirers,  the  Open  Door  policy 
has  connoted  very  different  ideas  to  the 
different  Powers  professing  it  in  prin- 
ciple. It  is  hard  to  say  whether  Powers 
have  intentionally  or  unintentionally  mis- 
interpreted the  principle,  but  a careful 
and  thorough  study  of  the  history  and 
development  of  the  policy  has  convinced 
us  that,  with  the  single  possible  exception 
of  the  United  States,  every  other  Power 
pledged  to  the  policy  insists  on  its  main- 
tenance only  when  it  suits  her  interest 
to  do  so.  It  is  almost  twenty  years  since 
Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  American  Minister 
to  China  from  1913  to  1919,  made  the 
observation,  which  still  holds  true  today, 
that  the  foreign  Powers  in  China  had  not 
the  slightest  scruple  in  playing  fast  and 
loose  with  their  plighted  word.  “Never 
has  it  been  more  true,”  said  Dr.  Reinsch, 
“that  treaties  are  simply  a statement  of 
existing  facts.”  “Treaties  concluded 
with  China,  and  treaties  framed  with 
regard  to  China,  are  simply  an  index  to 
the  present  position  and  power  of  the 
various  governments  who  are  parties  to 
the  respective  agreements.  Wherever  an 
opportunity  or  a plausible  pretext  to  dis- 
regard the  treaties  offers  itself,  or  wher- 
ever a Power  feels  that  the  rival  nations 
are  so  occupied  with  other  matters  as  not 
to  be  able  to  insist  upon  the  enforcement 
of  their  treaty  rights,  the  promises  and 
arrangements  contained  in  treaties  will 
have  very  little  restraining  influence  on 
political  action.”  * 

While  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  at- 
tempt to  specify  all  violations  of  the 
Open  Door  policy,  an  effort  will  be  made 
to  give  concisely  the  attitudes  of  the  dif- 
ferent Powers  who  have  either  professed 

’ Paul  S.  Reinsch,  World  Politics  At  the 
End  of  Nineteenth  Century,  p.  175. 

7 


respect  for  the  policy  or  declared  it  to 
be  the  cardinal  principle  of  their  diplo- 
macy in  the  Chinese  Republic.  By  so 
doing  we  can  gain  a bird’s-eye  view  of 
the  past  and  the  present  of  the  Open 
Door  policy,  and  possibly  a fleeting 
glimpse  of  its  future. 

First  of  all,  let  us  ask  what  was  the 
attitude  of  Russia.  It  is  necessary  to 
bear  in  mind  here  that  the  present-day 
Russia  is  not  the  same  Russia  of  the  pre- 
war days,  and  that  the  views  and  poli- 
cies of  the  present-day  Russia  are  widely 
different  from  those  of  the  old  Russia  as 
day  is  different  from  night.  It  is  only 
with  the  latter,  however,  that  we  are 
most  concerned  in  our  investigation.  To 
the  old  autocratic  Russia — to  the  Russia 
of  czars  and  Romanoffs,  the  Open  Door 
policy  meant,  if  it  meant  anything  at  all, 
an  equal  opportunity  for  the  foreign 
Powers  to  extort  concessions  from 
China.  According  to  the  statement 
ascribed  to  Count  Sergius  Witte  at  the 
Portsmouth  Conference,  the  Russian 
definition  or  interpretation  of  the  policy 
was  that  “no  rights  which  were  ac- 
quired lawfully  from  China  within  a 
limited  space  of  her  territory,  and  which 
did  not  exclude  a third  party  from  se- 
curing similar  advantages  from  her,  could 
be  considered  a monopoly,  or  a violation 
of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity.”  ° 
In  other  words,  with  Russia  the  Open 
Door  meant  neither  the  administrative 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of 
China  nor  equal  economic  opportunity 
for  all  nations,  but  freedom  to  acquire 
leaseholds,  “spheres  of  interest  or  influ- 
ence,” and  other  political  concessions  in 

® George  H.  Blakeslee,  China  and  the  Far 
East,  Clarke  University  Lectures,  1910,  p.  325. 
Count  Witte  was  reported  by  his  private  sec- 
retary at  the  Portsmouth  Conference  to  have 
said:  “I  have  nothing  against  the  so-called 
Open  Door  policy,  about  which  the  Americans 
make  such  a fuss.”  J.  J.  Korostovetz,  Pre- 
War  Diplomacy:  The  Russo-Japanese  Prob- 
lem, p.  12, 


8 


China,  so  long  as  they  “did  not  exclude  a 
third  party  from  securing  similiar  ad- 
vantages.” The  Open  Door  policy  as  thus 
understood  would  encourage  setting  up 
new  spheres  of  interest  or  influence  and 
would  eventually  lead  to  new  battles  for 
concessions.  For,  any  Power  could  ex- 
tort whatever  she  pleased  from  China, 
without  at  the  same  time  “excluding  a 
third  party  from  securing  similar  ad- 
vantages,” be  they  economic,  commercial, 
political,  or  territorial.  In  other  words, 
China  could  be  dismembered  provided  all 
the  Powers  could  have  a hand  in  the  par- 
tition ! This  is  the  Russian  understanding 
of  the  Open  Door  policy,  in  accordance 
with  which  the  Czarist  Government  had 
apparently  conducted  its  sinister  diplo- 
macy in  China. 

Tied  hard  and  fast  to  the  wheels  of 
Russian  diplomacy  and  equally  ambitious 
in  her  politico-economic  designs  in 
China,  France  cherished  no  greater  re- 
spect for  the  Open  Door  policy  than  did 
her  Czarist  ally.  More  polished  in  man- 
ner and  more  suave  in  language,  France, 
like  Russia,  has  created  for  herself  an 
unenviable  reputation,  which  would  dis- 
count her  professions  for  the  Open  Door 
at  hundred  per  cent.  Thus,  M.  Del- 
casse,  one  of  the  best  known  French 
Foreign  Ministers,  was  generous  in 
words  when  they  could  be  used  to 
allay  the  suspicions  of  the  diplomatic 
world  about  French  ambitions  in  China. 
France  did  not  desire,  he  said,  “the 
break-up  of  China,  which  is  perhaps 
spoken  of  without  reflection.”  She  was 
merely  “anxious  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  equilibrium  in  the  Far  East.”  ^ These 
are  brave  words,  uttered  at  the  time 
when  the  “Sick  Man”  of  the  Far  East 

“John  Bassett  Moore,  International  Law 
Digest,  Vol.  V,  pp.  482-3.  These  words  are 
taken  from  a speech  which  M.  Delcasse 
made  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  July  3, 
1900,  on  the  Chinese  situation, 

9 


was  proposed  for  dissection.  But,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  what  was  the  policy  of 
France  in  regard  to  China  then,  and  what 
has  it  been  since?  Words  do  not  always 
square  with  deeds,  as  Colonel  Roosevelt 
was  wont  to  say,  and  certainly  French 
ambitions  in  China  did  not  square  with 
the  objects  of  the  Open  Door  policy. 
The  junior  partner  in  the  Franco-Rus- 
sian  combination  had,  before  the  out- 
break of  the  European  War  in  1914,  a 
political  program  in  the  South  of  China, 
which  was  no  less  ambitious  than  that 
of  her  ally  in  the  North.  The  aims  and 
aspirations  of  France  in  Yunnan  and 
Kwangsi  conflicted  most  violently,  not 
only  with  the  interests  of  other  Powers, 
but  also  with  the  fundamental  concepts 
of  the  Open  Door.  “The  ambition  of 
France,  though  continuous  in  intention, 
is  spasmodic  and  incoherent  in  action, 
Its  motive  is  political  and  antagonistic, 
not  commercial  and  peaceful.  Com- 
merce is  merely  the  stalking  horse.”  ’ 
Indeed,  it  was  too  much  to  expect  that, 
being  bound  to  Russia  by  political  and 
financial  ties,  France  would  not  play  the 
game  hand  in  glove  with  her  diplomatic 
partner.  M.  Delcasse  admitted  this 
when  he  said  in  reply  to  a question 
which  Sir  E.  Monson,  British  Ambassa- 
dor at  Paris,  put  to  him : “Erom  the  out- 
set of  the  trouble  in  China  Erance  and 
Russia  had  gone  hand  in  hand,  and  it 
was  hardly  necessary,  therefore,  to  add 
that  Erance  approved  the  declaration  of 
policy  made  by  Russia,  and  adopted  it  as 
far  as  it  was  applicable  to  Erench  in- 
terests.” “ 

In  close  resemblance  to  the  attitude  of 
Russia  and  Erance  towards  the  Open 
Door  in  China  was  that  of  Germany.  The 
first  Power  to  initiate  the  struggle  for 

^ Archibald  R.  Colquhoun,  China  in  Trans- 
formation, p.  328. 

8 China,  No.  1,  1901,  No.  280. 

10 


territorial  leases  and  among  the  first 
to  engage  in  the  battle  for  concessions, 
Germany  had  little  or  no  claim  to  be  a 
worshipper  of  the  Open  Door  policy. 
Her  attitude  was  well  defined  by  Prince 
Billow,  when  he  said  in  a speech  in  the 
Reichstag:  “Mention  has  been  made  of 
the  partition  of  China.  Such  a partition 
will  not  be  brought  about  by  us  at  any 
rate.  All  that  we  have  done  is  to  provide 
that  come  what  may,  we  ourselves  shall 
not  go  empty-handed.  The  traveller  can- 
not decide  when  the  train  is  to  start, 
for  the  moment  when  the  train  is  to 
start  does  not  depend  upon  the  will  of 
the  passenger.  It  is  his  business  to  see 
that  he  does  not  miss  it.  The  devil  take 
the  hindmost.”  “ And  later  on  another 
occasion,  the  Chancellor  of  the  former 
German  Empire,  was  reported  to  have 
said,  with  his  usual  gaiety:  “We  do 
not  in  the  least  want  to  have  an  extra 
helping  of  the  China  pudding,  but  we 
ask  for  the  same  helping  which  the 
others  get.”  Now,  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that,  frank  as  were  these  official 
utterances  they  were  not  frank  enough 
to  admit  the  responsibility  which  was 
clearly  Germany’s.  It  was  the  seizure  by 
Germany  of  Kiao-chow  Bay  and  its  sur- 
rounding territories  that  set  the  tune  of 
foreign  aggressions  in  China.  Whether 
she  travelled  as  a “passenger”  or  as  a 
conductor,  she  was  the  very  first  to  get 
on  the  train,  and  let  “the  devil  take  the 
hindmost.”  And  although  she  did  not 
have  an  extra  helping  of  the  China 
pudding,  she  certainly  had  just  as 
much  as  the  others  had.  It  would  be  a 
travesty  of  fact  if  Germany  should 
choose  to  pose  as  the  champion  of  the 
Open  Door  policy,  and  her  sincerity  in 

“ Parliamentary  Debates,  April  29,  1898,  pp. 
1564-1565.  The  same  is  cited  by  Paul  S. 
Reinsch,  World  Politics,  p.  164. 

The  London  Times,  March  3,  1902. 

11 


the  matter  was  sorely  tested  when  she 
entered  into  the  so-called  Anglo-German 
Agreement  of  October  16,  1900,  which 
was  aimed  at  the  Russian  activities  in 
Manchuria  at  the  time.  Chancellor  Von 
Bulow  had  to  go  back  on  his  own  words, 
when  he  explained  to  the  Reichstag  that 
the  said  agreement  had  nothing  to  do 
with  Manchuria,  where  the  maintenance 
of  the  Open  Door  policy  was  of  no  in- 
terest to  Germany."  This  repudiation 
could  mean  only  that  the  Open  Door 
policy  would  be  maintained  in  those 
parts  of  China  where  Germany  had  spe- 
cial interest  and  where  the  maintenance 
of  the  policy  would  operate  to  her  bene- 
fit and  not  to  her  disadvantage. 

What  the  Open  Door  policy  has  meant 
to  Japan,  is  a question  to  which  no 
answer  has  ever  been  given.  It  is  perhaps 
due  to  the  complicated  relations  be- 
tween China  and  Japan  that  the  question 
is  not  so  easy  to  answer  as  it  is  to  ask. 
History  records,  however,  the  different 
international  agreements  which  Japan 
has  entered  into  with  the  Western  Pow- 
ers, either  for  the  altruistic  purpose  of 
maintaining  the  peace  in  the  Far  East,  or 
for  the  well  pronounced  and  well  adver- 
tised purpose  of  maintaining  the  Open 
Door  policy  and  the  territorial  integrity 
of  China!  The  Anglo- Japanese  Alli- 
ances, the  Franco-Japanese  convention, 
the  Russo-Japanese  treaties,  the  Root- 
Takahira  “agreement,”  and  lately  the 
Lansing-Ishii  “agreement,”  are  part  and 
parcel  of  the  paraphernalia  which  the 
Japanese  statesmen  and  diplomatists  have 
used  in  their  international  performances 
in  regard  to  the  maintenance  of  the  Open 
Door  policy  in  China.  Without  ex- 
amining into  the  intentions  and  motives 
that  were  behind  these  international 
agreements,  the  persistence  on  the  part 

“ K.  Asakawa,  The  Russo-Japanese  Conflict, 
pp.  156-161. 


12 


of  Japan  in  pledging  herself,  and  the 
other  contracting  parties  as  well,  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  Open  Door  policy  in 
China  appears  to  be  admirable  at  first 
flush.  But,  keeping  in  mind  the  Jap- 
anese conduct  in  Manchuria,  in  Fukien, 
and  in  Shantung,  and  remembering  in- 
deed the  whole  course  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  Japan  and  China  since  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  one  is  at  a loss  to 
say  whether  Japan  has  understood  the 
Open  Door  policy  rightly  or  wrongly. 
The  policy  which  Japan  has  pursued  in 
China  is  certainly  not  that  of  the  Open 
Door.  “While  paying  lip  service  and 
formal  homage  to  the  principle  of  the 
Open  Door  and  equal  opportunity,”  it 
was  observed  by  an  American  student  of 
international  politics,  “Japan  is  rapidly 
developing  a policy  of  her  own  in  re- 
spect to  China — a policy  with  which  she 
feels  that  we  have  no  right  to  inter- 
fere.” And  this  policy,  as  far  as  can 
be  made  out  in  the  light  of  Japan’s  con- 
duct in  China,  is  one  which  is  dia- 
metrically opposed  to  the  principle  of 
equal  economic  opportunity  for  all  na- 
tions. In  other  words,  with  Japan  the 
Open  Door  means  an  open  door  for  her- 
self. What  she  has  undertaken  to  main- 
tain in  China  in  so  many  international 
agreements  and  undertakings  is  a fic- 
tion, pure  and  simple.  No  one  knows 
better  than  her  own  statesmen  and 
diplomatists  that  it  is  contrary  to 
Japan’s  established  interests  and  im- 
perialistic designs,  either  to  carry  the 
principle  into  practice  herself  or  to  de- 
mand respect  for  the  principle  by  the 
other  Powers.  The  course  of  events  as 
recorded  in  the  history  of  Chino-Japan- 
ese  relations  of  the  last  two  decades 
furnishes  ample  proofs  of  this  fact. 

The  attitude  of  Great  Britain  is  more 

'“Amos  S.  Hershey,  Modern  Japan,  pp.  342- 
343. 


13 


interesting  but  less  definite.  Subject  to 
changes  and  reversals  owing  to  the 
whims  and  fancies  of  the  different  per- 
sons in  charge  of  the  Foreign  Office,  and 
balanced  by  considerations  of  her  inter- 
ests in  European  politics,  the  policy  of 
Great  Britain  as  concerns  China  is  one 
of  opportunism,  as  changeable  as  the 
September  sky.  In  one  instance,  we  see 
a Great  Britain  who  was  generous  in 
sharing  with  other  Powers  whatever 
commercial  and  economic  privileges  that 
she  might  get  in  China ; in  another  we 
see  a Great  Britain  who,  disregarding 
the  benefits  and  advantages  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  treatment,  was  eager  to 
claim  for  herself  concessions  from  which 
other  Powers  would  be  absolutely  ex- 
cluded. Protesting  that  her  objects  in 
China  were  commercial  and  not  terri- 
torial, and  holding  that  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  China  should  be  main- 
tained, Great  Britain  was  nevertheless 
a follower  of  the  doctrine  of  spheres 
of  interest  or  influence,  which  would  in 
the  very  nature  of  things  defeat  the  ob- 
ject that  she  had  in  view.  Determined 
as  she  apparently  was,  at  the  time  when 
the  international  scramble  menaced  Brit- 
ish interests  in  China,  to  preserve  intact 
the  rights  and  privileges  that  were  hers, 
she  was  nevertheless  unready  and  indis- 
posed to  do  anything  that  would  in  the 
least  hurt  the  feeling  of  aggressive  Rus- 
sia or  voracious  Germany.  If  we  should 
ask  whether  Great  Britain  favored  the 
continuance  of  the  old  status — that  which 
was  based  upon  the  most-favored-nation 
clauses  in  China’s  commercial  treaties, 
the  answer  would  be  in  the  affirmative, 
for  it  was  she  who  looked  upon  the  Tien- 
tsin Treaty  “as  a sort  of  heaven-sent 
document,  eternal  and  immutable,”  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  said  treaty  con- 
tained the  most  favored  nation  treatment 
for  Great  Britain  in  China;  if  we 


should  ask  whether  Great  Britain  fa- 
vored the  Open  Door  policy — the  policy 
which  seeks  to  maintain  the  independ- 
ence and  integrity  of  China  and  equal- 
ity of  economic  opportunity  for  all  na- 
tions, the  answer  would  be  also  in  the 
affirmative,  for  it  was  her  own  nationals 
and  her  own  diplomatic  representatives 
abroad  who  were  strongly  for  the  Open 
Door  policy,  the  maintenance  of  which 
would  be,  as  they  clearly  saw,  greatly 
beneficial  to  their  own  commercial  inter- 
ests in  China.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a 
diametrically  opposite  question  were 
raised  — whether  or  not  Great  Britain 
was  in  favor  of  the  regime  of  spheres 
of  interest  or  influence,  the  answer 
would  be  at  once  “yes”  and  “no.” 
Great  Britain,  to  be  accurate,  could  not 
be  said  to  be  in  favor  of  the  spheres  of 
interest  regime.  Her  most  distinguished 
statesmen  had,  one  after  another,  gone 
on  record  that  they,  and  the  Government 
they  represented,  were  strongly  opposed 
to  dividing  China  into  “water-tight  com- 
partments.” Yet  at  the  same  time,  the 
very  fact  that  Great  Britain  leased  Wei- 
hai-wei  for  as  long  a period  as  Russia 
would  hold  Port  Arthur,  and  that  she  ear- 
marked the  Yangtze  Valley  as  her  own 
sphere  of  interest,  showed  most  clearly 
that,  while  she  was  not  in  favor  of  the 
regime,  she  was  not  exactly  opposed  to  it. 
The  same  is  true  of  her  attitude  regard- 
ing the  maintenance  of  the  Open  Door 
policy.  Undoubtedly,  Great  Britain  was 
strongly  in  favor  of  the  Open  Door  if 
for  no  other  reason  than  that  the  policy 
would  operate  to  the  benefit  of  the  Brit- 
ish commercial  interests  in  China.  She 
was,  however,  always  ready  to  compro- 
mise with  it,  to  disregard  it,  and  some- 
times to  violate  it,  in  spirit  if  not  in  let- 
ter, either  to  suit  her  own  particular  in- 
terest in  China,  or  to  meet  political  and 
diplomatic  exigencies  which  often  con- 
15 


fronted  her  in  view  of  her  alliance  with 
the  most  designing  Power  of  the  Far 
East.  Indeed,  the  policy  of  Great  Britain 
in  China,  influenced  always  by  consider- 
ation of  her  interests  elsewhere  in  the 
world,  has  been,  at  least  for  the  last 
score  of  years,  most  uncertain  and 
most  changeable.  Coming  down  from 
the  lofty  pedestal  of  the  most  favored 
nation  treatment,  of  which  she  was  the 
chief  builder,  and  passing  through  the 
Open  Door,  on  whose  threshold  she 
lingered  awhile.  Great  Britain  finally 
arrived  at  the  position  where  stood 
Russia,  Germany,  Japan,  and  France 
more  than  twenty  years  ago,  and  where, 
with  the  exception  of  Germany  and 
Russia,  they  stand  today.  The  question 
may,  then,  be  legitimately  raised : What 
has  been  the  Chinese  policy  of  Great 
Britain  for  the  past  score  of  years 
and  what  is  it  today?  Or  has  Great 
Britain  ever  had  a well-defined  policy 
with  respect  to  China?  It  is  not  easy  to 
answer  either  of  these  questions,  al- 
though a correct  answer  to  each  will  go 
a long  way  to  clear  up  the  British  atti- 
tude on  the  Open  Door  policy. 

It  remains  now  but  to  consider  the 
attitude  of  the  United  States — the  only 
Power  whom  we  have  singled  out  as  a 
respecter  of  the  Open  Door  policy  in 
deeds  as  well  as  in  words.  Speaking 
very  briefly,  the  United  States,  as  far  as 
her  policy  towards  China  is  concerned, 
stands  very  high  in  the  opinion  of  the 
world,  and  what  is  more,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Chinese.  Ever  since  the  days 
when  Caleb  Cushing  was  sent  out  to  Can- 
ton as  the  first  American  Minister  to 
China,  the  relations  between  the  two 
countries  have  been  most  cordial ; and 
they  would  have  been  uniformly  so 
but  for  the  fact  that  the  difficulties 
arising  out  of  the  immigration  question 
gave  birth  to  a certain  amount  of  ill  feel- 
16 


mg  among  both  peoples.  While  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  say  whether  the  American  note 
of  September  6,  1899,  which  Secretary 
John  Hay  addressed  to  Japan  and  to  the 
European  Powers,  was  prompted  by  con- 
siderations of  American  commercial  in- 
terests in  China  or  by  anxieties  for  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  Chi- 
nese Empire,  it  is  always  easy  to  see  that 
the  United  States,  unlike  the  other  Pow- 
ers, has  never  cherished  any  ambition  or 
desire  for  leasing,  holding,  or  acquiring 
Chinese  territories.  “The  policy  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,”  it  was 
pointed  out  by  Secretary  Hay,  “is  to  seek 
a solution  which  may  bring  about  perma- 
nent safety  and  peace  to  China,  preserve 
Chinese  territorial  and  administrative 
entity,  protect  all  rights  guaranteed  to 
friendly  Powers  by  treaty  and  interna- 
tional law,  and  impartial  trade  with  all 
parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire.”'’  Erom 
this  policy,  which  was  in  its  essence  an- 
nounced by  Anson  Burlingame  in  1867, 
when  he  was  commissioned  by  the  Chi- 
nese Government  as  the  first  representa- 
tive of  China  to  the  Western  world,  the 
history  of  Chinese-American  relations  of 
close  to  a hundred  years  contains  not  a 
single  deviation.  The  United  States  may 
therefore  be  accepted  as  a zealous  cham- 
pion and  defender  of  the  Open  Door,  her 
attitude  towards  China  having  in  this  re- 
gard been  as  uniform  and  consistent  as 
that  of  Great  Britain  has  been  change- 
able. 

‘^U.  S.  For.  Rel.  1200,  p.  299. 


17 


CHAPTER  II 


The  Opening  Up  of  China 

ONE  of  the  most  interesting  chapters 
of  the  history  of  the  relations  be- 
tween East  and  West  is  the  “open- 
ing up”  of  China.  Being  the  oldest  coun- 
try existing  in  the  world,  boasting  as  she 
has  a right  to  do  so  of  a civilization 
that  long  antedates  the  Christian  era, 
and  occupying  437,000,000  square  miles 
of  territory,  nearly  one-third  of  the 
Asiatic  continent,  and  possessing  a 
wealth  of  natural  resources  that  is  prac- 
tically unsurpassed  and  a population  gen- 
erally estimated  at  one-fourth  of  that  of 
the  entire  world,  China  could  easily  have 
been  one  of  the  leading  Powers  of  to- 
day, if  she  had  not  confined  herself  for 
hundreds  of  years  in  political  and  eco- 
nomic seclusion  and  thus  cut  herself  off 
from  the  rest  of  the  family  of  nations. 
Without  taking  into  consideration 
China’s  early  intercourse  with  the  West,’ 
or  even  the  comparatively  recent  efforts 
in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  cen- 
turies of  some  of  the  Western  Powers  to 
establish  commercial  and  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  her,’’  it  must  be  said  that  she 
was  not  in  any  sense  “opened  up”  until 
1842  when,  because  of  the  Opium  War, 
British  cannon  battered  down  her  walls 
of  isolation  and  seclusion.  It  is  difficult 
to  say  whether  the  policy  of  non-inter- 
course, or  “closed  door”  policy,  which 
China  had  followed  for  hundreds  of 
years  had  really  worked  to  her  benefit  or 

1 Henri  Cordier,  Histoire  Generate  De  La  Chine  et 
Be  Ses  Relations  Avec  Les  Pays  Strangers  Depuis  Les 
Temps  Les  Plus  Anciens  Jusqu’a  La  Chute  Dc  La  Dy- 
nastic Mandchoue,  3 Vols. 

’ S.  W.  Williams,  The  Middle  Kingdom,  Vol. 
II,  Chapter  XXI,  pp.  406-462. 

18 


to  her  detriment.  It  is  difficult,  because 
we  are  not  at  all  sure  that,  in  view  of  the 
deplorable  conduct  of  the  Western  Pow- 
ers as  shown  especially  in  their  ava- 
ricious struggle  for  economic  and  polit- 
ical concessions  and  in  their  continuous 
fight  for  the  monopoly  of  the  Chinese 
trade  each  for  her  own  nationals,  China 
would  have  been  any  better  off  even  if 
she  should  have  been  “opened  up”  much 
earlier  than  she  actually  was.  We  must 
realize  that  China,  as  a nation,  had  been 
at  first  freely  open  to  foreign  intercourse, 
and  that  she  was  later  forced  to  resort 
to  seclusion  as  the  only  wise  alternative 
in  the  face  of  the  unsatisfactory  conduct’ 

® “Sporadic  diplomatic  missions  from  the 
nations  of  modern  Europe  began  about  A.  D. 
1500  and  continued  to  the  establishment  of 
permanent  relations.  The  French  first  ap- 
peared in  China  A.  D.  1506;  the  Portuguese 
followed  them  in  A.  D.  1516;  the  Spaniards 
in  A.  D.  1575;  the  Dutch  in  A.  D.  1624;  the 
Russians  in  A.  D.  1689,  and  the  British  in 
A.  D.  1793.  With  the  exception  of  the  Rus- 
sian and  British  embassies,  the  conduct  of 
all  these  messengers  of  amity,  good-will  and 
commercial  intercourse  was  such  as  befitted 
pirates  rather  than  peaceably  disposed  men, 
and  it  went  far  to  justify  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment in  its  policy  of  rigid  seclusion  from  all 
association  with  Europeans.”  Chester  Hol- 
combe, The  Real  Chinese  Question,  p.  179. 
This  opinion  was  supported  by  all  authori- 
ties on  the  history  of  early  intercourse  be- 
tween China  and  the  Western  Powers.  Even 
Sir  Robert  K.  Douglas,  a critical  writer  on 
China  and  the  Far  East,  had  to  admit  in  a 
still  stronger  language  that  the  conduct  of 
the  early  traders  in  China,  not  excepting  the 
British  and  the  Russians,  was  really  “in- 
famous.” “They  outraged  every  law  and  set 
the  feelings  of  the  people  (Chinese)  at  defi- 
ance. They  refused  to  submit  to  the  native 
authorities,  and  on  one  occasion  in  revenge 
for  one  of  their  number  having  been  cheated 
by  a Chinaman  they  sent  an  armed  force  into 
a neighboring  village  and  plundered  the  na- 
tives, carrying  off  a number  of  women  and 
young  girls.”  Robert  K.  Douglas,  Europe 
and  the  Far  East,  p.  11. 

As  to  the  general  attitude  of  defiance  on 
the  part  of  the  foreigners  in  China  towards 
Chinese  authorities.  Dr.  V.  K.  Wellington  Koo 
made  this  observation;  “A  want  of  regard  for 
Chinese  laws  characterized  the  foreigners 
who  went  to  China  in  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries.  They  were  either  ad- 
venturous or  desperate  characters,  and  with 
the  exception  of  a few  missionaries,  they 
were  animated  by  the  sole  desire  to  seek  for- 
tune in  a new  land.  It  mattered  little  what 
the  territorial  laws  required  and  what  they 

19 


of  the  early  European  traders,  for  the 
Government  of  which  she  was  in  lack 
of  an  adequate  system  of  law  and  of 
courts.  It  is,  therefore,  not  easy  to  say 
whether  the  “closed  door”  policy  had 
worked  to  her  benefit  or  to  her  detriment, 
although  we  are  on  the  fairly  safe  ground 
when  we  say  that  the  “closed  door”  pol- 
icy which  she  had  followed  for  hundreds 
of  years  saved  her  from  political  disin- 
tegration on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the 
other,  denied  her  all  the  possible  advant- 
ages of  contact  with  Western  civiliza- 
tion that  might,  as  in  the  case  of  Japan, 
contribute  much  towards  qualifying  her- 
self as  a full-fledged  member  of  the  fam- 
ily of  nations. 

Tlie  “opening  up”  of  China  has  been 
the  gradual  work  of  nearly  one  hundred 
years.  While  is  is  true  that  she  had 
maintained  early  intercourse  with  the 
West,  it  is  equally  true  that  that  inter- 
course was  neither  formal  nor  regular. 
The  visits  of  European  missionaries  to 
the  Chinese  capital  and  the  early  efforts 
of  the  Portuguese  and  the  Dutch  to  open 
up  trade  relations  with  China  brought 
about  nothing  but  a ripple,  which  did 
not  even  disturb  the  calm  waters  of 
Chinese  seclusion.  Even  the  attempts 
by  the  Czar  of  Russia,  the  King  of 
France,  and  the  King  of  England  to  es- 
tablish trade  and  diplomatic  relations 
with  China  by  the  despatch  of  special 
missions  and  envoys  to  the  Chinese  capi- 
tal in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries  absolutely  failed  to  accomplish 
their  cherished  purpose.  It  was  true  that 
in  1828,  owing  to  the  wreck  of  a French 
vessel  on  the  coast  of  Cochin-China  and 

prohibited;  they  came  on  a mission  to  re- 
plenish their  purses  and  were  prepared  to 
leave  as  soon  as  their  object  was  accom- 
plished; in  their  opinion,  it  would  have  been 
disloyal  to  themselves  to  allow  their  conduct 
to  be  shackled  by  laws  of  which  they  knew 
nothing,  and  about  which  they  did  not  care 
to  know  anything.” — V.  K.  W.  Koo,  The 
Status  of  Aliens  in  China,  p.  64. 

20 


the  subsequent  massacre  by  the  natives 
of  her  crew,  France,  by  dint  of  threat 
of  war,  succeeded  in  obtaining  from  the 
Chinese  Government  what  she  had  long 
desired — the  right  to  station  a consul  at 
Canton,  then  the  only  port  in  China 
where  foreign  trade  was  tolerated.  This 
concession  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese 
Government,  however,  did  not  mean  the 
opening  of  China  to  foreign  trade  or  in- 
tercourse. Nor  could  the  appointment 
of  a British  superintendent  of  trade  at 
Canton  in  183-1  be  taken  as  the  beginning 
of  the  new  commercial  era.^  China  was 
not  in  any  sense  “opened  up”  until  in 
1842  when,  by  virtue  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking  which  con- 
cluded the  Opium  War,  she  had  to  let 
down  the  bolt  across  her  doors  and  throw 
them  open  to  foreign  trade,  residence, 
and  intercourse.  It  is  unnecessary  here 
to  go  into  the  details  of  the  Opium  War, 
its  causes  and  its  effects,  about  which 
opinions  differ  very  widely.  It  is,  never- 
theless, pertinent  to  say  that  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,  inasmuch 
as  it  was  intended  to  serve  as  “the  char- 
ter of  commercial  rights  in  China,”  could 
not  fail  to  be  marked  as  the  first  step  in 
the  “opening  up”  of  China  to  Western 
intercourse.  According  to  the  terms  of 
the  Treaty China  had  to  cede  to  Eng- 
land the  Island  of  Hongkong  where  the 
British  subjects  could  “careen  and  refit 
their  ships  when  required  and  keep  stores 


^ It  should  be  remembered  that  in  1834  the 
Chinese  Charter  of  the  East  India  Company, 
which  permitted  it  to  carry  on  trade  with  the 
Hong  merchants  at  Canton,  expired.  The 
British  Government  decided  not  to  renew  it, 
but  to  place  the  British  trade  with  China  un- 
der the  care  of  a superintendent.  Lord  Na- 
pier was  accordingly  appointed  the  first  trade 
superintendent  in  Canton,  “to  protect  and 
foster  the  British  trade  there,  to  endeavour 
to  obtain  markets  in  other  ports  of  China, 
and  to  seek  an  opportunity  of  establishing 
direct  communication  with  the  Court  at 
Peking.” 

“ Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Third  Edition, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  7-12. 


21 


for  that  purpose to  pay  an  indemnity 
of  $31,000,000,  twelve  millions  to  meet 
the  cost  of  the  war,  three  millions  to  pay 
for  the  debt  due  by  Chinese  to  British 
merchants,  and  six  millians  to  compen- 
sate for  opium  seized  and  destroyed  by 
the  Chinese  authorities  at  Canton  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  war ; and  what  was 
still  more,  to  open  five  ports.  Canton," 
Amoy,  Foochow,  Ningpu,  and  Shanghai, 
to  British  trade  and  residence,  with  per- 
mission for  British  consuls  to  reside  at 
each.  The  treaty  was  signed  on  August 
39,  1843,  and  it  was  ratified  on  June  36, 
1843.  The  British  fleet  that  took  part 
in  the  war  was  immediately  withdrawn 
from  the  Chinese  waters  after  the  ratifi- 
cations were  exchanged.  The  first  Brit- 
ish consuls  appointed  to  the  ports  thus 
opened  to  foreign  trade  proceeded  to  take 
up  their  duties  without  delay,  and  in 
these  ports  the  land  required  for  the  set- 
tlements for  the  British  merchants  and 
for  the  erection  of  business  houses  and 
factories  was  given  them  by  the  Chinese 
Government.  It  was  in  this  manner  that 
the  British  gained  a legitimate  and  early 
foothold  in  China.  Before  the  conclusion 
of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,  British  mer- 
chants, like  the  merchants  of  other  na- 
tionalities, traded  in  Canton  by  suffer- 
ance. After  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty, 
they  carried  on  their  commerce  and  trade 
in  China  by  right.  Who  could  dispute, 
then,  that  the  Treaty  of  Nanking  was  the 
Magna  Charta  of  Great  Britain’s  com- 
mercial rights  in  China  ? Who  could 
deny  that  the  said  treaty  was  the  first 
instrument  which  served  to  open  up 
China  commercially  ? 

The  Opium  War  was,  however,  only 
the  first  frontal  attack  on  the  towering 
citadel  of  Chinese  seclusion.  According 

“Canton  was  not  opened  to  foreign  resi- 
dence until  April  6,  1849.  By  the  Convention 
of  April  4,  1846,  and  that  of  April  6,  1847,  the 
British  Government  consented  to  this  delay. 

22 


to  Dr.  W.  A.  P.  Martin,  the  well-known 
sinologue,  the  opening  of  China  was  “a 
drama  in  five  acts,”  of  which  the  Opium 
War  was  but  the  first.  Although  the  ex- 
act number  of  acts  was  immaterial,  the 
opening  of  China  was  indeed  nothing 
short  of  a “drama” — a political  drama, 
but  full  of  human  interest.  It  should  be 
observed,  however,  that  the  circum- 
stances in  which  China  was  forced  to 
throw  open  her  doors  could  not  be 
said  to  be  fortunate.  “With  nations 
no  less  than  individuals,  the  nature 
of  their  mutual  relations  will  depend 
largely  upon  the  circumstances  under 
which  their  acquaintance  began.”  “It 
was  most  unfortunate  that  the  use  of 
force  was  necessary  to  the  establishment 
of  foreign  relations  with  China?”’  The 
history  of  China’s  relations  with  the 
West  since  the  Opium  War  goes  far  to 
prove  the  general  truth  of  the  statement. 
No  one  would  deny  that  the  opening  of 
China  “was  not  a gradual  evolution  from 
within,”  but  that  “it  was  the  result  of  a 
series  of  collisions  between  the  conserva- 
tism of  the  extreme  Orient  and  the  pro- 
gressive spirit  of  the  Western  world.”  ® 
It  is  no  wonder,  therefore,  that  every 
act  in  the  drama  has  culminated  in  an 
international  armed  conflict. 

The  second  act  in  this  grand  drama, 
in  which  the  breaking  down  of  the  walls 
of  seclusion  is  pictured,  was  the  “Ar- 
row” War  of  1856  to  1860.  The  con- 
flict was  so  named  after  the  vessel,  the 


’ Chester  Holcombe,  The  Real  Chinese 
Q\iestion,  p.  251.  He  also  said:  “It  may  safe- 
ly be  claimed  that  to  knock  a man  down  s 
not  the  surest  path  to  his  high  esteem,  and 
that  to  kick  open  his  front  door  will  not 
guarantee  an  invitation  to  dinner."  “What 
the  Chinese  will  believe,  to  the  end  of  time 
to  have  been  the  real  motive  for  the  use  of 
force  renders  it  substantially  impossible  to 
hope  for  any  cordiality  upon  their  part,  in 
intercourse  or  relations  with  the  nations  of 
the  Western  world.” 

® W.  A.  P.  Martin,  The  Awakening  of  China, 
p.  149. 


23 


seizure  of  which  by  the  Chinese  authori- 
ties at  Canton  was  at  once  the  cause  and 
the  occasion  of  the  war.  The  “Arrow” 
was  a small  vessel,  commonly  called 
“lorcha,”  manned  and  owned  by  Chinese, 
and  engaged  in  illicit  traffic,  which  was 
the  ground  for  seizure  by  the  Chinese 
authorities.  As  the  vessel  was  registered 
in  England,  however,  and  as  she  was 
sailing  under  the  British  flag.  Sir  Harry 
Parkes,  then  British  Consul  at  Canton, 
demanded  her  release  and  insisted  that 
the  whole  matter  should  be  settled  at  the 
British  Consulate.  The  refusal  of  the 
Chinese  authorities  was  seized  upon  as 
the  casus  belli,  and  under  this  pretext 
Great  Britain  waged  another  war  upon 
China.  “The  matter  was  a serious  one 
and  immediate  reprisals  were  necessary,” 
observed  one  English  writer  on  the  sub- 
ject. “Sir  Michael  Seymour,  the  Adt- 
miral  on  the  station,  was  communicated 
with  and  promptly  entered  the  river  and 
captured  the  forts  without  loss.”  “The 
Canton  forts  were  taken  on  the  28th 
October,  1856.  The  Chinese  fleet  was 
destroyed  in  the  following  month,  and  the 
bombardment  of  the  city  commenced  im- 
mediately.” " 

The  war  so  easily  begun  could  not  be 
so  easily  ended.  The  Chinese  fleet  was 
destroyed,  the  Canton  forts  were  cap- 
tured, the  city  itself  was  taken,  and  even 
Commissioner  Yeh  was  sent  to  Calcutta 
a prisoner.  In  short,  the  Chinese  were 
badly  beaten,  but  they  were  still  able  to 
continue  the  struggle.  The  British 
forces,  now  supported  by  the  forces 
under  Baron  Gros,  the  Erench  Admiral, 
attacked  the  Taku  forts,  which  fell 
an  easy  prey.  Eor  two  years  the 
war  dragged  on,  in  which  the  diplo- 
matists and  the  Admirals  alternately  oc- 
cupied the  centre  of  the  stage.  Upon  the 

“Alexis  Krausse,  China  in  Decay,  pp.  128- 
129. 


24 


fall  of  the  Taku  forts,  Lord  Elgin  began 
negotiations  with  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, which  resulted  in  the  conclusion  on 
June  26,  1858,  of  the  well-known  Treaty 
of  Tien-tsin.  The  terms  of  the  treaty 
included,  among  other  things,  the  re- 
newal of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,  the  tol- 
eration of  Christianity  in  China,  the  pay- 
ment by  the  Chinese  Government  of  a 
war  indemnity,  the  revision  of  the  exist- 
ing tariff,  and  the  right  of  the  British 
subjects  to  travel  in  all  parts  of  China. 
The  most  important  articles  of  the  treaty, 
that  had  a vital  bearing  upon  the  opening 
of  China,  were  those  which  provided  for 
the  right  of  the  Contracting  Parties  for 
the  exchange  of  diplomatic  representa- 
tions, and  for  the  opening  of  five  more 
ports  to  foreign  trade  and  residence.  Ar- 
ticle XI  of  the  treaty  opened  Newchwang, 
Tangchow  (Chefoo),  Taiwan,  Swatow, 
and  Kiungchow  (Hainan)  to  foreign 
trade,  where  the  British  subjects  should 
“enjoy  the  same  privileges,  advantages, 
and  immunities  at  the  said  towns  and 
ports  as  they  enjoy  at  the  ports  already 
opened  to  trade,  including  the  right  of 
residence,  of  buying  and  renting  houses, 
of  leasing  land  therein,  and  of  building 
churches  and  hospitals  and  cemeteries.”  “ 
It  was  a matter  of  interest  that  among 
these  five  ports,  Tien-tsin,  the  most  im- 
portant port  of  entrance  in  North  China, 
where  the  treaty  was  drawn  up  and 
signed,  was  not  included.  According  to 
Dr.  W.  A.  P.  Martin,  who  served  as  in- 
terpreter to  the  Honorable  W.  B.  Reed, 
the  American  Minister,  and  who  enjoyed 
therefore,  the  best  of  opportunities  for 
observing  what  actually  went  on  behind 
the  scenes  in  the  negotiation  of  the 
treaty,  it  was  the  wish  of  Lord  Elgin, 
the  British  Minister,  that  Tien-Tsin 
should  not  be  thrown  open  to  foreign 

Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Srd  Ed.,  Vol.  I, 
p.  23. 

25 


commerce,  “because  in  that  case  it  would 
be  used  to  overawe  the  capital”  of 
China.” 

The  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Tien- 
tsin brought  about  only  a temporary  re- 
lief. The  war  was  destined  to  go  on  yet 
for  another  couple  of  years.  Early  in 
March,  1859,  Sir  Frederick  Bruce,  the 
British  representative  appointed  for  the 
purpose  of  exchanging  ratifications  of 
the  treaty,  was  denied  admission  to  the 
Chinese  capital,  and  his  passage  on  Pei- 
ho  River  was  blocked.  The  British  rep- 
resentative, insisting  that  the  exchange 
of  ratifications  must  take  place  in 
Peking,  appealed  to  Admiral  Hope  to 
force  the  entrance.  Thus  war  broke  out 
again,  but  this  time  it  proved  to  be  even 
worse  for  China.  Tung-chow  was  easily 
taken,  Peking  was  captured,  and  Em- 
peror Hienfung  fled  to  Jehol.  And  Ad- 
miral Hope,  “finding  it  impossible  to  pur- 
sue the  fugitive,”  but  “determined  on 
giving  the  Chinese  an  object  lesson  which 
they  would  not  be  likely  to  forget,”  gave 
the  memorable  order,”  on  October  18, 
1860,  for  the  destruction  of  the  beautiful 
Summer  Palace ! The  order  was  carried 
out  to  the  letter,  and  the  Summer  Palace 
was  accordingly  seized  and  set  on  fire. 
The  unsightly  ruin,  outside  of  the  West 
Gate  of  the  Chinese  capital,  is  an  irre- 
sistible reminder  today  of  the  way  in 
which  Great  Britain  and  France  forced 
open  China’s  door.  After  such  reverses, 
China  could  only  submit  and  the  rati- 
fication of  the  Treaty  of  Tien-tsin 
was  finally  exchanged  on  October  24, 
1860,  in  the  “Hall  of  Ceremonies,” 
between  Lord  Elgin  and  Admiral 
Hope  on  the  one  side,  and  Prince 
Kung  on  the  other.  And  on  the  same 
day,  a new  Convention  of  Peace  and 

“ W.  A.  P.  Martin,  The  Awakening  of  China, 
pp.  165-166. 

“Alexis  Krausse,  China  in  Decay,  p.  131. 

26 


Friendship  between  China  and  Great 
Britain  was  signed  at  Peking.  Among 
other  things,  it  provided  for  the  cession 
of  Kowloon,  which  was  formerly  held  by 
Great  Britain  on  a perpetual  lease,  and 
for  the  opening  of  Tien-tsin  to  foreign 
trade.  “It  is  agreed,”  the  fourth  Article 
of  the  Peking  Convention  reads,  “that 
on  the  day  on  which  this  Convention  is 
signed.  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  China  shall  open  the  port  of 
Tien-tsin  to  trade,  and  that  it  shall  be 
thereafter  competent  to  British  subjects 
to  reside  and  trade  there  under  same  con- 
ditions as  at  any  other  port  of  China  by 
treaty  open  to  trade.”  Thus  by  de- 
manding Tien-tsin  as  a treaty  port.  Lord 
Elgin  reversed  his  own  opinion  of  two 
years  before. 

With  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of 
Tien-tsin  the  stage  was  set  for  next  act 
in  the  drama,  the  actual  scene  of  which 
took  place,  not  in  any  of  the  treaty  ports 
where  the  foreigners  frequented,  but  in 
an  inland  city,  thousands  of  miles  from 
the  coast,  where  they  had  never  set  foot 
before.  The  usual  title  of  the  act  is 
“The  Murder  of  Margary the  place 
is  Manwyne  in  Yunnan  Province,  and 
the  date  is  February  21,  1875. 

The  commercial  rights  and  privileges 
secured  under  the  Treaties  of  Nanking 
and  Tien-tsin  gave  a great  stimulus  to 
foreign  intercourse  and  led  to  a consid- 
erable increase  both  in  the  number  of 
foreign  merchants  in  China  and  in  the 
volume  of  trade  which  they  carried  on. 
Canton,  Ningpu,  Amoy,  and  Foochow, 
four  of  the  ports  opened  under  the 
Treaty  of  Nanking  had  rapidly  devel- 
oped into  centres  of  considerable  foreign 
trade,  and  Shanghai,  which  remains  to- 
day the  most  important  treaty  port  in 
China  because  of  its  favorable  geo- 

“ Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  3rd  Ed.,  Vol. 
I,  p.  50. 


27 


graphical  location,  had  out-stripped  them 
all.  In  view  of  this  gradual  opening  up 
of  the  coast  provinces  to  foreign  inter- 
course, and  in  view  of  the  decidedly  bet- 
ter understanding  to  which  the  foreign 
traders  in  China  were  coming  with  the 
natives,  the  British  merchants,  who  were 
in  most  cases  commercial  pioneers  and 
frequently  more  enterprising  and  more 
ambitious  than  the  merchants  of  other 
nationalities,  turned  their  eyes  on  the 
rich  inland  provinces  hitherto  unex- 
ploited. As  far  back  as  1820,  British  au- 
thorities and  merchants  in  India  contem- 
plated the  opening  of  a direct  trade  route 
between  India  and  China  through  Burma 
and  the  back-door  of  Yunnan  Province. 
Different  attempts  were  made  for  this 
purpose,  but  none  led  to  anything  defi- 
nite. In  1874,  encouraged  by  the  rights 
of  the  British  subjects  to  travel  “to  all 
parts  of  the  interior,”  as  provided  for  in 
the  Treaty  of  Tien-tsin,  the  British  au- 
thorities in  India,  with  the  cordial  sup- 
port of  the  merchants  there  and  in  China, 
decided  to  send  an  exploring  expedition 
to  make  surveys  and  to  report  on  the 
prospects  of  the  opening  up  the  desired 
trade  route  from  India  and  Burma  into 
the  Chinese  province  of  Yunnan.  Sir 
Thomas  Wade,  then  British  Minister  in 
Peking,  readily  obtained  from  the  Chi- 
nese Government  the  permission  for  this 
exploring  exepdition  in  accordance  with 
Article  IX  of  the  Tien-tsin  Treaty. 
“These  preliminaries  being  arranged,  it 
was  decided  that  in  order  to  assure  the 
success  of  the  expedition,  it  would  be 
well  for  some  person  acquainted  with  the 
country  to  be  traversed,  as  well  as  with 
the  people  and  the  language,  to  accom- 
pany the  expedition.”  “ Accordingly, 
Mr.  Augustus  Raymond  Margary,  a 
member  of  the  British  Legation  in 

“Alexis  Krausse,  op.  cit.,  p.  154. 

28 


Peking  and  a master  of  the  Chinese  lan- 
guage, was  instructed  to  proceed  to  meet 
the  exploring  party  on  the  Yunnan  bor- 
der (on  the  Burmese  side)  and  to  con- 
duct the  party  back  to  the  Yunnan 
province.  Mr.  Margary  was  very  well 
received  by  the  local  authorities  and  was 
given  every  consideration  and  courtesy 
on  his  outward  journey.  On  January  16, 
1876,  he  safely  reached  Bhamo,  where  he 
found  the  Indian  expeditionary  party 
awaiting  him.  When  he  was  about 
to  conduct  the  party  into  China,  choosing 
the  route  that  leads  from  Bhamo  to  Man- 
wyne  in  Yunnan,  he  was  warned  of  im- 
pending trouble  and  strongly  urged  to 
delay  his  advance.  It  was  said  that 
the  Kakyen  tribe,  which  inhabited  the 
mountainous  regions  on  the  borderland, 
and  over  which  the  power  of  the  local 
Chinese  officials  was  meagre,  was  deter- 
mined to  prevent  the  passage  of.  the  ex- 
pedition. Unconvinced  of  the  seriousness 
of  the  danger  confronting  him  and  his 
party,  but  emboldened  by  the  fact  that  he 
had,  on  his  outward  journey,  come  safely 
through  the  Kakyen  Hills,  unarmed  and 
almost  unattended,  Margary  volunteered 
to  go  in  advance  of  the  expedition  to 
ascertain  the  truth  of  the  report.  With 
a few  attendants  he  started  on  what 
proved  to  be  his  fatal  mission  on  the  19th 
of  February,  and  two  days  later  his  life 
was  taken  by  the  hill-men,  who,  mustered 
in  force,  threatened  to  attack  the  entire 
party  and  forced  its  final  retreat. 

The  death  of  Margary  was,  indeed,  a 
matter  of  serious  international  import. 
While  it  was  undoubtedly  true  that  over 
the  savage  tribes  in  the  mountains  on  the 
Yunnan  borderland  the  local  Chinese  au- 
thorities had  little  or  no  control,  the  fact 
that  Margary  was  a member  of  the  Brit- 
ish Legation  in  Peking,  that  he  was  given 
a special  permission  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment for  his  trip,  and  that  he  was 
29 


supposedly  traveling  under  Chinese  pro- 
tection, made  it  difficult  for  the  Peking 
Government  to  deny  responsibility  for 
the  crime.  Had  Great  Britain  so  chosen, 
the  murder  might  have  been  made  a 
legitimate  casus  belli.  Sir  Thomas  Wade, 
while  prepared  to  use  the  occasion  to 
great  advantage,  did  not  resort  to  force 
immediately  for  a settlement.  At  first, 
he  suggested  a joint  commission  for  in- 
vestigation. This  failed  to  accomplish 
its  purpose.  Being  unable  to  obtain  sat- 
isfaction from  the  Chinese  Government, 
the  British  Minister  left  the  capital  as  a 
preliminary  step  to  the  cessation  of  diplo- 
matic relations  between  China  and  Great 
Britain.  The  British  fleet  in  Eastern 
waters  was  communicated  with,  and 
steamed  into  the  Gulf  of  Pechili. 
This  demonstration,  which  might  or 
might  not  mean  a threat  of  war,  but  the 
Chinese  Government  immediately  sent 
Sir  Robert  Hart  of  the  Chinese  Maritime 
Customs  Service  to  Shanghai  to  induce 
him  to  return.  This  Sir  Thomas  Wade 
refused  to  do,  but  he  agreed  to  meet  at 
Chefoo  any  accredited  representative  of 
the  Chinese  Government  to  discuss  the 
terms  of  a settlement.  Accordingly,  Li 
Hung-chang  was  appointed  to  conduct 
the  necessary  negotiations,  and  a satis- 
factory arrangement  was  soon  reached. 
It  was  embodied  in  the  Chefoo  Conven- 
tion of  September  13,  1876. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  remained  un- 
ratified for  about  ten  years  (the  ratifica- 
tions were  exchanged  at  London,  May  6, 
1886),  the  Chefoo  Convention,  in  view  of 
its  numerous  provisions  that  had  a good 
deal  to  do  with  the  rights  and  privileges 
of  the  foreigners  in  China,  undoubtedly 
constituted  another  land-mark  in  the  his- 
tory of  her  opening  up.  The  Conven- 
tion included  among  its  provisions  mone- 
tary compensation  (200,000  taels)  to  the 
Margary  family ; the  opening  of  the  fron- 
30 


tier  trade  between  Burma  and  Yunnan; 
the  despatch  of  a Chinese  embassy  to 
London  (which  turned  out  to  be  a per- 
manent one)  ; the  drawing  up  of  a “code 
of  etiquette”  to  be  observed  in  official 
intercourse  at  Peking,  and  of  new  rules 
of  procedure  for  the  British  courts  in 
China ; the  opening  of  I-chang,  Wu-hu, 
Wen-chow,  and  Peihai  (Pakhoi  in 
Kwangtung)  as  treaty  ports  and  consular 
stations;  and  the  opening  of  Tatung, 
Anking,  Hukow,  Wu-suh,  Luchikou, 
and  Sha-shih  as  ports  of  call/'  The  Che- 
foo  Convention  also  provided  for  the 
right  of  residence  of  British  officers  at 
Chungking  to  watch  the  conditions  of 
British  trade  in  the  Szechuan  province, 
although  at  the  same  place  British  mer- 
chants would  not  be  permitted  to  reside 
or  to  open  establishments  and  ware- 
houses, so  long  as  no  steamers  could  have 
access  to  the  port.  The  Convention  also 
authorized  the  despatch  of  a British  mis- 
sion of  exploration  to  Thibet  through  a 
route  to  be  decided  upon  later.  Aside 
from  these  main  provisions,  there  were  a 
few  other  minor  concessions,  which 
would  serve  to  improve  the  trade  rela- 
tions between  China  and  the  treaty  Pow- 
16 

ers. 

Without  question,  the  settlement  of  the 
Margary  affair  was  a triumph  of  peace. 
In  view  of  the  large  number  of  conces- 
sions that  the  Chinese  Government  made 
in  the  Convention  and  that  meant  much 
in  the  opening  up  of  China,  commercially 
and  politically,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  re- 


Ports  of  call  are  different  from  treaty 
ports.  Ports  of  call  are  places  of  trade  in  the 
interior,  where,  as  they  are  not  treaty  ports, 
foreign  merchants  are  not  legally  authorized 
to  open  business  houses.  While  foreign 
steamers  are  allowed  to  touch  “the  ports  of 
call”  for  the  purpose  of  landing  or  shipping 
passengers  or  goods,  this  must  be  done  “in 
all  instances  by  means  of  native  boats  only, 
and  subject  to  the  regulations  in  force  affect- 
ing the  native  trade.” 

For  the  details  of  the  Convention,  see 
Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  pp.  73-80. 

31 


dress  by  peaceful  means  of  international 
grievances  is  by  no  means  less  fruitful  in 
salutary  results  than  that  by  force,  to 
which  the  Powers,  in  their  dealings  with 
China  in  the  past,  were  ever  ready  to 
resort.  The  Margary  incident,  fortu- 
nately, was  not  made  an  excuse  for  war ; 
but  even  if  war  should  have  been  waged 
against  China  once  again,  the  settlement 
could  not  have  been  more  satisfactory, 
and  the  results  might  not  have  been  quite 
so  substantial. 

While  Great  Britain  was  thus  having 
difficulties  with  the  Chinese  Government 
owing  to  the  killing  of  Margary,  which 
was  the  net  result  of  the  British  attempt 
to  open  up  a trade  route  from  India  to 
Yunnan,  France  was  essaying  somewhat 
the  same  scheme  at  almost  the  same  time 
and  in  almost  the  same  direction.  In 
1862,  France  acquired  the  province  of 
Saigon  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mekong 
River,  which  was  then  popularly  taken  as 
a highway  into  China  Proper.  Two 
years  later,  the  whole  kingdom  of  An- 
nam  was  made  virtually  a protectorate 
of  France.  When  it  was  discovered  that 
the  Mekong  River  was  not  navigable  and 
therefore  without  value  as  a highway  into 
China  Proper,  the  French  were  disap- 
pointed, but  not  daunted.  They  found 
another  stream,  the  so-called  Red  River, 
which  flowed  across  the  Chinese  border 
into  Yunnan  and  was,  therefore,  deemed 
quite  as  valuable  for  the  purpose  of  ex- 
tending the  French  trade  into  the  interior 
of  China.  Eager  to  use  this  newly  dis- 
covered stream  as  a high  road  to  the 
wealthy  districts  of  interior  China  the 
French,  in  1874,  entered  into  a new 
treaty  with  the  Court  of  Hue,  annexing 
the  kingdom  of  Annam.  But  the  French 
had  omitted  one  important  factor  from 
their  calculations.  They  made  no  allow- 
ance for  the  fact  that  Annam,  through 
which  they  were  seeking  a direct  route 
32 


of  trade  to  the  interior  of  Yunnan 
province,  had  been  for  centuries  a de- 
pendency of  China.  It  was,  therefore, 
perfectly  natural  that  the  annexation  was 
viewed  by  China  with  great  displeasure. 
China  protested,  but  in  vain.  In  1881, 
Marquis  Tseng,  Chinese  Ambassador  in 
Paris,  declared  formally  that  the  Chinese 
Government  repudiated  the  treaty  of  Hue 
of  1874.  This  repudiation  France  re- 
fused to  acknowledge.  Curiously  enough, 
in  1882,  Annam  declared  war  on  France. 
In  the  year  following,  defeated  by  the 
French,  she  had  no  choice  but  to  “recog- 
nize and  accept  the  protectorate  of 
France.”  War  between  China  and 
France  was  now  within  measureable  dis- 
tance. And  it  was  truly  said  that  “if  the 
aggrieved  party  had  been  any  other 
country  but  China,  war  must  have  fol- 
lowed. But  China  was  not  prepared  for 
war ; and  verbal  protests  were  the  only 
overt  measures  which  she  was  prepared 
to  adopt.”  ” On  May  11,  1884,  the  so- 
called  Fournier  Convention  was  conclud- 
ed at  Tien-tsin  between  Li  Hung-chang 
and  Captain  Fournier,  Commander  of  a 
French  man-of-war,  whereby  China  was 
to  withdraw  her  garrison  from  Tonking 
and  to  respect  treaties  between  France 
and  Annam,  while  France  was  to  respect 
and  to  protect  Chinese  frontiers  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Tonking. 

Although  intended  to  avert  an  armed 
conflict  between  China  and  France,  this 
preliminary  convention  proved  to  be  but  a 
step  towards  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco- 
Chinese  War.  Misunderstandings  and 
difficulties  soon  arose  in  regard  to  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Chinese  garrison  from 
Tonking,  for  which  no  date  was  specified 
in  the  Fournier  Convention.  The  French 
forces  advancing  to  take  possession  of  the 
city  soon  came  to  blows  with  the  Chinese. 

” Robert  K.  Douglas,  Europe  and  the  Far 
East,  p.  227. 


33 


France  protested  against  what  she 
claimed  was  an  infringement  by  China 
of  the  Fournier  Convention,  while  the 
Chinese  Government  was  equally  indig- 
nant because  the  French  had  apparently 
broken  the  treaty  by  attacking  the  Chi- 
nese garrison  at  Tonking.  War  broke 
out,  in  the  course  of  which  it  was  China’s 
usual  fate  to  suffer  severe  reverses.  The 
Chinese  fleet  was  seized  in  the  Min 
River,  Foochow  was  captured,  the  ar- 
senal there  was  destroyed,  Kelung  was 
taken,  and  Formosa  was  blockaded.  At 
length,  again  through  the  good  offices 
of  Sir  Robert  Hart,  preliminary  arrange- 
ments for  peace  were  agreed  upon  at 
Peking  on  April  6,  1885.  The  definitive 
treaty  of  peace  was  signed  at  Tien-tsin 
on  the  9th  of  June  following.  It  was 
agreed,  among  other  things,  that  China 
was  to  recognize  all  the  treaties  con- 
cluded between  France  and  Annam,  that 
China  and  France,  within  six  months 
after  the  signature  of  the  treaty,  were  to 
appoint  commissioners  to  delimit  the 
Chinese-Annamese  frontier,  and  that 
China  was  to  give  permission  for  trade 
to  pass  the  frontier,  either  through 
Mengtze  in  Yunnan  or  through  Lung- 
chow  in  Kwangsi,  where  customs  sta- 
tions were  to  be  established  by  China  and 
consular  agents  were  to  be  appointed  by 
France.  Aside  from  these  concessions, 
France  was  also  given  the  right  to  con- 
struct railways  on  the  Yunnan  border.’® 
Other  commercial  privileges  were  pro- 
vided for  in  the  two  additional  treaties 
between  China  and  France,  one  signed 
at  Tien-tsin,  April  25,  1886,  and  the 
other  at  Peking,  June  26,  1887,  in  which 
questions  regarding  transit  dues,  pass- 
ports, opium  traffic,  the  most  favored  na- 
tion treatment,  and  the  opening  of  Lung- 

For  a full  account  of  the  War  and  the  negotia- 
tions, see  Henri  Cordier,  Histoire  des  Relations  de  la 
Chine  avec  Us  Puissances  Oceidentales,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
242-575. 


34 


chow,  Mengtze,  and  Manhao  to  foreign 
commerce  were  settled. 

Judged  by  its  results,  the  Franco-Chi- 
nese  War  of  1884-1885  contributed  very 
little  towards  the  eventual  opening  of 
China.  The  war  could  not  be  considered 
as  an  important  act  in  the  drama  that 
was  rapidly  unfolding  before  us.  The 
terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  registered 
nothing  but  the  status  quo  ante  helium, 
which,  in  fact,  was  already  recognized  by 
China  in  the  Fournier  Convention.  What- 
ever other  privileges  and  rights,  which 
France  obtained  and  which  served  to 
open  up  China  still  further,  were  pro- 
vided for  in  the  two  additional  com- 
mercial treaties,  which,  strictly  speaking, 
were  not  the  direct  results  of  the  war. 

Almost  ten  years  had  elapsed  before 
the  curtain  was  raised  on  the  fifth  act 
in  the  drama.  This  time  it  was  Japan 
who  occupied  the  centre  of  the  stage.  The 
Chino-Japanese  War  broke  out  in  1894 
as  a result  of  serious  misunderstandings 
and  rival  claims  over  Korea  between  the 
two  countries.  Owing  to  her  geographical 
position,  “the  Land  of  Morning  Calm” 
had  been  for  ages  the  arena  of  conflict 
between  her  ambitious  neighbors.  Strict- 
ly speaking,  Korea  was  a Chinese  de- 
pendency— a status  which  she  had  oc- 
cupied for  hundreds  of  years,  and  which 
Korea  herself  had  acknowledged.  In 
1876,  however,  Japan  recognized  the  in- 
dependence of  Korea,  and  having  rec- 
ognized the  independence,  Japan  claimed 
to  have  an  equal  voice  in  Korean 
affairs.  In  1883,  there  was  a serious 
outbreak  against  the  Japanese  in  Seoul, 
including  the  Japanese  Legation  staff. 
The  riot  was  so  serious  that  China,  as 
the  suzerain  Power,  had  to  despatch 
forces  to  the  scene  in  order  to  restore 
order  and  maintain  peace.  At  the  same 
time,  Japan  also  despatched  troops  to 
Seoul  to  demand  reparation — indeed,  a 
35 


novel  procedure  of  dealing  with  a coun- 
try whose  independence  Japan  had  pur- 
posely recognized.  Thus  the  armies  of 
the  two  countries  were,  for  the  first  time, 
brought  face  to  face  under  the  walls  of 
the  Korean  capital.  In  December,  1884, 
another  insurrection  broke  out  against 
the  Japanese  in  Seoul,  who,  because  of 
their  sinister  efforts  to  secure  a pre- 
dominating position  in  the  kingdom,  were 
none  too  popular  with  the  natives.  China, 
as  the  suzerain  Power,  again  rushed  her 
forces  to  the  scene,  upon  the  appeal  of 
the  Korean  Government.  On  the  other 
hand,  acting  as  she  did  before,  Japan 
sent  another  expeditionary  force  to 
Seoul,  with  the  purpose  of  remaining 
there  indefinitely.  Thus,  the  armies  of 
the  two  countries,  each  claiming  control 
in  Korean  affairs,  were  once  again 
brought  face  to  face  in  the  Korean  capi- 
tal. The  situation  was  critical,  for  the 
two  countries  found  themselves  right  on 
the  brink  of  war.  But  war  was  averted 
at  the  last  moment  by  the  conclusion  on 
April  18,  1885,  of  the  Treaty  of  Tien- 
tsin, which,  as  a modus  vivendi,  provided, 
among  other  things : “In  case  of  any  dis- 
turbance of  a grave  nature  occurring  in 
Korea,  which  might  necessitate  the  re- 
spective countries  or  either  of  them  to 
send  troops  to  Korea,  it  is  hereby  under- 
stood that  they  shall  give,  each  to  the 
other,  previous  notice  in  writing  of  their 
intention  so  to  do,  and  that  after  the 
matter  is  settled  they  shall  withdraw  their 
troops  and  not  further  station  them 
there.” 

Now,  it  has  been  asserted  again  and 
again  that  it  was  a breach  of  this  under- 
standing by  the  Chinese  Government  in 
the  suppression  of  the  Tonghak  revolt  in 
Korea  in  1894,  that  served  as  the  imme- 
diate cause  of  the  outbreak  of  the  Chino- 


**Hertslet’a  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  pp.  361- 
362. 

36 


Japanese  War.  Never  was  an  assertion 
so  misleading  and  so  much  contradicted 
by  the  known  facts.  The  truth  is  that 
when  the  Korean  Government  failed  to 
suppress  the  Tonghak  revolt,  the  King, 
in  accordance  with  the  established  prac- 
tice, appealed  to  China,  the  suzerain 
Power,  for  help.  In  despatching  Chi- 
nese troops  to  Seoul,  due  notice  of  the 
fact  was  sent  to  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, which,  after  giving  a correspond- 
ing notice  to  China,  despatched  a corps 
d’armee  to  Korea  in  all  haste.'"  It  was 
frankly  admitted  that  “in  having  recou’'se 
to  military  aid,  China’s  nominal  purpose 
was  to  quell  the  Tonghak  insurrection, 
and  Japan’s  motive  was  to  obtain  a posi- 
tion such  as  would  strengthen  her  demand 
for  drastic  treatment  of  Korea’s  mal- 
ady.” “ For  this  reason,  therefore,  Japan 
continued  to  keep  her  forces  in  the  vicin- 
ity of  Seoul,  and  refused  to  withdraw 
them,  although  the  Tonghak  revolt,  for  the 
suppression  of  which  the  troops  of  both 
countries  were  sent,  had  died  of  inani- 
tion. The  Chinese  Government  expressed 
its  willingness  to  withdraw  concurrently 
with  the  Japanese,  but  the  latter  abso- 
lutely declined  to  do  so  until  the  Ko- 
rean Government  should  have  adopted 
such  drastic  reforms  as  Japan  desired. 
Greatly  alarmed  lest  his  country  should 
become  the  theatre  of  war  between  China 
and  Japan,  the  King  of  Korea  solicited 
the  help  of  the  diplomatic  representatives 
of  the  other  foreign  Powers  in  Seoul. 
In  response  to  the  King’s  request,  the 
foreign  diplomats  submitted  to  both 
China  and  Japan  the  proposal  for  a si- 

Despatches  between  the  Chinese  and  Jap- 
anese Governments  on  the  Korean  affair  be- 
fore the  commencement  of  hostilities  were 
laid  by  Count  Ito  before  the  House  of  Peers 
on  the  19th  of  October,  and  were  given  in  the 
Japan  Mail  of  the  22nd  of  October,  1894. 
The  same  can  also  be  found  in  Vladimir,  The 
China-Japan  War,  Appendix  B,  pp.  338-348. 

Captain  Brinkley  and  Baron  Kikuchi,  A 
History  of  the  Japanese  People,  p.  700. 

37 


multaneous  withdrawal  of  the  Japanese 
and  Chinese  troops.  The  Japanese  de- 
clined the  proposal.  Being  now  satisfied 
that  Japan  was  actually  contemplating 
war,  the  King  of  Korea,  in  his  desperate 
strait,  appealed  to  the  United  States  to 
intervene  in  favor  of  peace.  The  Chi- 
nese Government  also  urged  the  United 
States  to  lead  the  way  and  to  unite  the 
European  Powers  in  a joint  request  to 
Japan  to  withdraw  her  military  forces 
in  Korea  to  save  any  armed  conflict.  To 
all  these  representations,  however,  the 
Japanese  Government  remained  impervi- 
ous. Under  these  circumstances,  China 
had  no  choice  but  to  send  reinforcements 
to  Korea  to  protect  her  own  position 
there.  On  April  25,  1894,  the  transport 
Kowshing  with  some  twelve  hundred 
Chinese  soldiers  on  board  was  fired  on, 
and  before  anything  could  be  done  to 
save  the  lives  aboard,  the  vessel  went 
down  practically  with  all  her  crew  and 
passengers.  This  act  precipitated  hostili- 
ties. On  August  1,  1894,  war  was  de- 
clared by  both  countries.'" 

It  may  also  be  said,  in  passing,  that 
there  was  another  cause  for  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  which  generally  escapes  the 
attention  of  the  students  of  Far  Eastern 
politics : the  desire  of  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment to  avert  a constitutional  crisis  at 
home  by  resorting  to  an  armed  conflict 
with  China.  Ever  since  the  Japanese 
Constitution  came  into  operation  in  1890, 
there  had  been  continuous  collision  be- 
tween the  parliament  and  the  executive. 
Within  a short  span  of  four  years,  three 
parliaments  were  “elected”  and  all  of 
them  were  prematurely  dissolved.  In 
the  beginning  of  the  month  of  July, 
1894,  when  the  Korean  situation  became 
threatening,  Japan  was  on  the  eve  of  an- 

“ U.  S.  For.  Rel.  1894,  Appendix  I,  pp.  23-39. 
For  a concise  account  of  the  efforts  of  medi- 
ation, see  John  W.  Foster,  American  Diplo- 
macy in  the  Orient,  pp.  332-337. 

38 


other  parliamentary  election.  Count  Ito, 
the  veteran  statesman  of  Japan,  and  then 
Minister  President  of  the  country,  de- 
cided to  play  a trump  card,  “the  strong- 
est that  could  possibly  be  played.” 
“There  is  little  doubt  that  for  some  time 
he  had  looked  to  a war  with  China  as  a 
possible  solution  for  the  Japanese  con- 
stitutional difificulty,  for  Ito  is  a man  who 
sees  a long  way  ahead,  and  knows  the 
Chinese,  as  well  as  his  own  countrymen, 
thoroughly.  The  strength  or  rather  the 
weakness  of  the  Middle  Kingdom,  had 
doubtless  long  before  been  accurately 
gauged  by  the  astute  and  penetrating 
Japanese  Minister  President.”  Thus, 
we  are  told,  by  July,  1894,  his  mind  was 
fully  made  up  on  two  points  : “In  the  first 
place,  he  must  have  been  quite  persuaded 
that  a successful  war  with  China  would 
quell  the  domestic  ferment  in  Japan, 
even  as  Neptune  quelled  the  waves  with 
his  quos  ego;  while  about  the  success  of  a 
war  with  China  he  could  have  been  in 
no  possible  doubt.”  “ It  was  quite  pos- 
sible that  owing  to  this  determination  on 
the  part  of  Count  Ito  to  solve  the  con- 
stitutional question  at  home  by  waging  a 
successful  war  abroad,  that  the  Japanese 
Government  persistently  refuse!  to  with- 
draw Japanese  troops  from  Korea. 

With  the  details  of  the  operations  of 
the  conflict  we  are  not  concerned  here. 
It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  war  was 
another  demonstration  of  the  absolute 
weakness  of  China,  for,  within  a few 
months  after  the  commencement  of  hos- 
tilities, the  Chinese  fleet  was  wiped  out, 
Port  Arthur  was  captured,  Wei-hai-wei 
was  taken,  Japanese  troops  practically 
overran  South  Manchuria,  and  Peking 
itself  was  in  danger.  This  series  of  dis- 
asters induced  the  Peking  Government 

“ The  Japanese  Constitutional  Crisis  and 
the  War,  The  Contemporarv  Review,  October, 
1895,  pp.  467-476. 


89 


to  make  overtures  for  peace.  The  first 
two  missions,  one  headed  by  Mr.  De- 
tring  of  the  Chinese  Customs  Service  and 
another  by  Chang  In-hoon,  proved  all 
futile,  as  neither  of  these  envoys  was 
given  plenipotentiary  powers.  Finally, 
Li  Hung-chang  was  appointed  to  pro- 
ceed to  Shimonoseki  to  negotiate  peace, 
which  was  concluded  on  April  17,  1895. 
By  the  terms  of  the  Treay  of  Peace, 
China  was  to  recognize  the  independence 
of  Korea,  to  cede  to  Japan  the  Liaotung 
peninsula,  Formosa,  and  the  Pescadores, 
to  pay  an  indemnity  of  200,000,000  taels, 
and  to  open  Shashih,  Chungking,  Soo- 
chow,  and  Hangchow  to  the  trade  and 
residence,  industries  and  manufactures 
of  Japanese  subjects,  “under  the  same 
conditions,  and  with  the  same  privileges 
and  facilities  as  exist  at  the  present  open 
cities,  towns,  and  ports  of  China.”  It 
was  also  provided  that  the  right  of  steam 
navigation  on  the  Yangtze  River,  on 
Woosung  River  and  on  the  canal  was  to 
be  extended  to  vessels  under  the  Japanese 
flag.  The  ratifications  of  the  Treaty 
were  exchanged  at  Chefoo,  May  8,  1895, 
but  owing  to  the  representations  of  Rus- 
sia, Germany,  and  France,  one  important 
modification  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty 
was  made.  In  place  of  the  cession  of  the 
Liaotung  peninsula,  an  additional  in- 
demnity of  20,000,000  taels  was  to  be 
paid  by  China.  This  change  was  agreed 
upon  by  both  parties. 

Here  we  have  the  story  of  the  opening 
up  of  China,  which  has  been  said  to  be 
“a  drama  in  five  acts.”  To  this  drama  an 
epilogue  has  to  be  added  in  order  to  make 
it  complete.  The  outbreak  of  the  Boxer 
Revolt  in  1899,  which  was  the  logical  se- 
quence of  the  rapid  unfolding  of  events 
of  the  past  sixty  years,  furnished  the 
necessary  theme.  Without  going  into 
the  details  of  the  event,  it  is  sufficient  to 
say  that  the  revolt  was  a strong  reaction 
40 


against  the  foreign  influences  and  aggres- 
sions, which  were  fast  undermining  the 
political,  social,  and  religious  structure  of 
the  country.  It  was  an  organized  move- 
ment in  connection  with  “the  Society  of 
the  Boxers,”  which  first  arose  in  the 
Shantung  province  and  rapidly  spread  to 
the  other  provinces  in  the  north.  Its 
motive  was  a patriotic  one,''^  as  its 
avowed  purpose  was  to  defend  China 
from  foreign  aggressions.  The  move- 

The  best  interpretation  of  the  Boxer 
movement  was  given  by  an  American  writer, 
who,  for  many  years,  served  first  as  Inter- 
preter and  then  as  Secretary  of  the  American 
Legation  in  Peking  and  finally  as  Charge 
d’ Affaires.  He  said:  “The  habit  of  repression 
paves  the  way  for  grudge  and  grievance  to 
be  held  and  cherished  in  secret.  These  may 
exist  and  grow  for  years  unsuspected  be- 
neath the  bland  and  expressionless  face  of 
the  Chinese,  until  some  trifle,  perhaps  quite 
unconnected  with  the  original  complaint, 
brings  the  crisis  and  lets  loose  the  storm. 
The  Boxer  movement  must  be  explained  in 
this  way.  To  reach  its  source,  one  must  go 
back  sixty  years,  to  the  very  beginning  of 
any  intercourse  or  association  between  Chi- 
nese and  foreigners.  To  understand  its  pow- 
er and  momentum,  the  anti-foreign  feeling, 
originated  then,  must  be  traced  as  it  spread 
throughout  the  empire,  and  studied  as  it  was 
fed  by  one  incident  after  another,  aggra- 
vated by  a thousand  mutual  misunderstand- 
ings and  genuine  causes  of  complaint,  deep- 
ened by  actual  and  imaginary  attacks  upon 
the  integrity  and  independence  of  the  na- 
tion, broadened  and  widened  by  offensive 
airs  of  patronage  and  superior  wisdom  and 
inexcusable  acts  of  injustice  and  wrong,  un- 
til this  feeling  reached  the  danger  point  at 
the  close  of  the  war  with  Japan.  Then  fol- 
lowed shortly  thereafter  the  occupation  of 
two  small  areas  of  Chinese  soil  by  Great 
Britain,  and  one  each  by  Russia  and  Germany 
(and  Prance).  Still,  the  repressed  anger 
made  no  sign.  But  the  hypothecation  of  a 
native  tax  to  secure  the  payment  of  the  in- 
demnity promised  to  Japan,  or,  as  the  Chinese 
regard  it,  the  diversion  of  their  money  to  the 
payment  of  Japan  for  an  unprovoked  and 
Inexcusable  attack  upon  their  country — this 
apparently  simple  and  routine  business  act 
furnished  the  friction  which  generated  the 
electricity  which  let  loose  the  whirlwind. 
Thus  the  Boxer  movement!  It  represents  the 
wrath  and  hate  of  sixty  years’  growth.  It  is 
the  more  violent  because  of  these  long  years 
of  repression.  And  it  receives  the  hearty 
sympathy  of  many  millions  of  Chinese  who 
have  taken  no  active  part  in  it.  For,  beyond 
a doubt,  it  represents  to  them  a patriotic  ef- 
fort to  save  their  country  from  foreign  ag- 
gression and  eventual  dismemberment  ’’ — 
Chester  Holcombe,  The  Real  Chinese  Ques- 
tion, pp.  56-57. 


41 


tnent  attained  dangerous  proportions  in 
the  fall  of  1899  and  reached  its  climax 
in  the  siege  of  the  foreign  legations  in 
Peking.  They  were  not  relieved  until 
August  14,  1900,  when  the  allied  forces, 
about  20,000  strong,  reached  Peking.  In 
the  ensuing  negotiations  for  the  settle- 
ment, the  moderating  influence  of  the 
United  States  exerted  itself.  The  United 
States  was  desirous  that  China  should 
not  be  impaired  in  her  territorial  in- 
tegrity, nor  be  weakened  in  her  ability 
to  maintain  a stable  government.  While 
she  supported  measures  needful  to  pun- 
ish the  guilty  parties  and  to  guarantee 
the  protection  of  American  citizens  and 
interests  for  the  future,  she  also  strove 
to  further  “the  interests  of  the  whole 
world  in  the  cause  of  equal  and  impar- 
tial trade  with  all  parts  of  the  Chinese 
Empire.”  “ The  twelve  demands  drawn 
up  by  the  allied  Powers  and  presented  to 
the  Chinese  representatives  on  December 
24,  1900,  were  accepted  in  toto  on  Janu- 
ary 16,  1901.  This  unqualified  accept- 
ance by  the  Chinese  representatives 
marked  the  end  of  the  long  story  of  the 
opening  up  of  China  and  the  beginning 
of  a new  chapter  of  her  friendly  rela- 
tions with  the  foreign  Powers. 

“Rockhill  to  Hay,  November  30,  1901.  See 
J.  B.  Moore,  A Digest  of  International  Law, 
Vol.  V,  p.  639. 


■££ 


CWAPTEB  in 


The  Early  Practice  of  The  Open  Door 
Principle 

Synchronous  with  the  opening 

up  of  China  to  foreign  trade  and 
commerce  was  the  introduction  into 
practice  of  the  principle  of  equal  eco- 
nomic and  commercial  opportunity,  which 
came  to  be  known  at  the  end  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  as  the  Open  Door  policy. 
It  may  sound  very  strange  indeed  that 
long  before  the  days  when  the  term 
“Open  Door”  was  heard  of  and  long  be- 
fore the  days  of  John  Hay,  to  whom  the 
origination  of  the  policy  has  usually  been 
attributed,  there  had  been  a principle 
which,  in  practice,  was  essentially  the 
same  as,  if  not  more  comprehensible  than 
that  which  was  later  espoused  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States, 
and  which  was  made,  still  later,  the  sub- 
ject of  a multitude  of  international  un- 
derstandings and  agreements.  It  is  nev- 
ertheless a fact,  undisputed  and  unde- 
niable, that  the  Open  Door  policy,  with- 
out being  actually  so  called,  was  as 
old  as  the  history  of  the  opening  of 
China,  and  had  been  observed  in  prac- 
tice ever  since  the  days  when  foreign 
trade  with  China  began  to  be  regulated 
by  treaty  provisions.  In  saying  this,  it 
should  be  clearly  borne  in  mind  that  the 
Open  Door  policy  is  but  a principle 
which  seeks  to  establish  economic  and 
commercial  opportunities  equally  for  all 
nations  in  China.  But  this  principle  has 
found  an  early  expression,  as  compre- 
hensible as,  but  more  comprehensive  than, 
the  Open  Door,  in  the  most  favored  na- 
tion treatment,  which  was  provided  for 
in  all  the  commercial  treaties  between 
43 


China  and  the  foreign  Powers.  The 
principle  of  the  most  favored  treatment 
means  that  what  is  enjoyed  by  one  nation 
in  China,  in  regard  to  commercial  and 
economic  privileges,  is  to  be  enjoyed  by 
all.  In  other  words,  all  the  trading  Pow- 
ers in  China  could  enjoy  equal  economic 
and  commercial  opportunities  in  the 
country.  Call  it,  therefore,  what  one 
pleases,  the  Open  Door,  the  most  favored 
nation  treatment,  or  any  other  diplomatic 
catch-phrase,  the  principle  is  there.  “We 
must  first  call  attention  to  the  importance 
of  the  most  favored  nation  clauses  in  the 
various  treaties  formerly  concluded  be- 
tween China  and  foreign  Powers,”  said 
Dr.  Reinsch.  “The  upholding  of  this 
clause  is  a necessary  condition  of  the 
policy  of  the  Open  Door.” " Now,  in 
order  to  trace  the  history  of  the  prin- 
ciple, it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to  the 
days  when  foreign  intercourse  with 
China  was  not  yet  placed  on  the  conven- 
tional basis. 

In  those  days  of  informal  intercourse, 
when  Western  traders  carried  on  their 
activities  in  Canton  by  sufferance  rather 
than  by  right,  there  was  no  equal  oppor- 
tunity to  speak  of.  On  the  contrary, 
there  was  constant  bickering  among  the 
foreign  traders  themselves.  Swayed 
by  jealousy,  avarice,  and  the  desire  to 
gain  the  most,  the  Dutch,  the  Portuguese, 
and  the  English,  who  had  frequented 
Chinese  shores  and  had  made  “big 
money”  from  the  natives,  each  sought  to 
monopolize  the  trade  and  exclude  every 
other  who  might  come  along  and  seek  to 
have  a hand  in  it.  In  this  struggle 
for  the  monopoly  of  China  trade,  one 
was  just  as  bad  as  the  other.  Neither 
the  English,  nor  the  Portuguese,  nor  the 
Dutch  hesitated  or  blushed  to  resort  to 
slandering,  conspiracy,  and  intrigue,  for 


1 Paul  S.  Reinsch,  World  Politics,  p.  175. 
44 


the  purpose  of  excluding  the  other  com- 
petitors from  the  field  and  thereby  se- 
curing for  himself  a monopoly  of  the 
trade.  It  was  a matter  of  record  that 
when  Captain  Weddell,  in  command  of 
a fleet  of  five  merchant  vessels  of  the 
British  East  India  Company,  reached 
Canton  in  the  summer  of  1637,  for  the 
purpose  of  negotiating  for  commercial 
rights  and  privileges,  the  Portuguese  in 
Macao  so  beslandered  the  Captain  and 
the  English  merchants  in  general,  “re- 
porting them  to  be  rogues,  thieves,  beg- 
gars and  what  not,”  that  the  Chinese  au- 
thorities decided  absolutely  to  have  noth- 
ing to  do  with  them  and  requested 
their  immediate  departure  from  Chinese 
waters.  This  wilful  misrepresentation 
by  the  Portuguese  before  the  Chinese  au- 
thorities at  Canton  in  1637  as  to  the  char- 
acter and  motives  of  the  British  traders 
in  general  and  Captain  Weddell  in  par- 
ticular was  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the 
Portuguese,  in  so  doing,  sought  not  only 
to  injure  the  commercial  opportunities 
of  the  British  in  China,  but  also  to 
avenge  what  they  considered  to  be  a 
cardinal  wrong,  which  the  British  had 
inflicted  upon  them  a few  years  ago.  It 
may  be  recalled  that,  in  1619,  the  English 
and  the  Dutch  East  India  Companies 
entered  into  a commercial  alliance  of  de- 
fence, which  was  “arranged  after  much 
diplomatic  negotiation  on  the  part  of 
their  Governments.”  ^ The  purpose  of 
the  alliance  was  to  force  the  Chinese  to 
trade  with  the  British  and  the  Dutch 
merchants,  and  with  them  alone,  and  the 
two  Companies  would  employ  their  fleet 
to  carry  out  the  purpose  they  had  in 
view.  At  such  a combination,  the  Por- 
tuguese, whom  it  sought  to  exclude, 
would  very  naturally  take  umbrage,  and 
it  was  no  wonder,  therefore,  that  they 

^ A.  J.  Sargent,  Anglo-Chinese  Commerce 
and  Diplomacy,  p.  3. 

45 


should  avail  themselves  of  the  first  op- 
portunity to  make  revenge  upon  the 
British.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Dutch, 
selfish  and  faithless  as  were  all  the  other 
foreign  merchants  in  China,  appropriated 
all  the  trade  to  themselves,  quite  regard- 
less of  the  protests  and  interests  of  their 
English  allies.  It  was  for  this  reason 
that,  when  the  Dutch  fleet  was  attacked 
and  beaten  by  the  Portuguese  off  Macao 
in  1622,  three  years  after  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  commercial  defensive  al- 
liance, the  British  did  not  lift  a hand  for 
its  rescue.  In  short,  selfishness,  avarice, 
intrigue,  conspiracy,  and  double-dealing 
of  all  sorts  characterized  the  attitude  and 
the  conduct  of  all  the  early  foreigners 
in  China,  and  this  fact  helped  to  create  in 
the  minds  of  the  Chinese  authorities  a 
just  contempt,  not  only  for  foreign  com- 
merce and  trade,  but  also  for  those  who 
were  ostensibly  its  apostles  and  were 
actively  engaged  in  promoting  it.  It  was, 
therefore,  not  at  all  unnatural  or  unrea- 
sonable that  China,  for  hundreds  of 
years,  should  have  pursued  a “closed 
door”  policy  in  preference  to  an  unre- 
stricted and  free  intercourse  with  the 
West. 

But  this  was  not  all.  Even  among 
the  English-speaking  peoples  themselves, 
the  Americans  and  the  Englishmen,  such 
brazen  disregard  of  mutual  rights  and 
interests  in  China  was  not  unknown.  As 
late  as  1812,  when  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  were  at  war  over  neutral 
rights  and  the  “impressment”  of  Amer- 
ican sailors  on  the  high  sea,  the 
American  trade  in  the  Chinese  waters 
was  practically  wiped  out  by  British  men- 
of-war.  “It  appears,”  said  John  W. 
Foster,  at  one  time  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  United  States,  “that  the  far-away 
waters  of  China  were  no  more  exempt 
than  those  of  the  Atlantic  from  the  high- 
handed violence  and  disregard  of  mari- 
46 


time  rights  by  Great  Britain,  which 
brought  on  the  War  of  1812.”  The  state 
of  affairs  was  so  bad  and  the  British 
went  so  far  to  realize  their  aims  that 
sailors  were  taken  from  American  ships 
even  under  the  neutral  flags  and  in  neu- 
tral waters.  The  commander  of  the 
Doris,  a British  warship,  took  as 
“prisoners  of  war”  the  passengers  and 
the  crew  of  a Boston  vessel  “under  the 
Chinese  flag  and  in  Chinese  waters.” 
“This  action  of  the  Doris,  in  cruising  off 
the  port  of  Canton  and  seizing  American 
ships  in  Chinese  waters,  gave  great  of- 
fense to  the  local  authorities,  who  or- 
dered the  man-of-war  to  leave,  saying 
that  if  the  English  and  Americans  ‘had 
any  petty  squabbles’  they  must  settle 
them  between  themselves  and  not  bring 
them  to  China.  Upon  a refusal  of  the 
Doris  to  depart,  all  trade  with  the  Brit- 
ish merchants  was  temporarily  suspend- 
ed. The  American  consul  not  only  com- 
plained of  the  bad  conduct  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  Doris,  but  he  reports  that 
it  was  ‘equalled  by  the  pusillanimous  con- 
duct of  the  governor  of  Macao,’  who  al- 
lowed that  port  to  be  made  a base  of 
operations  for  the  British  to  prey  upon 
American  commerce.”  ’ 

Fortunately  for  China,  and  fortunately 
for  the  Western  Powers,  however,  such 
cut-throat  competition  among  the  foreign 
traders  along  the  Chinese  coast,  and  con- 
temptuous disregard  of  the  rights  of 
the  territorial  sovereign,  were  not  to 
continue  indefinitely.  These  practices 
were  the  order  of  the  day  when  the  for- 
eign trade  at  Canton  was  not  regulated 
by  treaty  provisions,  and  when  each  and 
every  foreign  merchant  struggled  to  keep 
the  field  open  to  himself  and  closed  to 
the  others.  In  other  words,  in  those 
days  the  merchants  had  no  more  thought 

*John  W.  Foster,  American  Diplomacy  In 
the  Orient,  pp.  39-40. 

47 


of  equal  opportunity  than  they  had  re- 
spect for  the  law  of  China.  With  the 
conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking, 
August  29,  1842,  which  secured  for  the 
British  in  China  a legal  status  never  be- 
fore enjoyed  by  them  or  by  any  other 
foreign  merchants,  a new  commercial  era 
may  be  said  to  have  arrived,  which  was 
more  or  less  free  from  the  “selfishness, 
avarice,  intrigue,  conspiracy,  and  double- 
dealing of  all  sorts”  of  the  pre-conven- 
tional  days.  Heretofore,  foreign  resi- 
dence in  China  was  not  permitted,  for 
trade  at  Canton  was  conducted  on  suffer- 
ance, and  the  foreigners  had  in  China  no 
locus  standi  to  speak  of.  Even  consuls 
were  not  recognized  in  any  way  by  the 
Chinese  authorities  before  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,  and  they 
were  not  allowed  to  remain  on  Chinese 
territory  at  or  in  the  vicinity  of  Canton. 
Like  the  merchants,  supercargoes,  and 
other  trade  agents,  they  had  to  go  to 
Macao,  a piece  of  Chinese  territory  un- 
der Portuguese  administration,  where 
they  could  reside  with  the  express  per- 
mission of  the  Portuguese  Government.* 
Now,  with  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty 
of  Nanking,  the  situation  was  entirely 
changed.  The  Treaty  not  only  opened 
Canton,  Amoy,  Foochow,  Ningpo,  and 
Shanghai  to  the  trade  and  residence  of 
British  subjects,  but  also  recognized  the 
right  of  the  British  Government  to  ap- 
point at  each  of  the  above  cities  superin- 
tendents or  consular  officers.  This  con- 


* One  Mr.  Catchpool,  who  had  served  as  the 
Chief  Supercargo  of  the  British  East  India 
Company,  was  commissioned,  in  1699,  as  “the 
King’s  Minister  or  consul  for  the  whole  Em- 
pire of  China  and  the  adjacent  waters.” 
Major  Samuel  Shaw  of  the  United  States  was 
appointed  as  early  as  January  27,  1786,  the 
first  American  consul  to  Canton.  As  he  was 
not  permitted  to  remain  on  Chinese  territory, 
he  had  to  go  to  Macao,  where  he  continued 
his  residence  for  about  ten  years.  For  a brief 
account  of  the  manner  in  which  the  trade  at 
Canton  was  carried  on  in  those  days,  see 
Poster’s  American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient, 
pp.  32-40. 


48 


cession  from  the  Chinese  Government 
practically  reversed  the  position  which 
the  British  together  with  the  other  for- 
eigners had  formerly  occupied.  What 
was  theretofore  denied  to  them  as  mere 
privileges  was  now  given  them  by  the 
treaty  provisions  as  legal  rights.  Truly 
said  was  it,  that  the  Nanking  Treaty 
of  1842  served  as  a charter  of  British 
commercial  rights  in  China.° 

More  significant  was  the  fact  that,  to- 
gether with  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty, 
which  practically  inaugurated  a new  com- 
mercial era  for  the  British  in  China,  was 
also  introduced  into  general  practice, 
somewhat  unconsciously,  the  commercial 
principle  that  was  in  essence  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  Open  Door  policy  of  today. 
This  new  principle  was  technically  known 
as  that  of  the  “most-favored  treatment,” 
which  was  understood  to  secure  equal 
commercial  and  economic  opportunity  in 
China  for  all  the  nations  of  the  world. 
It  is  true  that  in  the  treaty  itself,  noth- 
ing could  be  found  to  support  this  asser- 
tion. At  the  same  time  it  can  be  said 
with  truth  that  the  principle  was  born 
with  the  treaty.  In  communicating 
the  Treaty  of  Nanking  to  Parlia- 
ment, Queen  Victoria  of  England 
said  among  other  things : “Throughout 
the  whole  of  my  negotiations  with  the 
Government  of  China,  I have  uniformly 
disclaimed  the  wish  for  any  exclusive 
advantages.  It  has  been  my  desire  that 
equal  favor  should  be  shown  to  the  in- 
dustry and  commercial  enterprise  of  all 
nations.”  ° This  was  an  authoritative 
utterance  by  the  reigning  sovereign  of 
the  country  which  was  a party  to  the 
treaty  and  which,  then  as  now,  had  the 
greatest  volume  of  trade  in  China.  Tech- 

^ Regulations  respecting  transit  dues,  etc., 
see  Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  pp.  12- 
14. 

‘John  Bassett  Moore,  A Digest  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  Vol.  V,  p.  418. 

4'J 


nically,  it  was  not  a declaration  of  the 
conventional  most-favored  nation  treat- 
ment, but  it  was  an  enunciation  by  the 
British  Government  of  the  policy  that 
equal  favors  and  advantages  should  be 
given  “to  the  industry  and  commercial 
enterprise  of  all  nations.”  Mr.  Caleb 
Cushing,  the  first  American  Minister  to 
China,  believed  that  Great  Britain  had 
“from  the  outset  adhered  in  good  faith 
to  this  idea”  of  equal  opportunity.^  The 
fact  that  the  establishment  at  Hongkong, 
which  Great  Britain  had  just  then  ac- 
quired from  China,  was  freely  open  to 
the  ships  of  the  United  States,  of  Hol- 
land, of  France,  and  of  other  countries, 
was  sufficient  testimony  of  her  good 
faith. 

Still  more  concrete  in  idea,  more  defi- 
nite in  language,  and  more  fruitful  in 
results  than  the  statement  by  Queen  Vic- 
toria to  the  British  Parliament  was  a 
provision  in  the  Anglo-Chinese  Treaty 
of  1843,  which,  when  examined  carefully, 
embodied  the  very  elements  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity  and  equal 
treatment,  such  as  is  usually  implied  in 
the  most  favored  nation  clauses.  The 
thirteenth  article  of  the  said  treaty, 
signed  at  Hoomun-Chae,  October  8, 1843, 
was  the  first  treaty  provision  with  China 
for  the  most  favored  nation  treatment. 
The  Article  reads : “The  Emperor  of 
China,  having  been  graciously  pleased  to 
grant  to  all  foreign  countries  whose  sub- 
jects or  citizens  have  hitherto  traded  at 
Canton,  the  privilege  of  resorting  for 
purposes  of  trade  to  the  other  four  ports 
of  Foochow,  Amoy,  Ningpo,  and  Shang- 
hai, on  the  same  terms  as  the  English,  it 
is  further  agreed  that  should  the  Em- 
peror hereafter,  from  any  cause  what- 
ever, be  pleased  to  grant  additional  privi- 
leges or  immunities  to  any  of  the  sub- 

’ J.  B.  Moore,  Ibid. 


50 


jects  or  citizens  of  such  foreign  coun- 
tries, the  same  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties will  be  extended  to,  and  enjoyed  by 
British  subjects.”  * 

This  first  stipulation  for  the  most 
favored  nation  treatment  contained  the 
germ  and  was  the  precursor  of  the 
later  day  Open  Door  policy.  It  is, 
however,  interesting  to  note  that  in 
this  case,  it  was  Great  Britain  who 
asked  for  equal  enjoyment  of  fur- 
ther trade  privileges  and  immunities 
should  they  be  granted  by  the  Chinese 
Government  to  the  citizens  or  sub- 
jects of  other  nations.  In  opening  up 
China  to  the  trade  of  the  world,  it  was 
Great  Britain,  as  we  have  seen,  who  had 
played  the  most  important  part.  That 
this  was  so  was  “one  of  the  common- 
places of  modern  politics  and  history, 
which  it  is  needless  either  to  demonstrate 
or  to  endorse,”  said  Lord  Curzon  in  a 
parliamentary  speech.  “We  were  the 
first  people  to  unlock  the  door  of  China 
to  foreign  trade ; we  were  the  first  Pow- 
er to  survey  her  coasts  ; we  were  the  first 
to  drive  away  pirates  fom  her  seas ; we 
were  the  first  to  stud  the  whole  line  of 
her  coasts  with  ports  open  not  only  to 
ourselves  but  to  the  commerce  of  the 
whole  world.  We  were  the  first  people 
to  send  steamers  up  her  waterways,  to 
build  railways  for  her,  to  exploit  her 
mines,  and  to  carry  for  thousands  of 
miles  into  the  interior  of  the  country  the 
benefits  of  European  manufactures  and 
comforts.  And  let  it  not  be  forgotten 
that  we  were  the  first  Power  to  give 
China  the  nucleus  of  a pure  administra- 
tion, at  the  same  time  that  we  added  a 
great  amount  of  annual  revenue  to  her 
Treasury  by  initiating  an  Imperial  Cus- 
toms service  in  that  country.” ' With- 

• British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1842- 
1843,  Vol.  XXXI,  p.  133. 

•Parliamentary  Debates,  March  1,  1898,  pp. 
330-331.  „ 


out  questioning  the  truth  of  the  asser- 
tion, it  is  sufficient  to  say  that,  certainly 
to  no  other  Power  could  be  given  the 
credit  of  making  China  available  to  for- 
eign trade  and  commerce,  although  the 
methods  by  which  it  was  done  can  not 
be  wholly  commended.  Great  Britain 
was  a free  trade  country,  and  it  may  be 
fairly  said  (without  taking  into  consid- 
eration the  nefarious  conduct  of  her  in- 
dividual merchants  in  the  early  days), 
that,  in  making  the  Chinese  market  avail- 
able for  her  own  commerce,  she  also 
made  it  available  to  the  entire  world. 
It  has  been  said  to  be  the  customary  prac- 
tice of  Great  Britain  that,  after  obtaining 
a new  outlet  for  trade  she  would  share  it 
equally  and  freely  with  other  countries. 
It  was  in  view  of  this  liberal  policy  that 
Queen  Victoria  “disclaimed  the  wish  for 
any  exclusive  advantages”  in  China,  but 
expressed  the  desire  that  “equal  favor 
should  be  shown  to  the  industry  and  com- 
mercial enterprise  of  all  nations.”  It  was 
but  natural  that  she  should  ask,  in 
the  supplementary  treaty  of  1843,  that 
whatever  additional  privileges  and  im- 
munities to  be  granted  to  the  citizens  or 
subjects  of  other  countries  should  be 
equally  enjoyed  by  her  own  nationals. 

Aside  from  this  equitable  arrangement, 
early  practice  of  the  Open  Door  principle 
can  be  found  in  a multitude  of  instances. 
Nowhere  was  it  so  clearly  shown,  how- 
ever, as  in  the  fact  that  the  acquisition 
by  Great  Britain  of  trade  facilities  in 
China  under  the  Nanking  Treaty  was  im- 
mediately followed  by  the  conclusion  be- 
tween China  and  the  foreign  Powers  of 
similar  treaties,  which  provided  for  simi- 
lar facilities  and  privileges.  Thus,  the 
French  and  American  Governments, 
soon  after  the  Treaty  of  Nanking,  “de- 
cided to  profit  by  the  privileges  which 
the  British  had  obtained.”  In  1844,  the 
French  Government  sent  a special  mis- 
52 


sion  to  Peking  with  the  purpose  of  cul- 
tivating trade  relations  between  the  two 
countries.  As  a result,  a treaty  was  en- 
tered into  between  China  and  France, 
whereby  trading  rights  and  privileges, 
similar  to  those  obtained  by  the  British 
two  years  before,  were  conceded  to  the 
French.  In  matters  of  transit  dues,  im- 
port and  export  duties,  France  was  given 
the  traitment  de  la  nation  la  plus  fa- 
vorisee.  And  the  Americans  were  not  at 
all  slow  in  taking  advantage  of  the  situ- 
ation. In  fact,  Americans  were  the  first 
to  demand  equal  enjoyment  of  the  rights 
and  privileges  thus  accorded  to  the  Brit- 
ish after  the  Opium  War.  Commodore 
Kearny,  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
American  squadron  in  Chinese  waters, 
who  watched  the  progress  of  the  Opium 
War  and  the  negotiations  of  the  Nan- 
king Treaty,  demanded,  in  a communica- 
tion to  the  Governor  at  Canton,  that  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  in  their 
trade  in  China  should  “be  placed  upon 
the  same  footing  as  the  merchants  of  the 
nation  most  favored.”  This  demand  was 
made  with  the  knowledge  that  a custom 
tariff  and  new  trade  regulations  would 
be  agreed  upon  between  China  and  Great 
Britain,  and  in  fear  that  exclusive  rights 
and  privileges  might  be  stipulated  for  the 
British  alone.  On  Kearny’s  representa- 
tion, the  Chinese  Government  promised 
that  whatever  concessions  made  to  Great 
Britain  would  also  be  granted  to  the 
United  States.  So  when  the  new  tariff, 
averaging  the  low  rate  of  five  per  cen- 
tum, and  the  trade  regulations  were 
agreed  upon  between  China  and  Great 
Britain,  they  were  applied  to  the  com- 
merce with  China,  not  only  of  England, 
but  of  all  countries.  “It  is  due  to  the 
Chinese  Government  to  say  that  this  grant 
of  trade  to  all  nations  upon  equal  terms 
was  an  inspiration  of  its  own  sense  of 
justice,  as  neither  the  Emperor  nor  his 
53 


commissioner  had  any  knowledge  of  the 
rule  of  international  law — ‘the  most  fa- 
vored nation’ — at  that  day  even  im- 
perfectly observed  by  the  Christian  gov- 
ernments.” 

On  May  8,  1843,  Mr.  Caleb  Cushing 
was  appointed  Minister  Plenipotentiary 
and  Commissioner  to  China  to  negotiate 
a treaty.  With  the  advantages  already 
secured  by  Commodore  Kearney,  it  was 
not  a very  difficult  task  to  carry  out  the 
mission  with  success.  The  first  treaty  be- 
tween China  and  the  United  States  was 
concluded  on  July  3,  1844,  in  which  the 
promise  given  to  Commodore  Kearny  for 
equal  treatment  for  the  Americans  in 
China  was  given  expression  in  this  lan- 
guage; “If  additional  advantages  or 
privileges  of  whatever  description  be 
conceded  hereafter  by  China  to  any  oth- 
er nation,  the  United  States  and  the  citi- 
zens thereof  shall  be  entitled  thereupon 
to  a complete,  equal,  and  impartial  par- 
ticipation in  the  same.”  In  the  same 
treaty,  there  were  “sixteen  points,”  as 
Mr.  Cushing  pointed  out,  which  were  not 
formerly  embraced  in  the  British  treaty 
of  Nanking.  As  the  supplementary 
treaty  of  1843  provided  for  the  British 
the  most  favored  nation  treatment,  they 
could  enjoy  at  once  whatever  additional 
privileges  accrued  to  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  “I  recognize  the  debt  of 
gratitude,”  said  Mr.  Cushing  triumphant- 
ly after  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  of 
Wang-Hiya  with  China,  “which  the 
United  States  and  all  other  nations  owe 
to  England,  for  what  she  has  accom- 
plished in  China.  From  all  this  much 
benefit  has  accrued  to  the  United  States. 
But,  in  return,  the  treaty  of  Wang-Hiya, 
in  the  new  provisions  it  makes,  confers  a 
great  benefit  on  the  commerce  of  the 
British  Empire  ; . . . and  thus  what- 

John  W.  Poster,  American  Diplomacy  in 
the  Orient,  p.  77. 


54 


ever  progress  either  government  makes 
in  opening  this  vast  empire  to  the  influ- 
ence of  foreign  commerce  is  for  the 
common  good  of  each  other  and  of  all 
Christendom.”  ” 

These  arrangements  marked  the  first 
stage  in  the  development  of  the  principle 
of  equal  treatment,  which,  as  has  been 
seen,  was  introduced  into  China  as  soon 
as  she  abandoned  her  policy  of  seclusion 
and  opened  her  doors  to  foreign  inter- 
course. As  the  maritime  commerce  of 
the  world  in  general  was  rapidly  increas- 
ing, and  as  the  ships  of  Western  nations 
were  traversing  all  seas,  owing  to  the  ap- 
plication of  steam  navigation,  the  volume 
of  China’s  foreign  trade  increased  by 
leaps  and  bounds.  Nations  in  the  West, 
which  had  had  hitherto  very  little  to  do 
with  China,  also  sought  to  establish  com- 
mercial relations  with  her.  Thus,  Bel- 
gium, Brazil,  the  Netherlands,  Denmark, 
Italy,  Germany,  Spain,  Portugal,  Peru, 
etc.,  all  began  to  have  treaty  relations 
with  China.  In  1858,  Great  Britain  and 
France  made  fresh  stipulations  for 
most  favored  nation  treatment,  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  “Arrow”  War.  And 
the  United  States,  though  not  a partici- 
pant in  the  war,  also  reaped  its  fruit  by 
entering  into  a similar  agreement  with 
China.  “The  allies  were  able  to  dictate 
their  own  terms ; and  they  got  all  they 
asked  for.  . . . The  rest  of  us  got 

the  same,  though  we  had  struck  no  blow 
and  shed  no  blood.  One  article  known 
as  ‘the  most  favored  nation  clause’  (al- 
ready in  the  treaty  of  1844)  was  all  that 
v>^e  required  to  enable  us  to  pick  up  the 
fruit  when  others  shook  the  tree.”  “ 

In  this  connection,  it  should  be  noted 
that  the  most  favored  nation  clauses  in- 
serted in  the  British  Treaty  of  Tien- 

U.  S.  Senate  Exec.  Doc.  67,  28th  Congress, 
2nd  session. 

W.  A.  P.  Martin,  The  Awakening  of 
China,  p.  166. 


55 


tsin  of  1858 — and  in  the  Chinese-Amer- 
ican  and  Chinese-French  treaties  of  the 
same  year,  were  much  broader  in  scope 
and  more  inclusive  in  language  than  the 
provisions  in  the  early  treaties.  It  was 
largely  on  the  model  of  the  provisions 
found  in  the  British  treaty,  however,  that 
almost  all  the  most-favored  nation 
clauses  in  China’s  commercial  treaties 
with  the  other  Powers  were  drafted. 
Article  XXIV  of  the  British  treaty  pro- 
vided for  the  most  favored  nation  treat- 
ment in  respect  to  imports  and  exports ; 
“It  is  agreed  that  British  subjects  shall 
pay  on  all  merchandise  imported  or  ex- 
ported by  them,  the  duties  prescribed  by 
the  tariff,  but  in  no  case  shall  they  be 
called  upon  to  pay  other  or  higher  du- 
ties than  are  required  of  the  subjects  of 
any  foreign  nation.”  And  by  Article 

Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  26. 

LIV,  the  most  favored  nation  treatment 
conferred  upon  British  subjects  in  the 
previous  treaties  with  China  was  con- 
firmed. “The  British  Government  and 
its  subjects  are  hereby  confirmed  in  all 
privileges,  immunities,  and  advantages 
conferred  on  them  by  previous  treaties ; 
and  it  is  hereby  expressly  stipulated  that 
the  British  Government  and  its  subjects 
will  be  allowed  free  and  equal  participa- 
tion in  all  privileges,  immunities,  and  ad- 
vantages that  may  have  been,  or  may 
hereafter  be,  granted  by  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  China  to  Government  or  sub- 
jects of  any  other  nation.”’*  These 
stipulations  were  reaffirmed  and  extend- 
ed in  the  first  article  of  the  supplemen- 
tary treaty  of  October  23,  1869.  “China 
having  agreed  that  British  subjects  shall 
participate  in  all  advantages  accorded  by 
Treaty  to  the  subjects  of  other  Powers, 
it  is  further  agreed  that  British  subjects 
desiring  to  participate  in  the  advantages 
accorded  by  Treaty  to  the  subjects  of 


Ibid,  p.  34. 


56 


other  Powers  shall  participate  in  such 
advantages  on  the  same  conditions  on 
which  they  have  been  accorded,  and  are 
participated  by,  the  subjects  of  such 
other  Powers.” 

These  articles  were  the  main  founda- 
tions upon  which  Great  Britain  had  built 
up  her  commercial  and  economic  struc- 
ture in  China.  They  were  the  bottom- 
rocks  of  the  practice  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity. They  were  almost  priceless  to 
Great  Britain,  and  to  the  other  Powers 
who  had  similar  provisions,  and  who 
were  anxious  to  keep  the  commercial  and 
economic  doors  in  China  open  for  all  the 
nations  of  the  world.  It  was  no  wonder, 
therefore,  that  the  British  Government 
was  most  insistent  upon  the  continuous 
and  faithful  observance  of  these  provis- 
ions, at  the  time  when  the  Powers,  in 
struggling  for  territorial  concessions  and 
spheres  of  influence,  were  ready  to  for- 
get their  existence.  In  the  heat  of  a par- 
liamentary debate.  Lord  Curzon  poig- 
nantly remarked:  “We  cannot  consent 
either  to  their  abandonment  or  infrac- 
tion.” The  Marquis  of  Salisbury  was 
equally  emphatic  when  he  said : “We 
have  no  intention  of  surrendering  one 
iota  of  our  treaty  rights ; there  is  no  ef- 
fort which  this  country  will  not  make 
rather  than  allow  those  rights  to  be  over- 
ridden.” ” These  were  brave  words,  and 
coming  as  they  did  from  the  responsible 
statesmen  of  Great  Britain,  they  served 
to  indicate  at  once  how  highly  the  most 
favored  nation  treatment  was  thought  of 
and  why  it  should  be  preserved  by  all 
means.  How  important  the  principle  and 
practice  of  equal  treatment  was  to  Great 
Britain  in  particular,  and  to  the  com- 
mercial world  at  large,  and  what  bearing 

*®Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  62. 

“ The  Parliamentary  Debates,  March  1,  1899, 
p.  339. 

” The  Parliamentary  Debates,  February  8, 
1898,  pp.  38-39. 

57 


this  principle  had  upon,  or  what  resem- 
blance it  bore  to,  the  Open  Door  policy 
of  today,  can  be  seen  best  from  the  utter- 
ances of  British  statesmen,  especially 
those  made  at  the  time  when  China  was 
threatened  with  disruption.  It  was  the 
firm  belief  of  the  British  statesmen  that 
the  provisions  for  the  most  favored  na- 
tion treatment  found  in  the  treaty  of 
Tien-tsin  and  other  subsequent  treaties 
were  the  rock  foundations  of  the  Open 
Door  policy  in  China,  and  the  abandon- 
ment of  them  would  mean  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  Open  Door.  “Our  belief,” 
said  Lord  Curzon,  “is  that  the  integrity 
of  China  is  most  likely  to  be  secured  by 
throwing  open  China  to  the  interests  and 
intercourse  of  the  whole  world,  and  not, 
so  to  speak,  by  closing  her  into  separate 
water-tight  compartments,  each  bearing 
a separate  label  or  appellation  of  its 
own.”  And  he  also  expressed  the  opin- 
ion that  the  articles  on  the  most  favored 
nation  treatment  in  the  Treaty  of  Tien- 
tsin and  subsequent  treaties  gave  the 
British  Government  “the  right  to  oppose 
any  exclusive  privileges  or  special  tariffs 
that  may  be  sought  for  by  others.”  “They 
establish,  in  fact,  equality  of  treatment 
and  opportunity  as  the  principal  basis  of 
our  relations — I might  almost  say,  the 
principal  basis  of  international  law — in 
reference  to  China.”  The  Earl  of  Kim- 
berley, another  prominent  member  of  the 
British  Government  at  the  time,  said  that 
the  British  policy  was  “that  of  the  Open 
Door — that  is  to  say,  of  maintaining  the 
conditions  arrived  at  under  the  Treaty 
of  Tien-tsin,  under  which  our  commerce 
has  been  hitherto  carried  on,  and  avoid- 
ing what  Mr.  Curzon  called,  by  the  very 
opposite  term,  the  partition  of  China  into 

The  Parliamentary  Debates,  March  1, 
1898,  p.  339. 

Ibid. 


58 


water-tight  compartments.”  “ Mr.  Kes- 
wick, a prominent  member  of  the  Brit- 
ish Parliament  then,  expressed  the  de- 
sire that  it  might  be  found  possible  “to 
arrange  for  the  universal  observance  of 
the  Treaty  of  Tien-tsin,”  in  which  the 
most  favored  nation  treatment  was  guar- 
anteed to  the  British  merchants.  “It  was 
the  observance  over  the  whole  of  China 
of  the  tariff  provided  by  that  treaty” 
that  was  regarded  as  an  essential  condi- 
tion of  the  operation  of  the  Open  Door 
principle.'’"  And,  on  May  10,  1899,  the 
Duke  of  Devonshire,  in  a speech  before 
the  Bankers’  Association  of  London, 
said:  “We  should  still  have  the  ‘Open 
Door’  in  China  so  long  as  it  was  in  the 
power  of  the  Chinese  Government  to  ob- 
serve its  treaty  engagements,”  meaning, 
of  course,  that  the  world  would  still  have 
the  Open  Door,  so  long  as  it  was  in  the 
power  of  the  weak  Government  at 
Peking  to  observe  the  most  favored  na- 
tion treatment.”  With  similar  expres- 
sions of  similar  views,  we  may  go  on 
infinitely.  This  much  is  enough,  how- 
ever, to  show  the  necessity  of  upholding 
the  most  favored  nation  clause  in  China 
in  order  to  keep  her  door  open  for  all 
countries  in  the  world. 

It  is  really  interesting  to  see  how  Brit- 
ish statesmen  at  the  time  interpreted  the 
spirit  of  the  Open  Door  policy  in  the 
terms  of  the  most  favored  nation  clauses, 
and  how  they  spoke  of  the  two  almost 
interchangeably.  No  one  saw  more 
clearly  than  they  that,  if  these  provis- 
ions were  not  to  be  disregarded,  or  if  the 
Chinese  Government  were  sufficiently 
strong  to  enforce  them,  there  would  be 
no  danger  to  the  traditional  principle  and 
practice  of  equal  treatment  for  all  na- 

“ The  Parliamentary  Debates,  April  6,  1898, 
p.  178. 

Cited  in  The  Problem  in  China,  Edin- 
burgh Review,  July  1899,  pp.  254-255. 

“Edinburgh  Review,  July,  1901,  p.  165. 

59 


tions  in  China.  And,  indeed,  no  one 
would  take  up  the  battle  cry  for  the 
Open  Door,  when  the  door  was  actually 
open.  But  unfortunately,  as  Dr.  Reinsch 
had  observed,  the  Powers,  in  their  strug- 
gle for  more  and  more  concessions  from 
China,  was  ready  to  cast  this  sound  prin- 
ciple into  oblivion.  The  sinister  game 
of  grabbing,  presumably  started  by  Ger- 
many, was  immediately  taken  up  by  the 
other  Powers,  who  had,  through  their 
early  dealings  with  China,  already  appro- 
priated to  themselves  parts  of  her  terri- 
torial possessions.  The  lease  of  Kiao- 
chow  Bay  by  Germany  was  swiftly  fol- 
lowed by  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
Ta-lien-wan  by  Russia,  Kwang-chow- 
wan  by  France,  and  Wei-hai-wei  and 
Kowlon  by  Great  Britain.  Together  with 
the  territories  leased  to  them,  these  Pow- 
ers ear-marked  for  themselves  spheres  of 
interest,  or  influence.  Within  the  leased 
territories,  the  European  Powers  were  to 
enjoy  jurisdictional  and  administrative 
rights,  which  were  delegated  to  them  by 
China  for  twenty-five  or  ninety-nine 
years,  as  the  case  might  be.  “Such  a 
condition  of  things  necessarily  suggests 
the  possibility  that  the  various  Powers 
may,  by  an  extension  of  their  acquired 
jurisdictional  and  administrative  rights, 
seek  to  annul  the  treaty  relations  of  the 
mercantile  nations  with  China  by  impos- 
ing discriminating  taxes,  duties  and 
charges  in  the  ports  and  rivers  and  on 
the  railways  in  their  respective  spheres, 
and  practically  exclude  their  competitors 
from  the  Chinese  market.”  It  was 
with  this  contingency  in  view  that  Secre- 
tary John  Hay,  in  his  famous  diplomatic 


S.  G.  Hishida,  The  International  Position 
of  Japan  as  a Great  Power,  pp.  207-208. 

60 


circular  of  September  6,  1899,  called 
upon  the  Powers  to  observe  in  their  re- 
spective spheres  and  leased  territories  ab- 
solute equality  of  treatment  in  matters 
of  transportation  and  navigation,  trade 
and  commerce. 


61 


CHAPTER  IV. 


The  Break-Up  of  China 

IF  one  studies  carefully  the  history  of 
the  opening  of  China  to  foreign 
trade  intercourse,  one  cannot  fail  to 
notice  the  most  striking  fact  that,  while 
she  was  being  forced  to  throw  open  her 
doors,  she  was  also  being  stripped  of  her 
territories,  dependencies,  and  colonial 
possessions.  Indeed,  it  may  be  truly  said, 
that  the  process  of  her  political  disinte- 
gration began  as  soon  as  her  walls  of  iso- 
lation failed  to  withstand  the  onslaught 
from  the  West  or  to  protect  her  from  the 
politico-economical  erosions.  This  pro- 
cess of  disintegration  may  be  likened  to 
an  ailment  in  China’s  body  politic.  It 
was  chronic,  but  it  became  suddenly 
acute  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  when  the  European  Powers, 
after  witnessing  her  absolute  weakness 
and  helplessness  as  revealed  in  the  Chino- 
Japanese  War  of  1894-5,  planned  for  her 
final  vivisection.  The  hue  and  cry  of  the 
dismemberment  of  China  went  up,  for 
the  time,  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  and 
it  was  echoed  and  re-echoed  from  the 
East  to  the  West  and  from  the  West  to 
the  East.  It  was  no  wonder  at  all,  there- 
fore, that  a British  Admiral  and  a promi- 
nent member  of  the  British  Parliament 
then,  should  write  a book  on  “the  break- 
up of  China,”  although,  for  its  real 
worth,  the  book  must  be  taken  by  its  sub- 
title, which  is  China’s  “future  prospects.” 

The  country  that  led  in  the  opening 
up  of  China  led  also  in  her  dismember- 
ment. For,  was  it  not  Great  Britain  who, 
after  the  conclusion  of  the  Opium  War, 
annexed  the  Isalnd  of  Hongkong  as  a 
price  of  peace?  This  annexation  was 
62 


the  first  of  the  kind  known  in  the  history 
of  China  of  thousands  of  years,  and  un- 
doubtedly it  set  the  tune  for  further  ag- 
gressions by  other  foreign  Powers. 
The  third  Article  of  the  Treaty  of  Nan- 
king gave  the  very  simple  reason  why 
Hongkong  was  annexed : “It  being  obvi- 
ously necessary  and  desirable  that  British 
subjects  should  have  some  port  at  which 
they  may  careen  and  refit  their  ships, 
when  required,  and  keep  stores  for  that 
purpose.  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
China  cedes  to  Her  Majesty  the  Queen 
of  Great  Britain,  etc.,  the  Island  of 
Hongkong,  to  be  possessed  in  perpetuity 
by  Her  Britannic  Majesty,  her  heirs  and 
successors,  and  to  be  governed  by  such 
laws  and  regulations  as  Her  Majesty  the 
Queen  of  Great  Britain,  etc.,  shall  see  fit 
to  direct.”  It  was  in  this  naive  manner 
that  Hongkong  passed  into  the  hands  of 
Great  Britain  ! Of  its  strategic  value,  the 
world  knew  little  or  nothing  at  first,  and 
as  to  its  advantage  as  a commercial  en- 
trepot, it  was  not  fully  realized  until 
Great  Britain  had  made  it  a centre  of 
international  trade  in  the  Far  East.  In 
view  of  its  strategic  value,  commercially 
and  politically,  Hongkong  was  admitted- 
ly as  a choice  morsel  of  Chinese  terri- 
tory as  Great  Britain  or  any  other  Power 
could  lay  her  hands  upon.  It  stands  to- 
day, not  only  as  a prosperous  British 
commercial  centre  in  the  Orient,  but  also 
as  one  of  the  strongest  links  of  the  Brit- 
ish Empire. 

But  this  was  not  all.  Not  satisfied  with 
the  acquisition  of  Hongkong,  Great 
Britain  was  continuously  on  the  lookout 
for  further  opportunities  to  grab.  The 
conclusion  of  the  “Arrow”  War  in  1860 
furnished  the  desired  opportunity.  Great 
Britain,  as  the  victor,  was  again  ready  to 
dictate  the  terms  of  peace,  and  China,  as 
the  vanquished,  was  once  more  called 
upon  to  pay  for  her  weakness.  One  of 
68 


the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  pro- 
vided for  the  cession  of  Kowloon  to 
Great  Britain,  which  was  formerly  leased 
to  Sir  Harry  Parkes  as  the  representa- 
tive of  the  British  Government/ 

Still  Great  Britain  was  not  contented. 
She  looked  for  more.  Hongkong  and 
Kowloon  were  but  stepping  stones  to 
something  yet  bigger  and  more  attractive. 
In  1886,  after  three  wars  waged  under 
different  pretexts.  Great  Britain  annexed 
the  Kingdom  of  Burma,  which  had  been 
for  centuries  a dependency  of  China.  Of 
the  long  history  that  leads  up  to  the 
annexation  we  can  give  but  a short  ac- 
count here. 

Owing  to  a close  contact  along  a very 
extended  line  of  frontier  between  Burma 
and  British  India,  it  was  evident  that  the 
two  countries  had  a good  deal  to  do 
with  each  other  as  neighbors.  It  was  al- 
most a habit  with  the  Burmese,  aggres- 
sive as  they  were  then  and  boastful  of 
their  valor  and  tactics,  to  harass  the 
frontier  forces  of  India,  whom  they 
thought  they  could  attack  with  immunity. 
Owing  to  the  failure  by  the  Burmese 
Government  to  make  due  reparations  for 
these  frontier  depredations,  war  was  de- 
clared by  the  British  Indian  Government 
on  March  5,  1824.  This  was  the  first 
Burmese  War,  and  it  was  brought  to  the 
end  by  the  treaty  of  Yandaboo,  of  Feb- 


' Article  VI  of  the  Peking"  Convention,  Octo- 
ber 24,  1860,  provided  for  the  cession  of 
Kowloon  In  this  language:  “With  a view  to 
the  maintenance  of  law  and  order  in  and 
about  the  harbor  of  Hongkong,  His  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  agrees  to  cede 
to  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  and  to  Her  heirs  and  successors, 
to  have  and  to  hold,  as  a dependency  of  Her 
Britannic  Majesty’s  colony  of  Hongkong,  that 
portion  of  the  township  of  Kowloon,  in  the 
Province  of  Kwangtung,  of  which  a lease 
was  granted  in  perpetuity  to  Harry  Smith 
Parkes,  Esquire,  Companion  of  the  Bath,  a 
member  of  the  Allied  Commission  at  Canton, 
on  behalf  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty’s  Gov- 
ernment, by  Lan  Tsung  Kwang,  Governor- 
General  of  the  Two  Kwang.” — Hertslet’s 
China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  60. 

64 


ruary  24,  1826,  in  which  the  Burmese 
Government  conceded  the  payment  of 
an  indemnity  and  a few  territorial  ar- 
rangements.” 

What  was  formerly  a local  ill-feeling 
between  the  Burmese  and  the  Indian 
forces  on  the  frontiers  became  a general 
hatred  of  the  British  with  the  conclusion 
of  the  Yandaboo  treaty.  Indeed,  the 
British  resident  functionary  in  Burma, 
who  was  appointed  in  1830,  found  his 
stay  there  so  disagreeable  either  to  the 
Court  or  to  himself  that,  in  1837,  he 
had  to  retire  from  the  country  altogether. 
This  state  of  sullen  dislike  was  soon  suc- 
ceeded by  acts  of  open  hostility  upon 
British  residents  and  British  seamen.  A 
refusal  on  the  part  of  the  Burmese  Gov- 
ernment either  to  atone  for  the  past 
wrongs  or  to  give  guarantee  for  the  fu- 
ture led  to  the  second  Burmese  War  of 
1852.  The  result  of  the  war  was  that 
“the  whole  province  of  Pegu  (Lower 
Burma)  was,  by  proclamation  of  the 
Governor-General  (of  India),  Lord  Dal- 
housie,  declared  to  be  annexed  to  the 
British  dominions  on  the  20th  of  Decem- 
ber, 1852.”  “No  treaty  was  obtained  or 
insisted  upon — ^the  British  Government 
being  content  with  the  tacit  acquiescence 
of  the  King  of  Burma  without  such  docu- 
ment.” ” 

The  loss  of  Lower  Burma  was  a mat- 
ter of  bitter  regret  among  all  classes  of 
Burmese,  and  the  King  absolutely  re- 
fused to  acknowledge  it  by  a formal 
treaty.  It  was  not  until  1862,  ten  years 
after  the  annexation  by  Great  Britain  of 
Lower  Burma,  that  the  King  consented 

• The  terms  of  the  treaty  of  Yandaboo  in- 
clude: (1)  the  cession  of  Arakan,  together 
with  the  provinces  of  Mergui,  Ye,  and  Tavoy; 
(2)  the  renunciation  by  the  Burmese  Govern- 
ment of  all  claims  upon  Assam  and  the 
contiguous  petty  states;  and  (3)  the  payment 
of  an  indemnity  by  the  Burmese  Government. 

• The  Encyclopedia  Britannica,  11th  Edi- 
tion, Vol.  IV,  p.  845. 

65 


to  the  establishment  of  a definite  diplo- 
matic relation  between  the  two  countries. 
And  then  five  years  later,  in  1867,  a treaty 
was  concluded  at  Mandalay,  providing 
for  the  free  intercourse  of  trade  and 
the  establishment  of  regular  diplomatic 
relations.  All  this  was  done  without  the 
knowledge  or  permission  of  China,  the 
suzerain  Power,  and  it  was  perhaps  the 
wish  of  the  British  Indian  Government 
that  China  should  not  be  informed  of 
these  matters.  For  several  years,  the 
relations  of  peace  and  friendship  be- 
tween Burma  and  British  India  con- 
tinued undisturbed.  But  the  feeling  of 
amity  on  the  part  of  the  Burmese  Gov- 
ernment and  people  was  never  very 
strong,  and  the  repeated  loss  of  their 
territories,  particularly  Lower  Burma, 
remained  a deep  wound  in  the  hearts  of 
the  patriotic  Burmese.  Disputes  in  re- 
gard to  commercial  rights  and  privileges 
were  bitter  and  frequent,  and  matters 
were  brought  to  a crisis  in  October,  1885, 
when  the  Burmese  Government  attempt- 
ed to  impose  a fine  of  $230,000  on  the 
Bombay-Burma  Trading  Corporation, 
and  refused  the  suggestion  of  the  Indian 
Government  that  the  matter  in  dispute 
should  be  investigated  and  decided  upon 
by  an  impartial  arbitrator.  This  refusal 
led  to  the  British  ultimatum  of  October 
22,  1885,  calling  upon  the  Burmese  Gov- 
ernment to  accept  the  British  proposal. 
On  the  7th  of  November,  King  Thibaw 
issued  a proclamation,  calling  upon  his 
subjects  to  drive  the  British  and  the  In- 
dians into  the  sea.  The  third  Burmese 
War  broke  out.  The  British  decided 
upon  the  occupation  of  Mandalay  and  the 
dethronement  of  the  King,  which  were 
easily  accomplished.  On  the  14th  of 
November,  1885,  the  British  forces 
crossed  the  frontier,  and  without  any 
serious  obstruction,  the  whole  country 
was  occupied  within  a fortnight.  On  the 


first  of  January,  1888,  Upper  Burma  was 
formally  annexed  to  the  British  Indian 
Empire. 

It  was  hardly  necessary  to  point  out 
that  though  the  annexation  of  the  coun- 
try was  thus  easily  brought  about,  there 
yet  remained  to  be  considered  the  tradi- 
tional rights  of  China  as  the  suzerain 
Power  over  Burma.  Negotiations  were 
soon  commenced  between  Great  Britain 
and  China,  which  resulted  in  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  Treaty  of  Peking  of  July  24, 
1886.  Other  than  going  to  war  with 
Great  Britain  China  had  no  alternative 
but  to  recognize  the  fait  accompli.  She 
agreed  that  “in  all  matter  whatsoever 
appeartaining  to  the  authority  and  rule 
which  England  is  now  exercising  in  Bur- 
ma, England  shall  be  free  to  do  whatever 
she  deems  fit  and  proper.”  ^ Thus  Great 
Britain,  after  years  of  war  and  di- 
plomacy, gained  undisputed  possession 
of  an  important  territory  contiguous  to 
her  Indian  Empire. 

Russia  was  the  next  Power  that  had 
a covetous  eye  on  the  NabotUs  vineyard 
in  China  and  took  the  biggest  slices  of 
territories  from  her.  The  story  of  the 
Russian  overland  expansion  in  the  Far 
East  at  the  expense  of  China  began  at  a 
very  early  date.  Ever  since  the  day  when 
the  Treaty  of  Nerchinsk  was  concluded 
in  1689,  which  placed  the  whole  of  the 
Amur  valley  in  the  hands  of  the  Chinese 
Emperor,  and  confined  the  Russian  pos- 
sessions to  the  north  of  the  Aigun  River," 

'*  Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I.  pp.  88-90. 
Article  I of  the  Treaty  provided  for  the  de- 
cennial missions  from  Burma  to  China:  “In- 
asmuch as  it  has  been  the  practice  of  Burma 
to  send  decennial  missions  to  present  articles 
of  local  produce,  England  agrees  that  the 
highest  authority  in  Burma  shall  send  the 
customary  decennial  missions,  the  members 
of  the  missions  to  be  of  Burmese  race.”  This 
provision  was  nothing  short  of  an  official  rec- 
ognition by  Great  Britain  of  China’s  suzerain 
-status  over  Burma. 

® For  the  history  and  the  negotiation  of  the 
Treaty  of  Nerchinsk,  see  John  'W.  Foster, 
American  Diplomacy  In  the  Orient,  pp.  17-18. 

67 


the  ambitious  statesmen  of  Russia  had 
been  on  the  continuous  watch  for  a con- 
venient opportunity  to  alter  the  frontiers 
thus  agreed  upon.  This  desired  oppor- 
tunity arrived,  after  a lapse  of  more  than 
two  hundred  years,  when,  in  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  China  was 
embroiled  in  the  Taiping  insurrection 
(1850-1867).  In  1851,  a Russian  war- 
ship, sailed  up  the  Amur  estuary,  and 
founded  the  town  of  Nikolaievsk,  and  in 
1853,  Alexandrovsk  and  other  towns 
were  established  on  the  Tartary  Coast,  all 
being  well  within  the  limits  of  the  Chinese 
territory  as  defined  by  the  Treaty  of 
Nerchinsk.  And,  in  a few  years,  thanks 
to  General  Mouraview,  the  sagacious  and 
aggressive  Governor-General  of  Eastern 
Siberia,  Russian  posts  were  established 
along  the  whole  of  the  north  bank  of  the 
Amur  River.  The  Chinese  Government 
promptly  protested  against  all  these  in- 
fractions of  the  Nerchinsk  Treaty,  but 
she  was  not  in  a position  to  back  up  her 
protests.  The  Taiping  Rebellion  had 
proved  such  a serious  menace  to  the 
Manchu  dynasty  that  all  available  troops 
in  the  country  were  sent  to  cope  with 
the  rebels.  Taking  advantage  of  this 
circumstance,  and  realizing  that  the 
“psychological  moment”  had  arrived,  for 
which  she  had  waited  for  centuries,  Rus- 
sia, in  1858,  sent  a formal  demand  to 
the  Peking  Government  for  the  “rectifi- 
cation” of  the  frontier.  It  was  easy  to 
understand  what  Russia  really  meant  by 
the  “rectification”  of  the  frontier,  but 
it  was  difficult  for  China  to  make  an  ef- 
fective reply.  She  was  then  absolutely 
helpless  and  powerless.  Menaced  on  the 
one  hand  by  the  serious  insurrection,  and 
harassed  on  the  other  by  the  difficulties 
then  pending  because  of  the  “Arrow” 
War  with  Great  Britain  and  France, 
China  was  in  no  position  to  resist  the 
Russian  demand.  She  had  no  choice  but 
68 


to  consent  to  the  rectification.  The  re- 
sult was  the  conclusion,  on  May  16, 
1858,  of  the  Treaty  of  Aigun,  which  re- 
versed the  Treaty  of  Nerchinsk,  and 
placed  in  the  hands  of  Russia  the  whole 
of  Chinese  territory  north  of  the  Amur 
River,  a region,  as  a British  writer  had 
observed,  covering  an  area  eight  times  as 
large  as  Great  Britain  and  Ireland.® 

With  this  acquisition,  Russia  was  not 
yet  satisfied.  Her  ambition  was  to  reach 
the  seaboard,  for  the  realization  of 
which  she  had  to  watch  for  another 
chance.  “Having  thus  obtained  posses- 
sion of  all  the  country  north  of  the  Amur 
River,”  as  one  writer  observed,  “Russia 
cast  her  eyes  on  that  which  lay  to  the 
south.”  “After  biding  her  time  a while, 
she  fixed  on  the  presence  of  the  allied 
French  and  English  forces  in  Peking  as 
a moment  when  the  Chinese  could  not 
afford  to  be  particular.  In  1860  then. 
General  Ignatieff  was  despatched  to  the 
Celestial  capital,  where  he  without  diffi- 
culty negotiated  the  Russian  treaty  of 
Peking,  which  has  since  served  as  the 
basis  of  intenational  relations  between  the 
two  countries.  Under  this  document  the 
whole  of  Manchurian  Coast  line  between 
Ussuri  River  and  the  sea  was  ceded  to 
Russia  without  any  restrictions  what- 
ever. In  addition  to  this,  it  conveyed  the 
right  of  Russian  traders  to  go  to  Peking, 
and  annulled  the  Treaty  of  Nerchinsk. 
Thus  did  Russia  obtain  an  accession  of 
close  upon  three  quarters  of  a million 
square  miles  to  her  territory,  and  an  ex- 
tension southward  to  the  Bay  of  Vladi- 
vostock.  More  than  this,  the  treaty 
brought  the  Southern  frontier  of  Russia 
into  contact  with  that  of  Korea,  and  gave 
her  an  advance  of  two  hundred  miles  in 
the  direction  of  Peking.”  ' 

• Hertselt’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  454. 

' Alexis  Krausse,  The  Far  East,  p.  40. 

69 


It  was  in  this  manner  that  Russia,  by 
dexterous  use  of  the  presence  in  Peking 
of  the  Anglo-French  forces,  extorted 
from  the  terrified  Government,  without 
much  difficulty,  this  expanse  of  territory, 
which  Japan  today  sets  her  covetous  eyes 
upon.  This  acquisition  paved  the  way 
for  her  frontier  aggressions  in  the  Far 
East,  which  brought  her  eventually  into 
sharp  conflict,  not  only  with  China,  but 
also  with  Japan  and  with  Korea.  But 
Russia  was  still  unsatisfied.  In  a few 
years,  another  effort  was  made  to  add  to 
the  Russian  Empire  another  piece  of  Chi- 
nese territory.  In  1863,  it  may  be  re- 
called, a serious  rebellion  broke  out 
among  the  Mohammedans  of  Sougaria, 
which  the  Chinese  Government,  owing 
to  the  Taiping  Rebellion  at  home,  could 
not  spare  enough  force  to  suppress  imme- 
diately. For  nearly  eight  years  the  dis- 
trict was  kept  in  a state  of  relative  an- 
archy. In  1870,  a Russian  force  marched 
into  Kuldja  and  occupied  the  valley  of 
Hi  on  the  pretext  of  restoring  order  and 
preserving  peace  in  the  region.  The  Chi- 
nese Government,  as  usual,  had  no  option 
but  to  consent  to  the  occupation,  which, 
the  Russian  Government  announced, 
would  only  be  of  a temporary  nature. 
In  1877,  after  a vigorous  campaign  by 
General  Tso  Tsiing-tang,  the  Mohamme- 
dan rebellion  was  suppressed.  Peace  be- 
ing restored,  the  Chinese  Government, 
very  naturally  asked  for  the  restoration 
of  Ili,  which  was  then  still  under  Russian 
occupation.  This  could  not  be  done,  of 
course,  except  by  negotiation,  the  result 
of  which  was  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty 
of  Livadia.  According  to  the  terms  of  the 
treaty,  China  was  to  repay  the  expenses 
of  the  occupation  to  the  amount  of  5,- 
000,000  roubles,  while  Russia  was  to  sur- 
render the  Kuldja  valley,  but  to  retain  the 
neighboring  Teke  territory,  which  com- 
mands the  approaches  to  Kashgar.  The 
70 


Chinese  Government  refused  to  ratify 
the  treaty.  Further  negotiations  con- 
ducted by  Marquis  Tseng  resulted  in  the 
conclusion,  on  February  12,  1881,  of  the 
Treaty  of  St.  Petersburg,  whereby  China 
was  to  pay  now  9,000,000  roubles  for 
compensation  and  to  give  up  only  the 
western  part  of  Hi,  that  was  later  in- 
corporated with  Russia. 

We  now  come  to  the  history  of  French 
expansion  in  the  Far  East,  which  is  in- 
teresting, mainly  because  of  the  fact  that, 
although  making  no  serious  effort  to  se- 
cure a footing  in  any  of  the  Chinese 
provinces,  France  practically  absorbed 
the  whole  of  the  former  dependencies  of 
China  in  the  Indo-Chinese  peninsula.  As 
early  as  1859,  France  set  her  eyes  on 
Cochin-China.  By  the  treaty  of  June  3, 
1869,  which  concluded  the  Annamese 
War,  the  province  of  Saigon  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Mekong  River,  was  ceded 
to  France.  Three  years  later,  in  1865, 
the  King  of  Cambodia  placed  himself 
and  his  dominion  under  the  protection  of 
France.  In  1874,  a fresh  treaty  was 
entered  into  at  Saigon  with  the  Court  of 
Hue,  whereby  the  whole  kingdom  of 
Annam  became  a French  protectorate, 
although,  it  must  be  admitted,  the  nomi- 
nal independence  of  Tu  Due,  the  king  of 
Annam,  was  guaranteed  by  the  said 
treaty.  On  August  25,  1883,  another 
treaty  was  concluded  at  Hue,  which  con- 
firmed, and  in  many  respects,  amplified, 
the  previous  agreement.  While  France 
was  determined  to  lose  no  time  in  an- 
nexing the  country  thus  placed  under  her 
protection,  she  had,  however,  omitted  one 
important  factor  from  her  calculation. 
The  fact  that  the  whole  of  Annam  had 
been  a dependency  of  China  was  entirely 
lost  sight  of.  Marquis  Tseng,  Chinese 
Minister  at  Paris,  protested  against  the 
annextion  again  and  again.  He  was  at 
first  told  that  France  had  no  designs  on 
71 


Annam,  but  later  he  was  informed  that 
the  French  Government  “had  no  explana- 
tion to  oflfer  to  China  in  matters  which 
concerned  only  France  and  Annam.”  ® A 
persistent  refusal  on  the  part  of  the 
French  Government  to  respect  China’s 
suzerainty  over  Annam  led  eventually  to 
the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Chinese  War 
of  1884-5,  a short  account  of  which  has 
been  given  before.  It  is  sufficient  here 
to  state  that  by  the  treaty  of  1885  China 
lost  all  her  dependencies  in  the  Indo- 
Chinese  peninsula. 

We  have  pointed  out  at  the  outset  that, 
while  China  was  ( being  forced  to  throw 
open  her  doors,  she  was  stripped  of  her 
territorial  possessions.  The  “break-up” 
of  China,  in  other  words,  dated  as  far 
back  as  her  opening.  A fresh  proof 
comes  into  our  view  when  we  consider 
the  history  of  the  occupation  of  Macao 
by  the  Portuguese — an  occupation  that 
“was  commenced  under  the  pretext  of 
erecting  sheds  for  drying  goods  intro- 
duced under  the  appellation  of  tribute 
(to  China),  and  alleged  to  have  been 
damaged  in  a storm.” " As  far  back  as 
1530,  Portuguese  merchants  began  to 
flock  to  Macao,  and  to  make  their  set- 
tlements there.  For  hundreds  of  years, 
largely  due  to  the  negligence  on  the  part 
of  the  Chinese  Government,  the  status  of 
Macao  was  never  distinctly  defined.  Be-' 
fore  1849,  rental  was  paid  by  the  Por- 
tuguese for  the  ground  tax,  but  this  pay- 
ment was  soon  discontinued.  On  Aug- 
ust 13,  1862,  a treaty  of  commerce  was 
signed  at  Tientsin  by  the  representatives 
of  China  and  Portugal,  but  it  was  never 
ratified  in  consequence  of  a misunder- 
standing or  dispute  in  regard  to  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  territory.’"  In  the  ninth 

® H.  B.  Morse,  The  International  Relations 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  Vol.  II,  p.  348. 

* S.  Wells  Williams,  The  Middle  Kingdom, 
Revised  Edition,  Vol.  II,  p.  428. 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  Vol. 
55,  p.  790.  72 


article  of  the  treaty  there  was  an  implica- 
tion of  the  supremacy  of  the  Portuguese 
authorities  over  the  territory.  In  order 
that  there  should  be  no  possible  misun- 
derstanding about  China’s  sovereignty 
over  the  colony,  China  insisted  that  an 
express  stipulation  of  her  right  of  domain 
to  the  peninsula  be  inserted  in  the 
treaty.  This  was  not  done,  and  conse- 
quently the  treaty  was  not  ratified.  The 
Portuguese  trade  at  Macao,  however, 
continued  to  flourish,  and  Portuguese 
residents  in  the  colony  continued  to  in- 
crease. But  this  state  of  affair  could  not 
be  allowed  to  drift  indefinitely.  Thus  an- 
other attempt  was  made  by  both  coun- 
tries in  1887  to  arrive  at  a permanent  set- 
tlement of  the  question.  The  result  was 
the  conclusion  at  Lisbon,  March  26, 1887, 
of  a preliminary  agreement,  whereby 
China,  on  the  one  hand,  agreed  to  the 
“perpetual  occupation  and  government 
of  Macao  and  its  dependencies  by  Por- 
tugal, as  any  other  Portuguese  posses- 
sion,” and  Portugal  on  the  other  hand, 
agreed  “never  to  alienate  Macao  and  its 
dependencies  without  previous  agreement 
with  China.”  These  provisions  were 
confirmed  by  the  Treaty  of  Friendship 
and  Commerce  between  China  and  Por- 
tugal, signed  at  Peking,  December  1, 
1887,  and  ratified  April  28,  1888.  The 
delimination  of  the  boundaries  of  the 
colony  remains  yet  to  be  carried  out, 
negotiations  in  1909  for  that  purpose 
having  proved  to  be  fruitless.  In  this 
connection,  it  may  be  of  interest  to  add 
that  though  signed  on  the  Chinese  side 
by  the  high  ministers  of  State,  “this 
treaty,  and  the  protocol  on  which  it  was 
based,  were  the  work  of  Sir  Robert 
Hart.”  The  Chinese — Li  Hung-Chang, 
Chang  Chih-tung,  and  Liu  Kun-yi, 
among  the  statesmen  of  the  Empire, 
who  were  personal  friends  of  Sir  Rob- 
ert Hart — never  forgave  him  for  the  ali- 
73 


enation  of  this  piece  of  Chinese  terri- 
tory.” 

In  the  game  of  territorial  grabbing, 
which  was  distinctly  European  in  origin, 
Japan,  though  an  Oriental  country,  was 
an  equal  adept.  As  early  as  1870,  japan 
gave  an  unmistakable  indication  of  her 
territorial  ambitions.  At  this  time  she  was 
not  what  she  is  today,  she  was  little  or- 
ganized and  scarcely  prepared  to  embark 
on  any  serious  program  of  territorial 
aggrandizement.  She  was,  nevertheless, 
anxious  to  annex  the  Loo-chow  Island, 
which  had  been  tributary  to  China  for 
centuries  and  centuries.  Without  going 
into  the  details  of  her  various  attempts, 
it  is  enough  to  say  that  Japan,  at  the 
time  when  China  was  having  serious  diffi- 
culties with  Great  Britain  owing  to  the 
Margary  murder,  attempted  to  treat  Loo- 
chow  Island  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
Mikado’s  dominions  by  converting  it  in- 
to a Japanese  prefecture.  To  this  ar- 
rangement, China,  as  the  suzerain  Pow- 
er, could  not  give  her  consent.  The  rela- 
tion between  the  two  countries  was  so 
strained  for  a time  that  war  was  threat- 
ened. In  1878,  the  Chinese  Government 
invoked  the  good  offices  of  the  United 
States.  General  Grant,  who  was  then 
in  China  on  his  world  tour,  offered  to 
mediate.  The  mediation,  however,  was 
without  practical  result.  Subsequently, 
it  was  understood  that  the  dispute  would 
be  amicably  settled  by  China  taking  part 
of  the  Island  and  Japan  retaining  the 
rest.  This  negotiation  undertaken  at 
Peking,  and  later  efforts  made  for  a set- 
tlement of  the  dispute,  all  ended  in  fail- 
ure. In  the  summer  of  1884,  owing  to 
the  relations  between  China  and  France 
being  severed,  the  Loo-chow  question 
was  set  aside,  and  it  was  never  taken  up 

H.  B.  Morse,  The  International  Relations 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  Vol.  II,  pp.  387-388. 
Mr.  Morse  considered  the  occupation  of 
Macao  by  Portugal  as  “an  act  of  usurpation.” 

74 


again.  Japan  continued  her  measures 
for  the  effective  administration  of  the 
Island.’^ 

Japan’s  appetite  for  new  territories 
was  whetted  with  eating.  She  had  the 
second  helping  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
Chino-Japan  War  of  1894-5,  which  fur- 
nished fresh  opportunities  for  her  terri- 
torial aggrandizement.  Japan  demanded 
as  a price  of  peace  a big  indemnity  from 
the  Chinese  Government,  the  cession  of 
Formosa  and  of  the  Pescadores,  and, 
intoxicated  by  the  easy  victory  over 
China,  she  even  went  so  far  as  to  de- 
mand from  her  the  cession  of  Liao-tung 
peninsula,  in  absolute  disregard  of  the 
future  security  of  the  Chinese  capital  of 
Peking,  of  public  opinion,  and  of  the 
faint  admonitions  of  the  rest  of  the 
world.  A coalition  of  three  European 
Powers  stepped  in;  Russia,  France,  and 
Germany,  in  no  uncertain  language,  ad- 
vised her  not  to  take  possession  of  Liao- 
tung peninsula.’^  Japan  had  to  yield  to 
this  representation,  and  be  satisfied  with 
an  additional  sum  of  20,000,000  taels 
which  China  was  to  pay  for  the  restora- 
tion of  the  territory.  This  submission  by 
Japan  was  a simple  admission  to  the 
world  that,  while  she  was  more  than  able 
to  exact  whatever  terms  she  wanted  from 
China,  she  quailed  and  yielded,  when  the 
European  Powers  of  the  first  magnitude 
spoke,  when  Russia  growled,  when 

“^John  Bassett  Moore,  A History  and  Di- 
gest of  International  Arbitrations,  Vol.  V,  p. 
5947. 

On  April  25,  1895,  the  following  note  was 
presented  by  Russia  to  the  Government  of 
Tokyo:  “The  Imperial  Russian  Government, 
having  examined  the  terms  of  peace  demand- 
ed of  China  by  Japan,  consider  the  contem- 
plated possession  of  the  Liao-tung  peninsula 
by  Japan  will  not  only  constitute  a constant 
menace  to  the  capital  of  China,  but  will  also 
render  the  independence  of  Korea  illusory, 
and  thus  jeopardize  the  permanent  peace  of 
the  Par  Bast.  Accordingly,  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment in  a spirit  of  cordial  friendship  for 
Japan,  hereby  counsel  the  Government  of  the 
Emperor  of  Japan  to  renounce  the  definitive 
possession  of  the  Liao-tung  peninsula.” 

75 


France  murmured,  and  when  Germany 
roared. 

To  China  this  three-Power  interven- 
tion was  by  no  means  a blessing.  In- 
deed, it  was  a source  of  future  troubles. 
In  consideration  of  what  was  yet  in  store, 
it  is  more  than  questionable  whether 
China  derived  any  benefit  from  the  step, 
which  the  three  Powers  took  ostensibly 
on  her  behalf.  Each  Power  had  a price 
for  her  “service,”  which  China  must  pay. 

The  immediate  result  of  the  Chino- 
Japanese  War  which,  to  borrow  Pro- 
fessor Holland’s  suggestive  language, 
“had  destroyed  the  fame  of  one  nation 
and  made  that  of  another,”  was  an  invi- 
tation, as  it  were,  to  the  Europ°an  Pow- 
ers for  further  encroachments  upon 
China.  Her  miserable  defeat  revealed 
her  desperate  weakness  and  absolute 
helplessness  to  the  world  much  more 
glaringly  than  ever  before,  and  the  Euro- 
pean Powers  were  quick  to  see  their  op- 
portunity for  further  aggandizement  at 
her  expense.  It  was  at  this  moment  that 
the  cry  of  the  “break-up  of  China”  was 
on  everybody’s  lips,  and  it  was  at  this 
moment  that  the  Powers  in  Europe,  not 
satisfied  with  what  they  had  already  ac- 
quired from  China  in  the  past,  actually 
contemplated  of  her  dismemberment. 

The  first  Power  that  took  advantage  of 
China’s  weakness  was  Germany,  who,  un- 
like France,  England,  Russia,  or  Japan, 
had  hitherto  no'  territorial  possession  in 
China,  and  who  was,  therefore,  unusual- 
ly anxious  to  seize  the' first  possible  op- 
portunity to  place  herself  on  an  equal 
footing  with  the  rest  of  the  Powers.  In 
the  month  of  January,  1897,  a German 
expert  in  harbor-building  and  engineering 
was  sent  out  to  China  by  the  Berlin  Gov- 
ernment, in  response  to  a suggestion 
made  in  the  previous  year  by  the  Ger- 
man Rear-Admiral  on  the  China  station. 
As  the  engineer’s  report  was  most  fa- 
76 


vorable  to  the  establishment  of  a German 
naval  base  at  Kiao-chow  Bay,  the  Ger- 
man Minister  in  Peking  made,  under  in- 
structions from  Berlin,  immediate  over- 
tures to  the  Chinese  Government  for  the 
lease  of  the  bay.  It  should  be  noted  that 
the  German  Government  wanted,  in  the 
first  place,  a naval  base  in  the  Chinese 
waters  for  the  protection  of  German 
commerce  and  for  the  upholding  of  Ger- 
man prestige  in  the  Far  East.  It  should 
also  be  noted  that  the  German  expert, 
who  was  sent  out  to  China  to  look  over 
the  ground,  decided  upon  Kiao-chow  Bay 
only  after  he  had  found  out  that  Samsa 
Bay,  Wei-hai-wei,  and  Sammon  Bay 
were  useless  for  such  purpose.  That 
this  was  so  was  admited  by  the  German 
Kaiser  himself.”  It  was  very  natural, 
therefore,  that  the  German  diplomat  in 
the  Chinese  capital,  under  instructions 
and  inspirations  directly  from  Berlin, 
should  have  made  repeated  overtures  to 
the  Chinese  Government  for  the  lease  of 
the  Kiao-chow  Bay,  and  not  of  any  of 
the  others.  To  these  overtures  the  Chi- 
nese Government  lent  but  a deaf  ear. 
Neither  the  German  Minister  nor  the 
German  Government  knew  how  to  pro- 
ceed. At  this  very  moment,  however,  an 
incident  took  place,  which  the  German 
Government  immediately  made  use  of  to 
bring  about  the  realization  of  its  ambi- 

“A  German  historical  writer  stated  (in  a 
book  published  under  Imperial  patronage) 
that  the  occupation  of  Kiao-chow  was  car- 
ried out  as  the  result  of  a proposal  by  Bishop 
Anzer,  then  a well-known  German  mission- 
ary in  China.  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II,  however, 
denied  the  truth  of  the  statement,  and  In  the 
margin  of  the  book,  he  commented  on  it  in 
the  following  language:  “Wrong.  I selected 
Kiao-chow  after  I had  had  Samsa  Bay  and 
Wei-hai-wei  reconnoitered.  Both  were  re- 
ported to  me  as  wholly  unsuitable.  I there- 
upon took  Baron  von  Richthofen’s  book  and  a 
map  of  China,  and  after  reading  his  chapter 
on  Shantung,  I decided  for  the  port  Kiao- 
chow,  as  Baron  von  Richthofen’s  opinion  of 
the  Hinterland  was  so  remarkably  favorable. 
Bishop  Anzer  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  de- 
cision.’’— The  Spectator,  December  14,  1907, 
p.  969. 


77 


tion.  On  the  first  of  November,  1897, 
three  German  Catholic  missionaries 
(named  Nies,  Henle,  and  Stenz)  were 
attacked  by  a Chinese  mob  in  a village 
named  Chang-chia  in  the  Tsao-chow 
prefecture  of  Shantung  province/'  The 
first  two  named  were  wounded  and 
finally  died,  and  the  third  escaped  un- 
hurt. In  this  incident  Germany  saw  im- 
mediately her  desired  opportunity  to 
translate  her  dream  into  reality.  She 
came  to  an  understanding  with  Russia 
first,  to  whom,  according  to  the  notorious 
Cassini  Convention,  Kiao-chow  Bay  was 
to  be  leased.  Thus,  on  the  10th  of 
November,  1897,  while  the  negotiation 
for  the  settlement  of  the  incident  was 
still  pending  and  the  demand  for  the 
lease  was  yet  to  be  reconsidered,  the  Ger- 
man cruiser  division  in  the  Far  Eastern 
waters,  commanded  by  Admiral  Dieder- 
ichs,  later  of  Manila  fame  in  his  tilt  with 
Admiral  Dewey  of  the  United  States 
during  the  Spanish-American  War,  ar- 
rived at  the  entrance  of  Kiao-chow  Bay, 
and  on  November  11,  he  took  possession 
of  the  Bay  and  its  surrounding  terri- 
tories in  the  name  of  the  German  Em- 
peror." 


B.  L.  P.  Weale,  Re-shaping  of  The  Par 
East,  pp.  372-373. 

The  details  of  the  seizure  were  given  in 
The  North  China  Daily  News,  November  29. 
1897,  as  follows:  “On  Sunday,  the  14th  in- 
stant, at  8 A.  M.,  a landing  party  was  sent 
ashore  to  take  possession  of  the  heights  sur- 
rounding the  bay.  'At  the  same  time  the  or- 
der was  given  to  the  ‘Cormorant’s’  landing 
party,  she  being  farthest  inside  the  bay  and 
commanding  the  passes  to  the  interior,  to 
take  the  powder  magazine.  Towards  9 
o’clock  these  points  having  been  secured,  the 
Flag-Lieutenant  was  sent  to  the  Chinese  Gen- 
eral with  an  ultimatium  that  within  3 hours 
he  must  clear  out  of  the  camp.  The  two 
ships  ‘Kaiser’  and  ‘Prinzess  Wilhelm’  were 
so  anchored  outside  of  the  port  that  they 
commanded  the  forts,  the  order  having  been 
given  to  lire  on  the  same  on  a certain  given 
signal.  After  delivery  to  him  of  the  ulti- 
matum the  General  withdrew,  as  resistance, 
especially  as  his  ammunition  had  been  seized, 
would  have  been  futile.  Towards  2 P.  M. 
the  German  flag  was  hoisted  on  the  east  fort: 
the  Admiral  made  a speech  to  the  crews; 
78 


It  will  be  recalled  that  in  the  alleged 
Cassini  Convention,  divulged  in  the 
N orth-China  Herald  of  Shanghai  and 
later  in  the  London  Times  in  the  fall  of 
1896,  Kiao--chow  Bay  was  mentioned  as 
the  first  of  three  ports  which  China  was 
to  lease  to  Russia.  The  German  Govern- 
ment must  have  been  well  acquainted 
with  its  contents,  the  premature  publica- 
tion of  which  raised  such  an  uproar  in 
the  diplomatic  world  that  everybody  hav- 
ing a hand  in  the  matter  denied  the  ex- 
istence of  the  Convention.  With  the  au- 
thenticity of  the  agreement,  be  it  in  the 
form  of  a treaty  or  of  a memorandum, 
we  are  not  here  concerned.  The  ques- 
tion of  interest  is : If  Kiao-chow  Bay  had 
been  first  promised  to  Russia,  how  did 
Germany  succeed  in  getting  it  from 
China  without  any  objection  from  the 
Russian  Government?  Was  Germany 
not  afraid  of  getting  into  serious  compli- 
cations with  Russia,  whose  good-will  she 
most  desired  to  cultivate.  The  pic- 
ture of  Germany  pursuing  a deliberate 
scheme  of  world-empire  with  an  aggres- 
siveness and  diplomatic  subtlety  alike 
miraculous  was  well-known,  but  it  could 
not  be  easily  imagined  as  to  what  she 
actually  did  in  order  to  lease  from  China 
the  territory  which  Russia  had  already 
pre-empted,  so  to  speak.  The  true  story 
and  the  diplomatic  background  of  the 
lease  were  known  among  a few  and  re- 
mained until  but  recently  a secret  to  the 
world  at  large.  With  the  publication  of 
the  facts  in  the  case  by  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon, 
it  is  now  known  that  the  Kaiser  got  the 
assent  of  the  Czar  first  before  he  sent 
out  his  brother  on  a voyage  of  conquest. 
During  his  first  visit  to  St.  Petersburg 
after  Nicholas’  accession  to  the  throne, 
the  Kaiser  was  driving  home  together 
with  the  Czar  in  an  open  carriage  from 

they  saluted  and  gave  three  cheers  for  the 
Kaiser.” 


79 


a review  at  Peterhof.  In  the  course  of 
conversation  between  the  two  potentates, 
the  Kaiser  suddenly  broke  away  from  the 
ordinary  topics  and  exclaimed : “I  want 
you  to  do  me  a favor.  You  are  in  the 
happy  position  of  being  able  to  help  your 
friends  as  well  as  to  punish  your  ene- 
mies. As  you  know,  I am  badly  in  need 
of  a port.  My  fleet  has  no  place  worthy 
of  the  name  outside  my  Empire.  And 
why  should  it  be  debarred?  That  may, 
perhaps,  serve  the  purpose  of  our  covert 
enemies,  but  not  Russia’s.  And  I know 
your  friendly  sentiment  towards  me  and 
my  dynasty.  I want  you  now  to  say 
frankly,  have  you  any  objection  to  my 
leasing  Kiao-chow  in  China?”  “What 
name  did  you  say?”  replied  the  Czar, 
whose  knowledge  of  the  Far  Eastern 
geography  was  no  better  than  that  of  a 
school  boy.  “Kiao-chow,”  repeated  the 
Kaiser.  “No — none.  I see  no  objection 
whatever,”  quickly  answered  the  Czar." 
The  royal  understanding  was  thus  com- 
plete. The  Kaiser  thanked  his  host  pro- 
fusely, and  the  imperial  pair  drove  to  the 
palace.  A few  moments  later,  the  Czar 
confessed  to  the  Grand  Duke  Alexei 
Alexandrovitch ; “I  feel  put  out  with  the 
Kaiser.  Today  he  has  tricked  me  into 
consenting  to  let  him  have  Kiao-chow. 
Of  course  it  is  not  downright  annexation 
that  he  aims  at.  He  is  only  going  to  lease 
it.  All  the  same,  it  is  a nasty  trick.” 
When  the.  Grand  Duke  requested  him  to 
withdraw  from  this  one-sided  arrange- 
ment, he  answered  with  heat:  “No,  no. 
I have  given  my  word  and  I cannot  back 
out.  It  is  most  vexing.”  “ 

Indeed,  “it  is  most  vexing.”  No  soon- 
er was  the  promise  given  than  the  unto- 
ward incident  took  place  in  China,  which 
furnished  the  Kaiser  the  desired  oppor- 

Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon,  The  Eclipse  of  Russia, 
pp.  247-249. 

18  Hid. 


80 


tunity  to  translate  the  word  into  action, 
and  enabled  him,  by  a startling  process 
of  political  chemistry,  to  turn  the  blood 
of  the  two  missionaries  in  China  into  a 
comfortable  place  under  the  sun.  The 
lease  of  Kiao-chow  was  demanded  from 
the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  the  Chinese  Foreign 
Office.  As  the  German  soldiers  were  al- 
ready in  possession  of  the  city,  and  as, 
with  Germany,  possession  was  nine 
points  of  law,  there  was  but  one  choice 
that  China  could  make : to  fight  or  to 
accept  the  demand.  Not  being  in  a position 
to  defend  herself,  nor  having  any  foreign 
assistance  in  sight,  she  accepted  the 
German  demand  as  gracefully  as  she 
could.  Kiao-chow  Bay  was  accord- 
ingly leased  to  Germany  for  ninety- 
nine  years,  with  a special  reservation  on 
China’s  sovereignty  over  the  territory. 
“Verily  the  blood  of  martyrs  is  the  seed 
of  wickedness !”  “If  one  had  to-  select 
the  political  crime  of  modern  history 
which  combined  the  maximum  of  vic- 
iousness with  the  minimum  of  excuse  it 
would  be  this.”  ” 


•’The  New  Statesmen,  July  5,  1919,  p.  339. 
In  this  connection  it  should  be  noted  that 
leasing  territory  from  China  was  not  all  a 
new  practice.  Germany  was  not  the  first 
Power  to  hold  a territorial  lease  from  China, 
popular  assumptions  to  the  contrary  not- 
withstanding. The  system  of  leasehold  was 
first  Introduced  in  China  by  Great  Britain, 
who  held  a perpetual  lease  of  Kowloon  be- 
fore it  was  ceded  to  her  in  1860.  By  the 
Treaty  of  Peking,  February  4,  1897,  relative 
to  the  Burmese-Chinese  frontiers,  Great 
Britain  held  on  a perpetual  lease  a large 
tract  of  territory  that  she  recognized  as  be- 
longing to  China.  Article  II  of  the  said 
treaty  reads:  "Great  Britain  engages  to  rec- 
ognize as  belonging  to  China  the  tract  to  the 
south  of  Namwan  River,  near  Namkhai, 
which  is  inclosed  to  the  west  by  a branch  of 
the  Nam  Mak  River  and  the  Mawsin  range 
of  hills  up  to  Loi  Chow  Peak,  and  thence 
by  the  range  running  in  a north-easterly 
direction  to  the  Shweli  River.  In  the  whole 
of  this  area  China  shall  not  exercise  any 
jurisdiction  or  authority  whatever.  The  ad- 
ministration and  control  will  be  entirely  con- 
ducted by  the  British  Government,  who  will 
hold  it  on  a perpetual  lease  from  China,  pay- 
ing a rent  for  it,  the  amount  of  which  shall 
be  fixed  hereafter.”  (Hertslet’s  China  Treat- 
ies, Vol.  I,  p.  114).  This  treaty  was  signed 
81 


The  seizure  of  Kiao-chow  Bay  by  Ger- 
many served  as  a signal  for  the  other 
Powers  to  rush  in.  The  game  of  terri- 
torial grabbing  was  now  revived  in  earn- 
est. Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain 
followed,  one  and  all,  in  Germany’s  foot- 
steps and  claimed  to  maintain  what  was 
generally  called  the  “balance  of  power,” 
the  principle  being  that  if  one  Power 
should  grab  something  from  China  the 
others  were  to  follow  the  example.  Thus, 
as  an  “Englishman  in  China”  had  ob- 
served, “the  scramble  which  moderate 
men  had  hoped  to  see  indefinitely  post- 
poned was  entered  into  with  the  zest  of  a 
Cornish  wrecking  raid.  The  officious  in- 
terference of  quasi-friendly  Powers  to 
save  the  derelict  Empire  from  mutilation 
proved,  according  to  unvarying  experi- 
ence, a remedy  which  was  worse  than 
the  disease.  Russia,  Germany  and 
France  (and  Great  Britain,  it  may  be 
added)  proceeded  to  treat  China  as  a 
No  Man’s  Land;  disintegration  was  the 
order  of  the  day.  The  example  was,  of 
course,  contagious.  Other  Powers,  with 
no  more  substantial  ground  of  claim  than 
was  afforded  by  the  defencelessness  of 
China,  began  whetting  their  knives  to 
carve  the  moribund  carcass.”  As  a set- 
off to  the  German  hold  in  Shantung, 
therefore,  France  leased  Kwang-chow- 
wan  from  China  for  ninety-nine  years 
R.ussia,  in  order  to  “provide  herself  a se- 
cure base  on  the  north  coast  of  China,” 
leased  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan  for 
twenty-five  years ; and  Great  Britain,  de- 

at  Peking,  February  4,  1897,  while  the  Con- 
vention between  China  and  Germany  respect- 
ing the  lease  of  Kiao-Chow  Bay  was  signed 
at  Peking,  March  6,  1898. 

“Alexander  Michle,  The  Englishman  In 
China,  Vol.  II,  pp.  417-418. 

” “Le  Oouvernement  chinois,  en  raison  de  son  amitle 
pour  la  France,  a donne  a bail  pour  99  ans  Kouang- 
tcheou-ouan  au  Oouvernement  Jrancais  pour  p etablir 
une  station  navale  avec  depot  de  charbon,  mais  il  rests 
entendu  gue  eette  location  n'atfectera  pas  les  droits  de 
souverainete  de  la  Chine  sur  les  territoires  cedes." — 
Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p 3S9. 

82 


viating  from  her  official  utterances  and 
protestations  that  her  interests  in  China 
were  commercial  and  not  territorial  and 
that  she  was  unalterably  opposed  to  di- 
viding China  into  “water-tight  compart- 
ments,” leased  Wei-hai-wei  “for  so  long 
a period  as  Port  Arthur  should  remain  in 
the  occupation  of  Russia.” In  addition 
to  this,  Great  Britain  also  took  advantage 
of  this  opportunity  of  international 
scramble  to  lease  from  China  Mirs  Bay, 
Deep  Bay,  and  the  adjacent  islands  and 
waters  near  Hongkong. 

The  last  Power  to  come  on  the  scene 
in  this  scramble  for  territorial  leases  was 
Italy,  who,  caught  by  the  contagious 
disease,  was  also  anxious  to  secure  a 
similar  foothold  in  China.  On  Febru- 
ary 28,  1899,  M.  Martino,  Italian  Min- 
ister in  Peking,  with  the  support  of  the 
British  Minister,  demanded  of  the  Chi- 
nese Government  “the  lease  of  Sammen 
Bay  on  the  coast  of  Chekiang  as  a coal- 
ing station  and  naval  base,  including  the 
concession  of  three  islands  off  the  coast, 
with  the  right  to  construct  a railway 
from  Sammen  Bay  to  Po-yang  Lake 
within  a sphere  comprising  the  southern 
two-thirds  of  Chekiang  province.”  “ To 
this  demand  Great  Britain  lent  her  diplo- 
matic support,  for  she  was  desirous  of 
making  use  of  the  Italian  co-operation 
in  the  preservation  of  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Far  East,  which  was  seri- 
ously menaced  by  Russia.  The  Italian 
demand,  however,  met  with  r;o  success. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  China  was  lying 


” “In  order  to  provide  Great  Britain  with  a 
suitable  naval  harbor  in  North  China,  and  for 
the  better  protection  of  British  commerce  in 
the  neighboring  seas,  the  Government  of  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  agree  to  lease 
to  the  Government  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen 
of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  Weihalwei,  in 
the  Province  of  Shantung,  and  the  adjacent 
waters,  for  so  long  a period  as  Port  Arthur 
shall  remain  in  the  occupation  of  Russia.” — 
Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  p.  122. 

“Annual  Register,  1899,  p.  358. 

83 


“like  a stranded  whale,  apparently  dead 
or  dying,”  ” not  all  Powers  could  come 
after  the  blubber  with  success.  The 
Italian  demand  was  met  with  a firm  re- 
fusal by  the  Chinese  Government. 

« W.  R.  Thayer,  Life  of  John  Hay,  Vol.  II, 
p.  240. 


84 


CHAPTER  V 


The  Regime  of  the  Spheres  of  Interest 

ONE  of  the  curious  by-products  of 
the  interplay  of  rival  demands  on 
China  for  territorial  and  eco- 
nomical concessions  towards  the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  century  was  the  demarca- 
tion of  the  country  by  the  foreign  Pow- 
ers into  what  is  now  generally  known  as 
the  spheres  of  interest  or  influence.  Not 
satisfied  with  the  leased  territories  which 
they  had  forced  from  the  crumbling  Gov- 
ernment at  Peking,  and  yet  discontent- 
ed with  the  numerous  railway  and  min- 
ing concessions  that  they  had  acquired 
one  after  another,  Russia,  Germany, 
France,  Great  Britain  and  Japan  came 
upon  a new  scheme  whereby  they  could 
assure  themselves  of  anything  and  every- 
thing that  China  could  offer  in  the  event 
of  her  dismemberment.  They  intro- 
duced the  system  of  spheres  of  interest 
or  influence,  which  was  nothing  more,  to 
use  the  words  of  an  eminent  international 
jurist,  than  ‘‘provisional  appropriation 
of  territories  in  advance  of  anything  re- 
sembling occupation.”  ^ This  “provis- 
ional appropriation”  might  be  political,  or 
merely  economic.  It  is  commonly  under- 
stood that  in  China  the  term  sphere  of 
interest  or  of  influence  is  used  in  a sense 
somewhat  different  from  that  which  is 
used  in  Egypt,  in  Africa,  or  elsewhere. 
In  China,  it  is  the  sphere  of  interest, 
rather  than  the  sphere  of  influence,  that 
the  Powers  have  established  or  claimed. 
The  niceties  of  diplomatic  terminology 
may  seem  to  an  ordinary  man  quite 
absurd,  but  between  the  two  terms  there 


^ John  Westlake,  International  Law,  Part 
I,  p.  130. 


85 


is  a good  deal  of  difference.  “The 
technical  meaning  of  the  term  sphere  of 
interest  is  an  area  of  territory  within 
which  a nation  claims  the  primary  right 
of  exploitation  of  commercial  and 
natural  resources.  The  term  sphere  of 
influence  is  by  some  thought  to  refer  to  a 
certain  degree  of  political  control,  how- 
ever slight  it  may  be.”  “ In  other  words, 
sphere  of  interest  is  a sphere  of  economic 
development,  which  is,  in  that  case,  de- 
sif  ned  for  peaceful  exploitation.  The 
term  sphere  of  influence,* *  is,  strictly 
speaking,  a sphere  of  dominion,  which 
implies  ultimate  political  control  by  the 
Power  who  claims  it.  These  two  terms 
have  been  used  interchangeably,  how- 
ever, by  most  writers,  and  it  is  mainly 
for  this  reason  that  not  infrequently 
writers  on  Chinese  questions  speak  of 
spheres  of  influence  when  they  actually 
mean  spheres  of  interest.  It  is  unneces- 
sary here  to  go  into  the  technical  details 
of  the  two  terms.  For  our  purpose,  it  is 
sufficient  to  remember  that  one  applies  to 
regions  reserved  or  pre-empted  for  eco- 
nomic exploitation,  while  the  other  refers 
to  territorial  spheres  ear-marked  for 
political  control.*  The  former  the  Euro- 

^ Paul  S.  Reinsch,  World  Politics,  p.  113. 

“ “It  cannot  be  irrelevant  to  remark  that 
‘spheres  of  influence’  and  the  theory  or  prac- 
tice of  the  ‘Hinterland’  idea  are  things  un- 
known to  international  law  and  do  not  as  yet 
rest  upon  any  recognized  principles  of  either 
international  or  municipal  law.  They  are 
new  departures  which  certain  great  European 
Powers  have  found  necessary  and  convenient 
in  the  course  of  their  division  among  them- 
selves of  great  tracts  of  the  continent  of  Af- 
rica, and  which  find  their  sanction  solely  in 
their  reciprocal  stipulations.”  Mr.  Olney, 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  to  Sir 
.Julian  Paunceforte.  British  Ambassador  at 
Washington,  June  22,  1896. — J.  B.  Moore,  A 
Digest  of  International  Law,  Vol.  I,  pp.  268- 
269. 

* “The  term  ‘sphere  of  influence’  is  not  in- 
frequently, but  never  officially,  it  is  believed, 
employed  in  China  as  synonymous  with  the 
term  ‘sphere  of  interest.’  This  latter  term 
is  certainly  to  be  preferred,  but  in  some  re- 
spects it  is  unfortunate  that  either  expres- 
sion should  have  found  currency  in  China, 
for,  as  here  applied,  they  both  carry  with 
86 


pean  Powers,  plus  Japan,  have  all 
claimed  to  have,  while  the  latter  does  not 
exist,  in  China.  It  should  be  noted  that 
neither  to  the  one  nor  to  the  other  do  the 
leased  territories  belong,  which  are  a 
class  by  themselves.  Strictly  speaking, 
these  territories  are  merely  leased  to  the 
different  Powers  for  the  stipulated  num- 
ber of  years,  and  they  cannot,  therefore, 
be  regarded  either  as  spheres  of  influ- 
ence or  of  interest. 

The  spheres  in  China,  territorial  in 
demarcation,  but  essentially  economic  in 
nature,  were  created  in  two  different 
ways.  The  first  way  was  by  understand- 
ings between  China  on  the  one  side,  and 
the  Powers  on  the  other,  whereby  the 
former  undertook  not  to  alienate  any 
part  of  her  territory,  which  any  one  par- 
ticular Power  entering  into  an  under- 
standing with  China  might  claim  to  be 
greatly  interested  in,  either  because  of  the 
economic  interests  that  she  had  already 
had  therein,  or  because  of  its  proximity 
to  her  own  territorial  possessions  in 
Eastern  Asia.  The  first  instance  of  an 
engagement  of  non-alienation  was  found 
in  the  Burma  Convention  of  March  1, 
1894,  between  China  and  Great  Britain, 
whereby  the  former  agreed  not  to  alien- 
ate the  States  of  Munglem  and  Kiang 
Hung,  which  Great  Britain  had  in  the 
same  treaty  renounced  in  favor  of  China. 
“His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China 
shall  not,  without  previously  coming  to 
an  agreement  with  Her  Britannic  Maj- 
esty, cede  either  Munglem  or  Kiang 
Hung,  or  any  portion  thereof,  to  any  oth- 

them  connotations  quite  different  from  those 
that  are  usually  attached  to  them  by  inter- 
national law  writers.  In  China  it  will  be 
found  that  a sphere  of  interest  has  only  an 
economic,  or,  at  the  most,  only  a quasi  or 
incidentally  political  meaning,  whereas  this 
expression,  as  well  as  that  of  sphere  of  in- 
fluence, has  a decidedly  political  signification 
when  applied  to  regions  in  other  parts  of  the 
world  and  especially  in  Africa.” — W.  W.  Wil- 
loughby, Foreign  Rights  and  Interests  In 
China,  pp.  270-271. 


87 


er  nation.”  ® No  sooner,  however,  was 
the  promise  made  than  it  was  broken. 
On  June  20,  1895,  a Convention  was  en- 
tered into  between  China  and  France  for 
the  delimitation  of  the  Tonkin-Chinese 
frontier.  In  this  delimitation,  unfortu- 
nately, a portion  of  the  territory  of  the 
State  of  Kiang  Hung  was  given  to 
France.  In  view  of  this  infraction, 
China  entered  into  another  agreement 
with  Great  Britain,  February  4,  1897,  in 
which  certain  territorial  compensations, 
including  the  state  of  Kokang,  were 
given  to  the  latter.  As  a further  precau- 
tion against  alienation  of  the  territory  in 
question,  the  Contracting  Powers  de- 
clared once  more : “It  is  agreed  that 
China  will  not  cede  to  any  other  nation 
either  Munglem  or  any  part  of  Kiang 
Hung  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Mekong, 
or  any  part  of  Kiang  Hung  now  in  her 
possession  on  the  left  bank  of  that  river, 
without  previously  coming  to  an  agree- 
ment with  Great  Britain.”  ® 

France  was  not  slow  in  realizing  the 
advantages  of  such  an  arrangement  with 
China,  and  was  quick  to  follow  the  ex- 
ample which  Great  Britain  had  set  in 
the  demand  on  China  for  the  non-aliena- 
tion of  the  Kiang  Hung  State.  Thus,  on 
March  15,  1897,  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, in  reply  to  a request  by  the  French 
Minister  in  Peking,  declared  that  the 
Island  of  Hainan,  which  is  in  close 
neighborhood  of  the  French  possessions 
in  Tonkin,  would  never  be  alienated  or 
ceded  by  China  to  any  foreign  Power, 
“either  as  final  or  temporary  cession,  or 
as  a naval  station  or  coaling  station.”  ’ 
It  should  be  noted  that  this  arrangement 
took  the  form  of  an  exchange  of  notes, 
and  did  not  attain  the  dignity  of  an  in- 

^ Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  104. 

® Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  116. 

^Documents  Diplomatiques,  Chine,  1894- 
1898,  p.  33. 


88 


ternational  agreement.  The  French 
Government  was,  however,  determined 
not  to  be  bothered  by  the  informal  char- 
acter of  the  engagement,  and  was  dis- 
posed to  be  satisfied  with  the  declaration 
of  non-alienation  of  the  island,  which 
the  Chinese  Government  had  made  ob- 
viously in  response  to  the  French  re- 
quest. It  was  later  tacitly  understood 
that  the  Island  of  Hainan  was  to  be  con- 
sidered as  a French  sphere  of  interest. 

Almost  a year  later,  France  made  an- 
other request  that  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment should  put  itself  on  record  that  it 
would  never  alienate  any  of  the  terri- 
tories on  the  Tonkin  border.  M.  Dubail, 
the  French  representative  in  Peking,  in 
a letter  to  Tsung-li  Yamen,  April  4,  1898, 
said : 

“With  the  purpose  of  assuring  the 
relations  of  neighborliness  and  friendship 
between  China  and  France ; with  the  pur- 
pose, equally,  of  seeing  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  the  Chinese  Empire  main- 
tained ; and,  further,  because  of  the  ne- 
cessity of  taking  care  that  no  change  be 
introduced  in  the  existing  situation  as  re- 
gards the  provinces  bordering  on  Ton- 
kin {par  suite  de  la  necessite  de  veiller  a 
ce  que  dans  les  provinces  liniitrophes  du 
Tonkin,  il  ne  soil  apportc  aitcune  modifi- 
cation a I’ctat  de  fait  et  de  droit  ex- 
istant),  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
(of  France)  would  attach  particular 
value  to  receiving  from  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment an  assurance  that  it  will  not  cede 
to  any  other  Power  all  or  a part  of  the 
territory  of  those  provinces,  either  defi- 
nitely or  temporarily,  or  on  lease,  or  by 
any  title  whatsoever.”  ® 

To  the  foregoing  request,  the  Chi- 
nese Government  made  the  following 

® Documents  Diplomatiques,  Chine,  1894- 
1898,  p.  49.  For  English  translation  of  the 
text  of  the  French  note,  see  Rockhill, 
Treaties  and  Conventions  With  or  Concerning 
China  and  Korea,  1894-1904,  p.  178. 

89 


reply,  which  was,  as  a matter  of  fact,  no 
more  a pledge  than  a declaration  of  its 
determination  not  to  cede  the  terri- 
tories in  question  to  any  Power  whatso- 
ever: “Our  Yamen  considers  that  the 
Chinese  provinces  bordering  on  Tonkin, 
being  important  frontier  points  which  are 
of  highest  interest  to  China,  must  always 
be  administered  by  China  and  remain  un- 
der her  sovereignty.  There  is  no  reason 
that  they  should  be  ceded  or  leased  to 
any  Power.”  With  this  declaration, 
France  was  apparently  satisfied.  It 
should  be  noted,  in  passing,  that  “the 
provinces  bordering  on  Tonkin”  meant 
the  provinces  of  Yunnan,  Kwangtung, 
and  Kwangsi — the  only  provinces  of 
China  which  are  coterminous  with  the 
French  possessions  in  Tonkin,  and  in  the 
neighborhood  of  which  France  was 
anxious  that  no  territorial  changes 
should  be  introduced.  It  should  also  be 
noticed  that  this  engagement  was  almost 
immediately  broken.  The  Anglo-Chinese 
Convention  of  June  9,  1898,  provided  for 
an  extension  of  Hongkong  territory  “for 
proper  defence  and  protection  of  the  Col- 
ony.” This  extension  included  Mirs 
Bay,  Deep  Bay,  the  Island  of  Lantao, 
the  Island  of  Lamma,  and  a large  tract  of 
territory  on  the  mainland  in  the  province 
of  Kwangtung,  all  of  which  Great 
Britain  leased  from  China  for  ninety- 
nine  years,  and  none  of  which  France 
would  like  to  see  China  cede  to  “any 
other  Power,”  “either  definitely  or  tem- 
porarily, or  on  lease,  or  by  any  title 
whatsoever.” 

That  Great  Britain  was  the  Power 
most  culpable  in  leading  the  program 
of  earmarking  the  Chinese  territories  as 
her  own  exclusive  spheres  is  a fact  that 
cannot  be  denied.  After  France  had  ex- 
tracted from  the  Chinese  Government  a 
promise  of  non-alienation  of  Hainan,  but 
before  she  got  a similar  one  regarding 
90 


the  provinces  on  the  Tonkin  border, 
Great  Britain,  in  order  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  power  in  Eastern  Asia,  de- 
manded from  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  a simi- 
lar declaration,  but  over  a much  vaster 
region  of  Chinese  territory.  On  Febru- 
ary 9,  1898,  Sir  Claude  M.  MacDonald, 
British  Minister  in  Peking,  asked  the 
Chinese  Government  to  give  “a  definite 
assurance  that  China  will  never  alienate 
any  territory  in  the  provinces  adjoining 
the  Yangtze  to  any  other  Power,  whether 
under  lease,  mortgage,  or  any  other  des- 
ignation.” ° Two  days  later,  the  Chinese 
Government  replied  that,  as  the  provinces 
adjoining  the  Yangtze  Valley  were  an 
integral  part  of  China,  to  which  she  at- 
tached great  importance,  it  was  “out  of 
the  question”  altogether  that  the  Chinese 
Government  would  cede  the  territory  in 
question  to  any  Power  whatsoever.  This 
was  an  emphatic  answer  by  the  Chinese 
Government,  but  the  emphasis  did  not 
prevent  Great  Britain  from  considering 
the  Yangtze  Valley  as  her  own  sphere  of 
interest.  It  is  mainly  on  the  strength  of 
this  declaration  of  non-alienation  by  the 
Chinese  Government,  which  is  a very 
slender  basis  even  if  treated  as  an  irre- 
vocable promise  by  China,  that  today 
“Great  Britain  has  built  up  for  herself  a 
claim  to  special  consideration  with  re- 
gard to  the  granting  of  railway  or  other 
concessions  in  this  region.”  Originally, 

10  -yy.  w.  Willoughby,  Foreign  Rights  and 
Interests  in  China,  p.  282. 

the  non-alienation  of  the  Yangtze  Valley 
was  one  of  those  demands  made  upon 
China  in  return  for  the  rejection  of  the 
offer  of  a guaranted  loan  from  Great 
Britain  in  1897,  and  it  was  then  pointed 
out  that  the  rebuff  to  Great  Britain  must 
be  paid  for.  Sir  Claude  M.  MacDonald, 
the  British  Minister  in  Peking,  was 
frank  enough,  however,  to  admit  this : 


“Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  pp.  119- 
120. 

91 


“My  chief  ground  was  that  we  could  not 
afford  to  find  one  morning  that  by  rea- 
son of  the  murder  of  a foreign  subject 
or  the  refusal  of  some  demand  by  a for- 
eign Power,  some  place  on  the  Yangtze 
had  been  seized  and  was  to  be  retained 
on  a ninety-nine  years’  lease.”  ” 

All  this  happened  at  the  time  when  the 
battle  for  political  and  economic  conces- 
sions in  China  was  at  its  height.  It  is 
easy  to  understand  how  the  foreign 
Powers  were  anxious  to  safeguard  their 
respective  interests  by  this  means,  or  by 
other  and  similar  means.  The  maintenance 
of  the  balance  of  power  served  as  a ready 
and  convenient  excuse  for  the  Powers  to 
do  one  thing  or  the  other  at  the  expense 
of  China,  and  the  well-known  intention 
on  their  part  to  preserve  China’s  terri- 
torial integrity  was  all  the  excuse  that 
was  necessary  for  demanding  from  her 
the  promises  of  non-alienation.  But  it  is 
somewhat  difficult  to  see  how,  seven  or 
eight  years  later.  Great  Britain  could  jus- 
tify herself  in  demanding  a similar  en- 
gagement from  China  regarding  the  in- 
tegrity of  Tibet — a country  wherein 
British  economic  and  commercial  inter- 
est was  almost  nil,  and  whose  integrity 
was  in  no  way  threatened  (if  it  were 
then  not  threatened  by  Great  Britain  her- 
self). Article  IX  of  the  Anglo-Tibetan 
Convention,  signed  at  Lhasa,  September 
7,  1904,  provided  for  the  non-cession  of 
Tibetan  territory  to  any  foreign  Power. 
“No  portion  of  Tibetan  territory  shall 
be  ceded,  sold,  leased,  mortgaged,  or  oth- 
erwise given  for  occupation  to  any  for- 
eign power.”  This  was  an  agreement 
between  Tibet  on  the  one  side,  and  Great 
Britain  on  the  other.  Inasmuch  as  Tibet 
is,  as  it  has  always  been,  a dependency 
of  China,  it  was  necessary  that  the  said 
agreement  should  be  confirmed  by  the 

“China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  20,  p.  15. 

“ Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  206. 

92 


suzerain  Power.  Thus,  by  the  Peking 
Convention  of  April  27,  1906,  China,  the 
suzerain  Power,  agreed  to  the  Anglo- 
Tibetan  Convention  of  1904,  and  under- 
took ‘‘not  to  permit  any  other  foreign 
State  (other  than  China)  to  interfere 
with  the  territory  or  internal  adminis- 
tration of  Tibet.” 

Chronologically,  Japan  was  the  next 
Power  to  claim  a sphere  of  interest  for 
herself,  and  her  piece  of  choice  was 
none  other  than  that  province  of  China 
nearest  to  her  own  territorial  possession 
off  the  Chinese  coast.  She  earmarked 
the  Fukien  province  as  her  sphere  of  in- 
terest. On  April  24,  1899,  Mr.  Yano, 
the  Japanese  Minister  in  Peking,  pre- 
sented to  Tsung-li  Yamen  the  following 
telegram  from  his  Government : 

“The  Government  of  Japan  has  view- 
ed with  constant  deep  concern  the  diffi- 
culties with  which  the  Government  of 
China  has  recently  been  confronted.  The 
declaration  made  at  the  time  of  the  evac- 
uation of  Wei-hai-wei  is  an  evidence  of 
this.  It  is  to  be  apprehended  that  trou- 
ble may  arise  with  consequence  disas- 
trous to  China.  In  all  this  there  is  no 
mistaking  what  our  purpose  is. 

“In  view  of  the  present  state  of  affairs, 
the  Government  of  Japan,  mindful  of  its 
own  interests,  cannot  act  as  if  entirely 
in  ignorance  of  passing  events,  but  must 
take  proper  measures  to  meet  any  situ- 
ation that  may  arise.  You  will  ask  the 
Government  of  China  to  make  a declara- 
tion that  it  will  not  cede  or  lease  to  any 
other  Power  any  portion  of  its  territory 
within  the  province  of  Fukien.” 

The  answer  of  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment was,  in  this  particular  case,  most 
emphatic.  The  declaration  which  the 
Japanese  Government  requested  was 
easily  and  unstintedly  given.  “China  will 

Hertslet,  op.  cit.  p.  203. 

93 


not  cede  or  lease  to  any  foreign  Power 
whatsoever,”  the  declaration  read,  “the 
province  of  Fukien,  with  all  the  territory 
in  the  interior  and  along  the  sea  coast 
within  its  limits,  which  is  an  important 
part  of  China.”  ” 

The  Japanese  demand  for  the  non- 
alienation of  the  Fukien  province  was 
followed  by  another  some  seventeen 
years  later,  covering  a much  greater  ex- 
tent of  the  territory  of  China,  and  with 
much  more  ambitious  schemes  in  view. 
It  is  interesting  to  recall  in  this  connec- 
tion that  among  the  “twenty-one  de- 
mands,” which  the  Japanese  Government 
pressed  upon  China  for  immediate  and 
complete  acceptance  in  the  January  of 
1915,  one  was  for  the  non-alienation  of 
the  territory  or  bays  on  the  Chinese 
coast.  The  language  of  the  demand  ran 
thus : “The  Chinese  Government  engages 
not  to  cede  or  lease  to  a third  Power  any 
harbor,  or  bay,  or  island,  along  the  coast 
of  China.”  This  was  one  of  the  demands 


W.  W.  Rockhill,  Treaties  and  Conventions 
With  or  Concerning  China  and  Korea,  1894- 
1904,  pp.  181-182.  It  may  be  also  of  interest 
to  note  that,  as  intimated  in  the  telegram 
quoted  above,  the  game  of  the  spoliation  of 
China  was  watched  with  great  interest  and 
discussed  with  great  inteliigence  in  Japan. 
Early  in  April,  1898,  an  association  was 
formed,  called  the  Taigai-doshi-kwai  (the 
Association  of  Foreign  Policy,  with  a view 
to  discussing  the  Chinese  affairs  and  to  press- 
ing the  Japanese  Government  to  take  posi- 
tive measures  to  meet  “the  new  order  of 
things’’  in  China.  It  was  composed  largely 
of  prominent  statesmen  and  diplomatists,  and 
leading  men  in  the  country.  When  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Association  called  upon 
Marquis  Ito  one  day,  who  was  then  Premier 
of  Japan,  he  assured  them  that  “the  Govern- 
ment would  not  neglect  to  promote  the  in- 
terest of  the  nation.”  Thus,  towards  the  end 
of  the  month  of  April,  1899,  the  Japanese 
Government,  in  order  to  forestall  the  lease 
or  occupation  of  any  part  of  the  Fukien 
Province  by  a European  Power,  which  would 
menace  the  Japanese  possessions  of  Formosa 
and  Pescadore  Islands,  demanded  and  ob- 
tained, just  as  Great  Britain  had  in  respect 
of  the  Yangtze  Valley  and  France  had  in 
respect  of  the  Island  of  Hainan  and  the  prov- 
inces on  the  Tonkin  border,  from  the  Chinese 
Government  a positive  declaration,  which  Ja- 
pan construed  as  a promise,  of  the  non- 
alienation of  the  province  in  question. 

94 


which  made  up  Group  IV,  and  which 
were  accepted  by  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment in  entirety.  It  was  difficult  to  un- 
derstand why  such  a promise  should 
have  been  exacted  from  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, especially  at  the  time  when  the 
whole  world  was  engaged  in  war,  and 
when  there  was  no  one  Power  in  sight, 
but  Japan  herself,  who  would  ask  China 
to  cede  or  to  lease  any  harbor,  bay,  or 
island  along  her  coast.  One  very 
plausible  explanation  which  has  often 
been  advanced  by  Japanese  writers  is 
that  this  demand  was  made  with  a view 
to  forestalling  the  return  to  China  of  the 
Germans,  who  were  successfully  ex- 
pelled from  their  leased  territory  at 
Kiao-chow,  and  who  might,  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  war,  demand  another 
leasehold  from  China,  possibly  on  her 
coast.  How  far  this  was  true,  none  but 
those  acquainted  with  the  innermost 
workings  of  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office 
could  tell. 

Here  we  have  the  substance  of  the 
different  declarations  by  China,  under- 
taking not  to  alienate  this  or  that  part 
of  her  territory.  It  is  extremely  inter- 
esting to  see  that,  in  each  and  every  case, 
the  particular  part  of  her  territory,  over 
which  a declaration  of  non-alienation 
was  made  on  the  request  or  demand  of  a 
particular  Power,  has  been  considered 
ever  since  as  the  sphere  of  interest  of 
that  Power,  in  which  she  claims  to  en- 
joy prior  rights  for  exploitation. 

The  second  way  whereby  spheres  of 
interest  were  created  and,  in  some  cases, 
recognized,  was  by  direct  understandings 
among  the  Powers  themselves  without 
consultation  with  China  and  without 
any  reference  to  her  wishes  or  desires 
at  all.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this 
method  was  much  more  obnoxious  than 
the  one  we  have  just  described. 

The  first  and  the  earliest  arrangement 

m 


of  this  sort  was  the  arrangement  made 
between  Great  Britain  and  France  in  re- 
gard to  their  mutual  advantages  in  the 
province  of  Yunnan  and  Szechuen.  It 
took  the  form  of  an  official  declaration, 
signed  by  the  Marquis  of  Salisbury  and 
M.  de  Courcel  at  London,  January  15, 
1896.  Article  IV  alone  of  the  declara- 
tion was  devoted  to  this  matter.  It 
read : 

“The  Two  Governments  agree  that  all 
commercial  and  other  privileges  and  ad- 
vantages conceded  in  the  two  Chinese 
provinces  of  Yunnan  and  Szechuen 
either  to  Great  Britain  or  France,  in  vir- 
tue of  their  respective  Conventions  with 
China  of  the  first  of  March,  1894,  and 
the  20th  of  June,  1895,  and  all  privi- 
leges and  advantages  of  any  nature 
which  may  in  the  future  be  conceded  in 
these  two  Chinese  provinces,  either  to 
Great  Britain  or  France,  shall,  as  far  as 
rests  with  them,  be  extended  and  ren- 
dered common  to  both  Powers  and  to 
their  nationals  and  dependents,  and  they 
engage  to  use  their  influence  and  good 
offices  with  the  Chinese  Government  for 
this  purpose.” 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  arrange- 
ment was  entered  into  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  Chinese  Government. 
Yunnan  and  Szechuen  are  the  two  pro- 
vinces, over  which  both  France  and 
Great  Britain  were  claiming,  then,  a spe- 
cial interest,  and  the  one  would  not  rec- 
ognize the  claim  of  the  other.  In  order 
to  avoid  possible  misunderstandings,  and 
conflicts  of  interest,  between  the  two 
Powers,  they  wisely  decided  that  what- 
ever privileges  and  advantages  were 
granted  by  the  Chinese  Government  to 
one  Power  should  be  shared  by  the  other. 
Tlius,  these  two  provinces,  Yunnan  and 
Szechuen,  instead  of  falling  into  the 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1895-96, 
Vol.  LXXXVIII,  pp.  13-16. 

96 


sphere  of  interest  of  any  one  particular 
Power,  became,  by  virtue  of  this  declara- 
tion, a field  open  to  joint  enterprises  of 
the  two  Powers.  To  both  France  and 
Great  Britain,  therefore,  these  two  pro- 
vinces are  today  an  open  field,  in  every 
sense  of  the  word.  To  the  other  Powers, 
however,  they  are  as  much  closed  as  the 
Forbidden  City  in  Peking  is  closed  to  the 
public. 

The  next  arrangement  of  this  sort  was 
the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  of  April 
28,  1899,  which  was  essentially  an  ar- 
rangement of  the  railway  interests  in 
China  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain  re- 
spectively. It  should  be  remembered 
that  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  when  the  European  Powers 
were  struggling  for  territorial  conces- 
sions, they  were  also  fighting  for  railway 
and  mining  concessions.  In  this  fight, 
the  Powers  seemed  to  have  been  well 
lined  up,  with  France,  Russia,  and  Bel- 
gium on  the  one  side.  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  (and  the  United  States)  on  the 
other.  The  first  tug-of-war  took  place 
over  the  construction  of  the  trunk  line 
between  Peking  and  Hankow,  nominally 
projected  by  Belgium,  but  really  backed 
by  Russia  and  France.  It  was  easy  to 
understand  that  such  a line  would  be 
most  strongly  objected  to  by  Great 
Britain,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
southern  terminus  of  the  line  was  to  be 
Hankow,  which  is  the  very  centre  of  the 
Yangtze  Valley,  earmarked  as  the  Brit- 
ish sphere  of  interest.  It  was  also  easy  to 
understand  that  the  objection  by  Great 
Britain  to  the  construction  of  this  trunk 
line  would  be  much  stronger  if  it 
were  to  be  undertaken  by  France  and 
Russia,  her  recognized  rivals  in  China. 
The  scheme  was  devised,  therefore,  that 
Belgium  should  be  made  to  pose  as  the 
real  builder  of  the  line.  A Belgian  syn- 
dicate, called  La  Societe  d’ Etude  des  Che- 
97 


mins  de  fer  en  Chine,  was  organized, 
and  acting  in  obvious  co-operation  with 
the  Russian  and  French  Ministers  in 
Peking,  the  Belgian  Syndicate  entered 
early  in  May  1898,  into  negotiation  with 
the  Chinese  Government  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  Peking-Hankow  line.  It 
was  not  difficult  for  Great  Britain  to  look 
beneath  the  surface  of  the  matter,  and 
to  view  the  scheme  in  its  true  color.  The 
news  of  the  negotiation  was  first  pub- 
lished in  the  Times  (London),  May  22, 
1898,  and  on  May  26,  Sir  Claude  Mac- 
Donald was  telegraphically  instructed  to 
do  what  he  could  on  the  spot  to  foil  the 
Franco-Russian  scheme.  Lord  Salis- 
bury, in  a telegraphic  dispatch  to  him 
declared  frankly  that  “a  concession  of 
this  nature  is  no  longer  a commercial  or 
industrial  enterprise  and  becomes  a polit- 
ical movement  against  the  British  inter- 
ests in  the  region  of  the  Yangtze.” 
He  was  accordingly  instructed  to  in- 
form the  Chinese  Government  that 
‘‘Her  Majesty’s  Government  cannot  pos- 
sibly continue  to  co-operate  in  a friendly 
manner  in  matters  of  interest  to  China, 
if,  while,  preferential  advantages  are 
conceded  to  Russia  in  Manchuria  and  to 
Germany  in  Shantung  these  or  other  for- 
eign Powers  should  also  be  offered  spe- 
cial openings  or  privileges  in  the  region 
of  the  Yangtze.”  The  British  Minister 
in  Peking  was  also  instructed  to  “press 
for  the  railways  from  Hankow  or  Kiu- 
kiang  to  Canton”  as  a counter-demand 
upon  China.”  In  view  of  this  vigorous 
representation,  the  Chinese  Government 
declared  that  Russia  was  not  interested 
in  the  scheme,  and  that  it  was  not  likely 
that  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  would  par- 
ticipate in  the  finance  of  the  line.  On 
June  27,  the  final  contract  of  the  Peking- 
Hankow  Railway  was  signed,  admitting, 

“China,  No.  1.  1899,  No.  175,  p.  117. 

"China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  141,  p.  98. 

98 


however,  the  Russo-Japanese  Bank  to 
financial  participation.  The  British  Min- 
ister declared  that  this  admission  was  a 
“breach  of  faith”  on  the  part  of  the 
the  Chinese  Government,  for  which  sat- 
isfactory compensation  must  be  given. 
“Her  Majesty’s  Government  considered 
that  they  had  been  badly  treated  by 
China  in  the  matter  of  railway  conces- 
sions, and  now  demanded  from  the 
Chinese  Government  the  right  for  Brit- 
ish merchants  to  build  the  following  lines 
upon  the  same  terms  as  those  granted  in 
the  case  of  the  Belgian  line;  Tien-tsin  to 
Chinkiang  (to  be  shared,  if  desired,  with 
the  Germans  and  Americans),  Honan 
and  Shansi,  Peking  Syndicate  lines  to 
the  Yangtze  ; Kowlon  to  Canton  ; Pukow 
to  Sing-yang;  Soochow  to  Hangchow, 
with  extension  to  Ningpo.”  In  order 
to  bring  the  maximum  amount  of  pres- 
sure to  bear  upon  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment, Sir  Claude  was  instructed  to 
declare  that,  “unless  they  (the  Chinese 
Government)  agree  at  once,  we  shall  re- 
gard their  breach  of  faith  concerning  the 
Peking-Hankow  Railway  as  an  act  of  de- 
liberate hostility  against  this  country,  and 
shall  act  accordingly.  After  consulta- 
tion with  the  Admiral,  you  may  give 
them  the  number  of  days  or  hours  you 
think  proper  within  which  to  send  their 
reply.”  In  the  face  of  such  a threat, 
which  was  nothing  short  of  an  ultima- 
tum, the  Chinese  Government  yielded  to 
the  British  demands  without  much  ado. 
Into  the  justice  of  the  British  demands 
we  need  not  inquire  here.  It  is  perti- 
nent to  observe  that  the  interests  of  the 
foreign  Powers  in  China,  and  the  eco- 
nomic balance  of  power,  were  always 

China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  382.  It  was  under- 
stood that  lines  Irom  Shanghai  to  Nanking, 
and  from  Shan-hai-kwan  to  Newchang, 
were  not  included  in  this  list.  The  prelimi- 
nary agreements  of  these  two  lines  had  al- 
ready been  signed. 

“China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  286. 

99 


maintained,  at  the  expense  of  China’s 
own  interests  and  rights.  A British 
writer  keenly  observed:  “When  we  fence 
with  Russia  or  France,  China  has  to 
stand  between  the  points  of  the  foils. 
Each  lunge  is  made,  as  it  were,  through 
the  body  of  the  Tsungli  Yamen.”  “ 

But  this  was  but  the  first  pitched  bat- 
tle. While  this  was  being  fought  out. 
Great  Britain  and  Russia  were  involved 
in  another  railway  dispute,  which  was 
equally  serious.  In  March,  1898,  Rus- 
sia, being  anxious  to  obtain  exclusive 
control  over  railway  matters  in  Man- 
churia and  in  Pechili,  pressed  the  Chi- 
nese Government  to  remove  Mr.  Kin- 
der, a British  subject,  from  his  position 
as  superintendent  of  the  Tien-tsin-Shan- 
hai-kwan  Railway,  and  to  appoint  a Rus- 
sian in  his  place.  Russia  also  demanded 
that  “the  line  north  of  Shan-hai-kwan 
should  be  constructed  by  Russian  engi- 
neers and  with  Russian  capital.”  But 
Great  Britain  was  equally  alive  to  her 
own  interests  in  North  China  and  Man- 
churia. No  sooner  was  the  demand  made 
by  Russia  than  the  Hongkong  and 
Shanghai  Banking  Corporation  secured 
from  the  Chinese  Government,  on  June 
7,  1898,  a preliminary  agreement  for  the 
construction  of  a railway  between  Peking 
and  Newchwang,then  the  only  treaty  port 
in  Manchuria,  undertaking  to  furnish 
the  necessary  amount  of  capital,  and  sat- 
isfying itself  merely  with  a mortgage  on 
the  line.  Russia  was  naturally  per- 
turbed by  what  she  considered  to  be  a 
“British  invasion  of  the  Russian  sphere  of 
interest.”  Unless  a satisfactory  arrange- 
ment were  come  to  between  the  two 
Powers,  more  serious  conflicts  would  be 
inevitable.  Thus,  M.  Lessar,  the  Russian 
Charge  d’Affaires  in  London,  in  an  in- 
terview with  Mr.  Balfour  on  August  13, 

“Edinburgh  Review,  July,  1899,  p.  255. 

« China,  No.  2,  1899,  No.  2,  p.  1. 

100 


1898,  suggested  “that  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation  might  perhaps  be  met  by  an 
arrangement  between  Russia  and  Great 
Britain,  by  which  the  latter  should  be 
bound  not  to  interest  herself  in  railway 
or  mining  concessions  in  Manchuria, 
Russia  on  her  part  binding  herself  in  a 
similar  manner  with  regard  to  the  much 
richer  and  more  populous  district  of  the 
Yangtze.”  Mr.  Balfour  admitted  that 
it  was  his  strong  belief  that  “great  advan- 
tages would  ensue  if  all  the  nations  con- 
cerned could  come  to  an  arrangement  on 
the  basis  of  spheres  of  interest  as  re- 
gards railway  and  mining  concessions 
(in  China),  or  of  even  leaving  the  whole 
country  equally  open  to  the  commerce  of 
the  world.”  The  idea  of  an  arrange- 
ment was  acceptable  to  both  Powers, 
who,  after  numerous  diplomatic  discus- 
sions on  the  question,  finally  came  to  an 
agreement,  whereby  the  Contracting 
Powers  defined  and  agreed  to  respect 
their  respective  spheres  of  interest  and 
their  rights  therein.  It  was  pointed  out 
that  this  agreement  was  not  to  apply  to 
the  railway  line  from  Shan-hai-kwan  to 
Newchwang,  for  the  construction  of 
which  a loan  had  already  been  contracted 
by  the  Chinese  Government  with  the 
Hongkong  and  Shanghai  Banking  Cor- 
poration. The  agreement  consisted  in  an 
exchange  of  notes,  April  28,  1899,  be- 
tween Sir  Charles  S.  Scott,  the  British 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  and 
Count  Mouraview,  the  Russian  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs.  Inasmuch  as  the  ob- 
ject of  the  agreement  was  to  arrange,  as 
Sir  Charles  described  it,  “the  partition  of 
spheres  for  concessions  for  the  construc- 
tion and  working  of  railways  in  China,” 
it  is  best  to  refer  to  the  text  of  the  note 
in  order  to  see  what  the  two  Powers  had 
actually  agreed  upon.  The  agreement, 
which  has  since  been  known  as  the 
22  China,  No.  2,  1899,  No.  13,  p.  6. 

101 


“Scott  - Mouraview  Agreement,”  read 
thus : 

“Great  Britain  and  Russia,  animated 
by  a sincere  desire  to  avoid  in  China  all 
cause  of  conflict  on  questions  where  their 
interests  meet,  and  taking  into  consider- 
ation the  economic  and  geographical 
gravitation  of  certain  parts  of  that  Em- 
pire, have  agreed  as  follows : 

“1.  Great  Britain  engages  not  to  seek 
for  her  own  account,  or  on  behalf  of 
British  subjects  or  of  others,  any  rail- 
way concessions  to  the  north  of  the 
Great  Wall  of  China,  and  not  to  obstruct, 
directly  or  indirectly,  applications  for 
railway  concessions  in  that  region  sup- 
ported by  the  Russian  Government. 

“2.  Russia,  on  her  part,  engages  not 
to  seek  for  her  own  account,  or  on  behalf 
of  Russian  subjects  or  of  others,  any 
railway  concessions  in  the  basin  of  the 
Yangtze  and  not  to  obstruct,  directly  or 
indirectly,  applications  for  railway  con- 
cessions in  that  region  supported  by  the 
British  Government. 

“The  two  Contracting  Parties,  having 
nowise  in  view  to  infringe  in  any  way 
the  sovereign  rights  of  China  or  existing 
treaties,  will  not  fail  to  communicate  to 
the  Chinese  Government  the  present  ar- 
rangement, which,  by  averting  all  cause 
of  complications  between  them,  is  of  a 
nature  to  consolidate  peace  in  the  Far 
East  and  to  serve  the  primordial  inter- 
ests of  China  herself.” 

What  could  be  the  possible  effect  or 
effects  of  such  an  agreement  ? The  Con- 
tracting Parties  were  “animated  by  a sin- 
cere desire  to  avoid  in  China  all  cause 
of  conflict  on  questions  where  their  in- 
terests meet,”  and  this  “desire”  could  be 
taken  as  the  legitimate  purpose  for  which 
the  agreement  was  entered  into.  They 
also  recognized  the  possibility  that,  “by 

23  “w.  Rockhill,  Treaties  and  Conventions 

With  or  Concerning  China  and  Korea,  1894- 
1904,  p.  183. 


102 


averting  all  cause  of  complications  be- 
tween them,”  they  were  helping  “consoli- 
date peace  in  the  Far  East,”  and  in  that 
way  serving  “the  primordial  interests  of 
China.”  The  Contracting  Powers  also 
spoke  of  “the  economic  and  geographical 
gravitation  of  certain  parts”  of  China. 
Whether  or  not  this  “gravitation”  could 
in  any  way  be  counteracted  by  the  Agree- 
ment, they  did  not  make  clear.  What 
was  clear  was  the  fact  that  each  Con- 
tracting Party  recognized  in  so  many 
words  the  sphere  of  interest  of  the  oth- 
er. Russia  undertook  not  to  seek  rail- 
way concessions  “in  the  basin  of  the 
Yangtze”  which  is  the  British  sphere  of 
interest,  and  Great  Britain,  on  her  part, 
engaged  not  to  seek  railway  concessions 
“to  the  north  of  the  Great  Wall  of 
China” — a vast  region,  which  includes 
South  Manchuria,  North  Manchuria,  and 
Outer  and  Inner  Mongolia,  and  which, 
at  the  time  of  the  exchange  of  the  notes 
under  consideration,  was  very  much  un- 
der the  thumb  of  the  Northern  colossus. 
On  the  surface  of  the  agreement,  it  con- 
tained nothing  more  than  a mutual  en- 
gagement not  to  invade  into  each  other’s 
economic  field.  But  this  self-denying  en- 
gagement was  in  itself  an  official  rec- 
ognition of  each  other’s  sphere  of  inter- 
est in  China.  The  practical  effect  of  the 
Scott-Mouraview  Agreement,  as  it  was 
so  called,  was,  therefore,  an  economic  di- 
vision of  China  by  the  Contracting  Pow- 
ers. It  could  be  something  more ; it  was 
certainly  nothing  less.  It  was  easy  to 
see  how  the  arrangement  would  serve 
the  “primordial  interests”  of  the  Con- 
tracting Parties,  but  it  was  difficult  to 
divine  how  it  could  be  made  to  serve  “the 
primordial  interests  of  China  herself.” 
Technically  speaking,  such  an  agreement 
is  res  inter  alios  acta,  and  as  such,  it  can- 
not be  quoted  against  a third  Power.  In 
practice,  however,  theory  has  to  yield  to 
103 


reality.  If  the  third  Powers  fail  to  pro- 
test or  to  signify  reserves  upon  the  pub- 
lication of  the  arrangement,  or  when  it 
becomes  known,  it  is  taken  for  granted 
that  they  accede  to  the  views  expressed 
and  provisions  made  therein.  In  such 
cases,  silence  means  consent. 

Pursuing  the  similar  policy.  Great 
Britain  entered  into  another  railway 
agreement,  but  this  time  with  Germany. 
On  September  2,  1898,  Mr.  von  Hanse- 
mann,  the  representative  of  a German 
Syndicate,  on  the  one  side,  and  Mr.  W. 
Keswick,  the  representative  of  the  Brit- 
ish and  Chinese  Corporation,  Ltd.,  and 
Messrs.  Ewen  Camerson  and  Julius 
Brussel,  the  representatives  of  the  Hong- 
kong and  Shanghai  Banking  Corpora- 
tion, on  the  other,  held  conferences  at 
London,  and  agreed  to  the  following  ar- 
rangement, for  the  partition  of  the  re- 
spective economic  spheres  of  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  in  China : 

“It  is  desirable  for  the  British  and 
German  Governments  to  agree  upon  the 
spheres  of  interest  of  the  two  countries 
regarding  the  railway  construction  in 
China,  and  to  mutually  support  the  in- 
terest of  either  country.” 

This  was  a proposal  made  by  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  German  Syndicate,  and 
was  agreed  to  by  the  British  representa- 
tives. According  to  the  minutes  of  the 
meeting,  the  German  representative  sug- 
gested the  following  arrangement : 

“1.  British  sphere  of  interest,  viz. — 
The  Yangtze  Valley,  subject  to  the  con- 
nection of  the  Shantung  lines  to  the 
Yangtze  at  Chinkiang;  the  provinces 
south  of  Yangtze;  the  province  of 
Shansi  with  connection  to  the  Peking- 
Hankow  line  at  a point  south  of  Chen- 
ting  and  a connecting  line  to  the  Yang- 
tze Valley,  crossing  Huangho  Valley. 

“2.  German  sphere  of  interest,  viz. — 
The  province  of  Shantung  and  the 
104 


Huangho  Valley  with  connection  to 
Tien-tsin  and  Chenting,  or  other  point 
of  the  Peking-Hankow  line,  in  the  south 
with  connection  to  the  Yangtze  at  Chin- 
kiang  or  Nanking.  The  Huangho  Val- 
ley is  understood  to  be  subject  to  the 
connecting  lines  in  Shansi  forming  part 
of  the  British  sphere  of  interest,  and  to 
the  connecting  line  to  the  Yangtze  Val- 
ley, also  belonging  to  the  said  sphere  of 
interest.” 

The  foregoing  arrangement,  proposed 
by  M.  A.  von  Hansemann,  the  represen- 
tative of  the  German  Syndicate,  met  with 
the  approval  of  the  representatives  of 
the  British  group.  The  same  was  also 
approved  by  the  British  Government. 
But  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
above  arrangement  was  agreed  to  by 
both  parties  on  the  condition  that  the  fol- 
lowing stipulations  should  be  faithfully 
observed : 

“The  line  from  Tien-tsin  to  Tsinan, 
or  another  point  of  the  northern  frontier 
of  the  province  of  Shantung,  and  the 
line  from  the  southern  point  of  the 
province  of  Shantung  to  Chinkiang  to 
be  constructed  by  the  Anglo-German 
Syndicate  (meaning  the  German  Syndi- 
cate on  the  one  part,  and  the  Hongkong 
and  Shanghai  Banking  Corporation  and 
the  British  and  Chinese  Corporation, 
Ltd.,  on  the  other  part)  in  the  follow- 
ing manner,  viz. : 

“1.  The  capital  for  both  lines  to  be 
raised  jointly; 

“2.  The  line  from  Tien-tsin  to  Tsi- 
nan or  to  another  point  on  the  northern 
frontier  of  the  province  of  Shantung  to 
be  built  and  equipped  and  worked  by 
the  German  group ; 

“3.  The  line  from  the  southern  point 
of  the  province  of  Shantung  to  Chin- 
kiang to  be  built  and  equipped  and  work- 
ed by  the  English  group; 


105 


“4.  On  completion  the  said  lines  to 
be  worked  for  joint  account.” 

This  constituted  the  details  of  the 
Anglo-German  railway  agreement,  as 
found  in  the  minutes  of  the  proceedings 
of  the  meetings.  The  representatives  at 
these  meetings  also  agreed  that  neither 
the  German  Syndicate  nor  the  British 
Group  would  be  bound  to  construct  the 
lines  assigned  to  the  spheres  of  the  re- 
spective Powers,  unless  the  Shantung 
lines  were  constructed  simultaneously."^ 

It  should  be  noted  that  this  arrange- 
ment was  signed,  nominally,  by  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  private  syndicates  of 
Great  Britain  and  Germany.  As  a mat- 
ter of  fact,  all  these  groups  had  the  most 
cordial  support  of  their  respective  Gov- 
ernments, which  had,  from  time  to  time, 
actually  encouraged  them  in  financing  the 
construction  of  railways  in  China.  Un- 
like the  previous  arrangement  between 
Great  Britain  and  Russia,  this  document 
frankly  and  openly  recognized  the 
spheres  of  interest  of  the  Contracting 
Parties.  The  practical  effect  of  this  ar- 
rangement was,  therefore,  another  eco- 
nomic division  of  China. 

Still  more  interesting  was  the  fact  that, 
prior  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-Ger- 
man Railway  agreement.  Great  Britain 
was  anxious  to  curry  favor  with  Ger- 
many. This  was  amply  shown  by  the 
unusual  willingness  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Government  to  undertake  not  to 
injure  Germany’s  established  interests  in 
China.  When  Great  Britain  leased  Wei- 
hai-wei  from  China  for  as  long  a period 
as  Russia  would  remain  in  Port  Arthur, 
she  was  most  anxious  not  to  offend 
Germany,  but  to  show  that  she  had  not 
the  slightest  intention  of  interfering  with 

The  minutes  can  be  found  in  T.  F.  Millard, 
Our  Eastern  Question,  Appendix  I,  pp.  444- 
445.  Quoted  by  W.  W.  Willoughby,  Foreign 
Rights  and  Interests  in  China,  pp.  285-286. 
See  also,  China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  Z12. 

106 


German  activities  in  Shantung,  which 
province  was  claimed  as  the  German 
sphere  of  interest.  In  his  instructions  to 
Sir  F.  Lascelles,  British  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  Mr.  Balfour  said,  April  2,  1898 : 
“You  should  inform  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, pointing  out  to  them  that  the 
action  of  Russia  forces  this  step  on  us. 
Its  sole  object  is  to  maintain  the  balance 
of  power  in  the  Gulf  of  Pechili,  which 
was  menaced  by  Russia’s  occupation  of 
Port  Arthur.  We  do  not  anticipate  this 
policy  will  give  any  umbrage  to  German 
interests  in  Shantung,  since  it  is  not  pos- 
sible to  make  Wei-hai-wei  a commercial 
port,  and  it  would  never  be  worth  while 
to  connect  it  with  the  peninsula  by  rail- 
way. If  desired,  a formal  undertaking 
on  this  point  would  be  given.”  In  re- 
ply, Germany  suggested  that  “England 
formally  declares  to  Germany  that  she. 
has  no  intention,  in  establishing  herself 
at  Wei-hai-wei,  of  creating  difficulties 
for  Germany  in  the  province  of  Shan- 
tung or  of  injuring  or  contesting  her 
rights  there,  and  more  especially  that  in 
that  province  she  will  not  establish  rail- 
way communication.” The  British 
Government  was  willing  to  give  a formal 
pledge,  but  not  in  the  form  suggested  by 
Germany.  In  order  to  keep  the  question 
of  the  occupation  of  Wei-hai-wei  sepa- 
rate from  the  general  question  of  the 
interests  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain 
in  Shantung,  Mr.  Balfour  suggested  that 
the  words  “in  that  province”  should  be 
substituted  by  “between  Wei-hai-wei 
and  any  part  of  the  province  of  Shan- 
tung.” To  this  suggestion.  Count  Hatz- 
feldt,  German  Ambassador  in  London, 
proposed  that  the  last  sentence  of  the 
declaration  should  be : “It  is  especially 
understood  that  England  will  not  con- 
struct any  railroad  communication  either 

China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  2,  p.  2. 

China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  7,  p.  5. 

107 


from  Wei-hai-wei,  or  from  any  other 
point  on  the  coast  into  the  interior  of 
the  province  of  Shantung.”  ” But  Mr. 
Balfour  was  insistent  upon  the  point  that 
the  question  arising  out  of  the  British 
lease  of  Wei-hai-wei,  and  the  question 
of  the  German  claims  with  regard  to  the 
construction  of  railways  in  Shantung, 
were  different  and  entirely  separate.  And 
he  added  these  significant  words,  which 
foreshadowed  the  conclusion  of  the 
Anglo-German  railway  arrangement  as 
described  in  the  above : “The  second 
question  is  most  complicated,  because  any 
arrangement  arrived  at  with  respect  to 
Shantung  would  clearly  involve  some 
reciprocal  arrangement  in  regard  to 
regions  in  which  Her  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment has  special  interests,  and,  further 
because  it  would  be  most  desirable  to 
have  some  workable  plan  with  regard  to 
the  construction  and  management  of  any 
through  lines  of  railway  which  might, 
during  part  of  their  course,  traverse 
some  portion  of  the  Shantung  pro- 
vince.” This  “workable  plan”  was  pro- 
vided for  in  the  Anglo-German  railway 
arrangement,  and  declaration  of  non-in- 
terference volunteered  by  the  British 
Government  finally  took  this  form: 
“England  formally  declares  that,  in  estab- 
lishing herself  at  Wei-hai-wei,  she  has 
no  intention  of  injuring  or  contesting  the 
interests  of  Germany  in  the  province  of 
Shantung,  or  of  creating  difficulties  for 
her  in  that  province.  It  is  especially  un- 
derstood that  England  will  not  construct 
any  railroad  communication  from  Wei- 
hai-wei,  and  the  district  therewith,  into 
the  interior  of  the  province.”  ” 

The  above  assurance  was  given  in  an 
exchange  of  notes  between  Great  Britain 
and  Germany.  The  practical  effect  of 

China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  8,  p.  6. 

China,  No.  1,  1899,  No.  9. 

Hertslet’s  China  Treaties,  Vol.  I,  p.  684. 

108 


such  an  assurance  was  a recognition  of 
the  Shantung  province  as  the  German 
sphere  of  interest.  “Downing  Street  has 
gone  out  of  its  way  to  promise  the  Berlin 
Foreign  Office  most  faithfully,”  observed 
an  English  writer  on  Chinese  affairs, 
“that  we  will  never  link  up  Wei-hai-wei 
with  any  Chinese  railway  system,  and 
that  we  entirely  acknowledge  German 
rights  in  Shantung.  It  has  never  been 
made  clear  what  reason  existed  for  mak- 
ing either  of  these  statements,  and  it 
seems  impossible  to  reconcile  either  of 
these  proclamations  of  the  vaunted  Open 
Door  policy  in  China — which  means  the 
eighteen  provinces,  Manchuria,  and  the 
New  Dominion  (what  about  Mongolia 
and  Tibet,  we  may  ask) — with  private 
admissions  made  the  next  moment  to  a 
European  Power  that  we  are  going  to 
further,  to  the  best  of  our  ability,  the 
promotion  of  disintegrating  schemes.”  °° 
But  Great  Britain  was  not  looking  for 
reconcilation  of  her  words  with  her 
deeds.  This  she  knew  to  be  impossible. 

B.  L.  Putnam  Weale,  The  Reshaping  of 
the  Par  East,  Vol.  I.  pp.  353-354. 


109 


CHAPTER  VI 


The  Hay  Notes 

The  parcelling  out  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  by  the  European  Powers 
as  a result  of  the  international 
scramble  in  1897  and  1898  for  leased 
territories  and  spheres  of  interest  or  of 
influence,  menaced  the  maintenance  of 
the  old  system,  built  upon  the  numerous 
treaty  provisions  for  the  most  favored 
nation  treatment,  not  for  this  or  that 
Power  alone,  but  for  all  the  Powers  hav- 
ing treaty  relations  with  China.  Unlike 
the  predatory  Powers  of  Europe,  the 
United  States,  while  anxious  for  her  eco- 
nomic and  commercial  interests  in  China, 
remained  a disinterested  though  not  at 
all  indifferent  spectator  of  the  game  of 
international  spoliation,  in  which  she  did 
not  take  the  slightest  part.  She  did  not 
earmark  any  portion  of  Chinese  terri- 
tory as  her  own  sphere  of  interest  or  of 
influence,  nor  was  she  so  aggressive  as 
to  demand  leases  from  China,  such  as 
the  European  Powers  had  done  one  after 
another.  In  short,  in  the  battle  for  ter- 
ritorial concessions,  the  United  States 
was  not  a participant.  Her  interests  in 
China  were  commercial,  not  territorial. 
She  was  opposed  to  the  partition  of 
China.  “We  are,  of  course,  opposed  to 
the  dismemberment  of  that  Empire,” 
wrote  John  Hay,  then  Secretary  of  State, 
in  a letter  to  Paul  Dana,  editor  of  the 
New  York  Sun,  “and  we  do  not  think 
that  the  public  opinion  of  the  United 
States  would  justify  this  Government 
in  taking  part  in  the  great  game  of  spoli- 
ation now  going  on.  At  the  same  time 
we  are  keenly  alive  to  the  importance  of 
safeguarding  our  great  commercial  in- 
110 


terests  in  that  Empire,  and  our  represen- 
tatives there  have  orders  to  watch  closely 
everything  that  may  seem  calculated  to 
injure  us,  and  to  prevent  it  by  energetic 
and  timely  representations.”  ^ In  other 
words,  anxious  as  she  was  to  protect  her 
immense  commercial  interests  in  China, 
she  was  averse  to  follow  the  examples  of 
the  European  Powers  to  acquire  bases  of 
operation  in  order  to  achieve  the  end  she 
had  in  view. 

Now,  the  question  naturally  arose: 
How  could  the  commercial  interests  of 
the  United  States  in  China  be  best  look- 
ed after,  without  at  the  same  time  resort- 
ing to  those  tricks  and  artifices  befitting 
only  the  role  of  a spoliator?  The  inter- 
ests of  the  United  States  were  menaced 
in  two  ways.  In  the  first  place,  it  was 
highly  probable  at  the  time  that  the  Chi- 
nese Government,  feeble  as  it  was,  might, 
under  pressure  from  the  foreign  Govern- 
ments, be  forced  to  adopt  rules  and  regu- 
lations adverse  to  the  United  States  and 
to  the  Americans  in  China.  In  other 
words,  the  Chinese  Government,  owing 
to  strong  pressure  from  the  aggressive 
Powers,  might  find  itself  unable  to  ac- 
cord to  the  United  States  and  her  citi- 
zens that  “equal  treatment”  and  that 
“equality  of  opportunity”  as  provided  for 
in  the  Chinese-American  treaties.  In  the 
second  place,  the  European  Powers 
might,  in  their  respective  leased  terri- 
tories and  spheres  of  interest,  erect  cus- 
toms stations,  over  which  they  would 
have  complete  control  and  through  which 
they  would  not  permit  the  trade  of  the 
United  States  or  of  any  other  country  to 
permeate.  They  might,  in  their  respec- 
tive territorial  spheres,  adopt  other  eco- 
nomic barriers,  which  would  be  favorable 
to  their  own  interests,  but  detrimental,  if 
not  exactly  hostile,  to  those  of  the  United 

'William  R.  Thayer,  Life  of  John  Hay, 
Vol.  II,  p.  241. 


Ill 


States  and  of  the  other  Powers.  In  either 
case,  the  feeble  Government  at  Peking 
could  do  nothing  to  remedy  the  situation ; 
and  in  either  case,  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  her  treaty  rights  would 
be  injured.  What  could  the  United 
States  do,  then,  in  order  to  protect  her 
commercial  interests  and  treaty  rights  in 
China,  which  were  most  seriously  threat- 
ened? Should  she  demand  a guarantee 
from  the  Chinese  Government,  or  should 
.she  ask  for  it  from  those  Powers  who, 
because  of  their  territorial  possessions  in 
China,  were  most  capable  of  doing  this 
little  favor  for  her?  Should  she  follow 
the  example  of  Great  Britain  and  carry 
water  on  both  shoulders  by  contending 
for  the  Open  Door  policy  and  earmark- 
ing for  herself  a sphere  of  interest  at  one 
and  the  same  time?  Or,  should  she  be 
prepared  to  fight  for  her  interests  and 
treaty  rights  in  China,  if  her  diplomatic 
representations  and  remonstrances  failed 
to  safeguard  them? 

There  was  but  one  answer.  The 
United  States  was  not  willing  to  mark 
out  for  herself  any  territorial  spheres  in 
China  in  order  to  be  better  prepared  to 
defend  her  rights  and  interests  there. 
And  although  she  was  ready  to  make  the 
most  strenuous  efforts  in  diplomacy, 
she  was  not  disposed  to  resort  to  force 
in  order  to  achieve  the  end  she  had 
in  view.  Her  only  choice  was  be- 
tween demanding  satisfactory  guar- 
antees from  the  Government  in  Peking 
and  making  representations  to  the 
European  Powers  that  they  should  re- 
frain from  making  use  of  their  terri- 
torial spheres  in  China  in  discrimination 
against  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  other  Powers  who  were  not  as 
fortunately  situated  as  they.  Theii  United 
States  decided  on  the  latter.  Guarantees 
from  the  Peking  Government  would 
mean  little  or  nothing  if  the  Government 
112 


were  not  strong  enough  to  enforce  the 
treaty  terms ; and  if  the  Government 
were  strong  enough  to  enforce  the  treaty 
terms,  in  the  face  or  in  spite  of  the  high 
pressure  from  the  European  Powers, 
guarantees,  even  if  demanded  and  ob- 
tained, were  unnecessary.  Thus,  on  the 
6th  of  September,  1899,  John  Hay,  Sec- 
retary of  State,  sent  the  following  diplo- 
matic note  to  Great  Britain,^  which,  mti- 
tatis  mutandis,  was  on  the  same  day  sent 
to  Germany,  France,  and  Russia,  and 
later  to  Japan  and  Italy : 

‘‘The  Government  of  Her  Britannic 
Majesty  has  declared  that  its  policy  and 
its  very  traditions  precluded  it  from 
using  any  privileges  which  might  be 
granted  it  in  China  as  a weapon  for  ex- 
cluding commercial  rivals,  and  that  free- 
dom of  trade  for  Great  Britain  in  that 
Empire  meant  freedom  of  trade  for  all 
ihe  world  alike.  While  conceding  by 
formal  agreements,  first  with  Germany 
and  then  with  Russia,  the  possession  of 
‘spheres  of  influence  or  interest’  in  China 
in  which  they  are  to  enjoy  special  rights 
and  privileges,  more  especially  in  re- 
spect of  railroads  and  mining  enter- 
prises, Her  Britannic  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment has  therefore  sought  to  maintain  at 
the  same  time  what  is  called  the  ‘open 
door’  policy,  to  insure  to  the  commerce 
of  the  world  in  China  equality  of  treat- 
ment within  said  ‘spheres’  for  commerce 
and  navigation.  This  latter  policy  is 
alike  urgently  demanded  by  the  British 
mercantile  communities  and  by  those  of 


“The  note  was  not  communicated  to  the 
Russian  Government  until  September  20;  to 
the  British  Government  until  September  22; 
to  the  German  Government  until  September 
26;  and  to  the  French  Government  until 
November  21.  It  was  sent  to  the  American 
Beg-ation  in  Tokyo  on  November  13,  and  com- 
municated to  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  on 
November  20.  It  was  sent  to  the  American 
Embassy  in  Rome  on  November  17,  and  com- 
municated to  the  Italian  Government  on  De- 
cember 9. — John  Bassett  Moore,  A Digest  of 
International  Law,  Vol.  V,  pp.  534-546. 

113 


the  United  States,  as  it  is  justly  held  by 
them  to  be  the  only  one  which  will  im- 
prove existing  conditions,  enable  them  to 
maintain  their  positions  in  the  markets 
of  China,  and  extend  their  operations  in 
the  future.  While  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  will  in  no  way  commit 
itself  to  a recognition  of  exclusive  rights 
of  any  power  within  or  control  over  any 
portion  of  the  Chinese  Empire  under 
such  agreements  as  have  within  the  last 
year  been  made,  it  can  not  conceal  its 
apprehension  that  under  existing  condi- 
tions there  is  a possibility,  even  a proba- 
bility, of  complications  arising  between 
the  treaty  powers  which  may  imperil  the 
rights-insured  to  the  United  States  under 
treaties  with  China. 

“This  Government  is  animated  by  a 
sincere  desire  that  the  interests  of  our 
citizens  may  not  be  prejudiced  through 
exclusive  treatment  by  any  of  the  con- 
trolling Powers  within  their  so-called 
‘spheres  of  interest’  in  China,  and  hopes 
also  to  retain  an  open  market  for  the 
commerce  of  the  world,  remove  danger- 
ous sources  of  international  irritation,  and 
hasten  thereby  united  or  concerted  ac- 
tion of  the  Powers  at  Peking  in  favor  of 
the  administrative  reforms  so  urgently 
needed  for  strengthening  the  Imperial 
Government  and  maintaining  the  in- 
tegrity of  China  in  which  the  whole 
western  world  is  alike  concerned.  It  be- 
lieves that  such  a result  may  be  greatly 
assisted  by  a declaration  by  the  various 
Powers  claiming  ‘spheres  of  interest’  in 
China  of  their  intentions  as  regards 
treatment  of  foreign  trade  therein.  The 
present  moment  seems  a particularly  op- 
portune one  for  informing  her  Britan- 
nic Majesty’s  Government  of  the  desire 
of  the  United  States  to  see  it  make  a for- 
mal declaration  and  to  lend  its  support  in 
obtaining  similar  declarations  from  the 
various  Powers  claiming  ‘spheres  of  in- 
114 


fluence’  in  China,  to  the  effect  that  each 
in  its  respective  spheres  of  interest  or 
influence : 

“First,  Will  in  no  wise  interfere  with 
any  treaty  port  or  any  vested  interest 
within  any  so-called  ‘sphere  of  interest’ 
or  leased  territory  it  may  have  in  China. 

“Second,  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tar- 
iff of  the  time  being  shall  apply  to  all 
merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all  such 
ports  as  are  within  said  ‘sphere  of  in- 
terest’ (unless  they  be  free  ports),  no 
matter  to  what  nationality  it  may  belong, 
and  that  duties  so  leviable  shall  be  col- 
lected by  the  Chinese  Government. 

“Third,  That  it  will  levy  no  higher 
harbor  dues  on  vessels  of  another  nation- 
ality frequenting  any  port  in  such 
‘sphere’  than  shall  be  levied  on  vessels  of 
its  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  rail- 
road charges  over  lines  built,  controlled, 
or  operated  within  its  ‘sphere’  on  mer- 
chandise belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects 
of  other  nationalities  transported  through 
such  ‘sphere’  than  shall  be  levied  on  simi- 
lar merchandise  belonging  to  its  own  na- 
tionals transported  over  equal  distance.” 

Tlie  substance  of  this  dispatch  was 
communicated  by  Joseph  H.  Choate, 
American  Ambassador  at  London,  to 
Lord  Salisbury,  in  a note  of  September 
22,  1899,  at  the  conclusion  of  which  Mr. 
Choate  said:  “It  is  therefore  with  the 
greatest  pleasure  that  I present  this  mat- 
ter to  your  lordship’s  attention  and  urge 
its  prompt  consideration  by  Her  Maj- 
esty’s Government,  believing  that  the  ac- 
tion is  in  entire  harmony  with  its  con- 
sistent theory  and  purpose,  and  that  it 
will  greatly  redound  to  the  benefit  and 
advantage  of  all  commercial  nations 
alike.  The  prompt  and  sympathetic  co- 
operation of  Her  Majesty’s  Government 
with  the  United  States  in  this  important 
matter  will  be  very  potent  in  promoting 
its  adoption  by  all  the  Powers  con- 
cerned.” 115 


On  September  29,  Lord  Salisbury 
acknowledged  the  receipt  of  the  com- 
munication, and,  in  reply,  he  said  that  he 
would  like  to  have  time  for  considering 
the  proposals  of  the  United  States  more 
fully  with  his  colleagues.  About  one 
month  later,  on  November  30,  in  a note 
to  Mr.  Choate,  Lord  Salisbury  accepted 
most  cheerfully  the  proposals  of  the 
United  States.  The  language  he  used 
was  most  specific : “I  have  much  pleasure 
in  informing  your  excellency  that  Her 
Majesty’s  Government  will  be  prepared 
to  make  a declaration  in  the  sense  de- 
sired by  your  Government  in  regard  to 
the  leased  territory  of  Wei-hai-wei  and 
all  territory  in  China  which  may  here- 
after be  acquired  by  Great  Britain  by 
lease  or  otherwise,  and  all  spheres  of  in- 
terest now  held  or  that  may  hereafter  be 
held  by  her  in  China,  provided  that  a 
similar  declaration  is  made  by  other 
Powers  concerned.” 

France  was  the  second  Power  to 
accede  to  the  proposals  of  the  United 
States,  in  language  as  specific  as  that 
of  Great  Britain,  and  with  the  same  un- 
derstanding that  the  acceptance  given 
was  conditional  upon  the  fact  that  the 
other  interested  Powers  would  give  simi- 
lar pledges.  M.  Delcasse,  French  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  declared,  in  a 
note  to  the  American  Embassy  in  Paris, 
December  16,  1899,  that  the  sentiment  of 
the  French  Government  was  entirely  in 
favor  of  the  maintenance  of  the  equality 
of  opportunity  and  treatment  in  matters 
of  trade  and  navigation  such  as  the  Pow- 
ers had  hitherto  enjoyed  in  the  Chinese 
Empire.  “It  desires  throughout  the 
whole  of  China  and,  with  the  quite 
natural  reservation  that  all  the  Powers 
interested  give  an  assurance  of  their  will- 
ingness to  act  likewise,  is  ready  to  ap- 
ply, in  the  territories  which  are  leased 
to  it,  equal  treatment  to  the  citizens  and 
116 


subjects  of  all  nations,  especially  in  the 
matter  of  customs  duties  and  navigation 
dues,  as  well  as  transportation  tariffs  on 
railways.”  It  should  be  noted  that  M. 
Delcasse  undertook  to  apply  the  Amer- 
ican proposals  to  the  leased  territories 
only.  Nothing  was  said  about  the  sphere 
of  interest  or  influence  which  France 
claimed  in  China.  It  was  perhaps  the 
opinion  of  the  French  Government  that 
the  sphere  which  France  had  earmarked 
in  China  was  economic  and  not  political, 
and  in  it  France  had  no  power  or  right 
to  make  rules  or  regulations  adverse  to 
the  commercial  interests  of  the  other 
Powers.  It  was  only  in  the  leased  terri- 
tories, where  she  had  jurisdictional 
rights  delegated  to  her  by  the  Chinese 
Government  for  the  stated  term  of  years, 
that  she  was  free  to  make  her  own  rules 
and  regulations,  and  to  adopt  tariff  meas- 
ures favorable  to  her  own  interests  and 
adverse  to  those  of  the  other  Powers.  It 
was  apparently  with  this  view  in  mind 
that  the  French  Foreign  Minister  con- 
sidered it  quite  sufficient  to  assure  equal 
treatment  in  the  territories  leased  to 
France,  and  not  in  the  economic  spheres 
that  she  had  claimed. 

The  answer  of  Japan,  who  was  the 
fourth  Power  to  accept  in  principle  the 
Hay  proposals,  was  also  conditional. 
Viscount  Aoki,  Japanese  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  declared  that  “the  Im- 
perial Government  will  have  no  hesita- 
tion to  give  their  assent  to  so  just  and 
fair  a proposal  of  the  United  States, 
provided  that  all  the  other  Powers  con- 
cerned shall  accept  the  same.”  While 
it  must  also  be  said  that  such  conditional 
acceptance  as  this  could  mean  very  lit- 
tle in  the  time  of  emergency,  and  the 
Power  who  gave  it  could  back  out  of  it 
with  ease  whenever  she  should  choose  to. 
Indeed,  in  the  case  of  a power  having  no 
particular  reputation  for  good  faith,  the 
lltr 


value  of  a conditional  promise  such  as 
this  was  nil.  In  his  diplomatic  instruc- 
tions to  Mr.  Choate  on  the  matter  of  pre- 
senting his  proposals  to  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, Secretary  Hay  made  this  ob- 
servation: “The  interests  of  Japan,  the 
next  most  interested  Power  (next  to 
Great  Britain)  in  the  trade  of  China, 
will  be  so  clearly  served  by  the  proposed 
arrangement,  and  the  declarations  of  its 
statesmen  within  the  last  year  are  so  en- 
tirely in  line  with  the  views  here  ex- 
pressed, that  its  hearty  co-operation  is 
confidently  counted  on.”  It  was  apparent 
that  Secretary  Hay  expected  much  from 
Japan  and  “counted  on”  her  “hearty  co- 
operation.” The  conditional  acceptance 
which  Japan  gave,  was,  therefore,  dis- 
appointing and  unsatisfactory,  in  view  of 
Secretary  Hay’s  high  expectation  of  her. 

Still  more  unsatisfactory  and,  there- 
fore, still  more  disappointing,  was  the 
answer  from  Russia,  the  Power  it  was 
most  desirable  to  commit  in  view  of  her 
aggressive  designs  in  North  China  at  that 
time.  Russia  was  reminded  of  the  fact 
that,  when  she  leased  Port  Arthur  and 
Talienwan  from  China,  she  gave  cate- 
gorical assurances  to  the  United  States 
that  American  interests  in  that  part  of 
the  Chinese  Empire  would  in  no  way  be 
affected  thereby,  that  it  was  not  the  in- 
tention of  Russia  to  interfere  with  the 
trade  of  other  nations,  and  that  Amer- 
ican citizens  would  continue  to  enjoy 
within  the  said  leased  territories  all  the 
rights  and  privileges  guaranteed  them 
under  existing  treaties  with  China. 
“However  gratifying  and  reassuring  such 
assurances  may  be  in  regard  to  the  terri- 
tory actually  occupied  and  administered, 
it  can  not  but  be  admitted  that  a further, 
clearer,  and  more  formal  definition  of 
the  conditions  which  are  henceforth  to 
hold  within  the  so-called  Russian  ‘sphere 
of  interest’  in  China  as  regards  the  com- 
llS 


mercial  rights  therein  of  our  citizens  is 
much  desired  by  the  business  world  of 
the  United  States,  inasmuch  as  such  a 
declaration  would  relieve  it  from  the  ap- 
prehensions which  have  exercised  a dis- 
turbing influence  during  the  last  four 
years  on  its  operations  in  China.”  Ac- 
cordingly, Russia  was  requested  to  de- 
clare those  principles,  which  Secretary 
Hay  had  formulated  and  presented  to 
Great  Britain  and  the  other  Powers,  and 
which  were  identical  to  those  quoted 
above  in  the  note  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment. On  December  30,  1899,  Count 
Mouraview,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
wrote  this  reply ; 

“In  so  far  as  the  territory  leased  by 
China  to  Russia  is  concerned,  the  Im- 
perial Government  has  already  demon- 
strated its  firm  intention  to  follow  the 
policy  of  the  ‘open  door’  by  creating 
Dalny  (Talienwan)  a free  port ; and  if  at 
some  future  time  that  port,  although  re- 
maining free  itself,  should  be  separated 
by  a customs  limit  from  other  portions 
of  the  territory  in  question,  the  customs 
duties  would  be  levied,  in  the  zone  sub- 
ject to  the  tariff,  upon  all  foreign  mer- 
chandise without  distinction  as  to  nation- 
ality. 

“As  to  the  ports  now  opened  or  here- 
after to  be  opened  to  foreign  commerce 
by  the  Chinese  Government,  and  which 
lie  beyond  the  territory  leased  to  Russia, 
the  settlement  of  the  question  of  cus- 
toms duties  belongs  to  China  herself, 
and  the  Imperial  Government  has  no  in- 
tention whatever  of  claiming  any  privi- 
leges for  its  own  subjects  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  other  foreigners.  It  is  to  be  un- 
derstood, however,  that  this  assurance  of 
the  Imperial  Government  is  given  upon 
condition  that  a similar  declaration  shall 
119 


be  made  by  other  Powers  having  inter- 
ests in  China^ 

“With  the  conviction  that  this  reply  is 
such  as  to  satisfy  the  inquiry  made  in 
the  above  mentioned  note,  the  Imperial 
Government  is  happy  to  have  complied 
with  the  wishes  of  the  American  Gov- 
ernment, especially  as  it  attaches  the 
highest  value  to  anything  that  may 
strengthen  and  consolidate  the  tradi- 
tional relations  of  friendship  existing  be- 
tween the  two  countries.” 

From  the  above  answer,  three  things 
stood  out  in  bold  relief.  The  request  by 
the  United  States  for  “a  further,  clearer, 
and  more  formal  definition  of  the  condi- 
tions which  are  henceforth  to  hold  with- 
in the  so-called  Russian  ‘sphere  of  in- 
terest’ in  China”  was  entirely  ignored. 
The  answer  was,  moreover,  “given  upon 
condition  that  a similar  declaration  shall 
be  made  by  other  Powers  having  inter- 
ests in  China.”  And,  lastly,  Russia  took 
this  opportunity  to  make  a reservation 
that,  although  Talienwan  had  been  de- 
clared a free  port,  a customs  zone  might 
be  created  therein  “at  some  future  time.” 
Russia  was  gracious  enough  to  say  that 
“the  customs  duties  would  be  levied,  in 
the  zone  subject  to  the  tariff,  upon  all 
foreign  merchandise  without  distinction 
as  to  nationality.”  But  she  failed  to 
specify  whether  the  tariff  she  spoke  of 
was  one  of  China  or  one  of  Russia.  Nor 
was  she  any  too  clear  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  “foreign  merchandise.”  Would 
she  consider  Russian  goods  found  in  the 
customs  zone  as  foreign  merchandise,  or 
would  she  consider  them  merely  as  “Rus- 
sian goods,”  that  is,  domestic  goods,  and 
therefore  subject  them  to  a different 
tariff  or  no  tariff  at  all?  If  the  customs 
zone  were  to  be  created  by  the  Chinese 
Government  and  the  tariff  to  be  applied 


® The  italics  in  this  and  the  other  quotations 
are  the  author's. 

120 


were  a Chinese  tariff,  it  would  be  neither 
necessary  nor  desirable  for  Russia  to 
point  out  in  her  diplomatic  communica- 
tion with  the  United  States  what  China 
might  or  might  not  do  in  the  future.  If 
the  customs  zone  were  to  be  demarcated 
by  Russia  herself,  and  the  tariff  were  to 
be  a Russian  tariff,  then  this  would  be 
the  very  condition  of  affairs  which  the 
United  States  sought  to  avoid  and  against 
which  she  was,  with  the  assistance  of 
Russia,  anxious  to  provide.  And  tO'  go 
one  step  further,  we  may  ask  what  did 
Russia  mean  by  “all  foreign  merchan- 
dise”? Would  she  or  would  she  not  in- 
clude her  own  goods — goods  of  her  own 
make — among  the  “foreign  merchan- 
dise”? If  she  would,  it  would  be,  then, 
a clear  case  of  the  misuse  of  the  lan- 
guage ; if  she  would  not,  she  would  there- 
by establish  a practice  of  unequal  treat- 
ment in  trade,  and  would  violate  the  very 
fundamental  principle  of  the  Open  Door 
policy  which  she  said  she  had  “firm  in- 
tention to  follow.”  With  these  inter- 
rogations in  mind,  and  their  possible 
answers,  one  could  not  avoid  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  Russian  reply  , was,  not  only 
evasive  and  non-committal,  but,  on  care- 
ful inspection,  a decisive  but  highly  sub- 
tle rejection  of  the  American  proposals. 

What  has  been  said  about  the  Russian 
reply  thus  far  is  based  upon  the  official 
documents  exchanged  between  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Russia  and  the  United 
States.  Behind  this  facade  of  official 
generalities,  however,  there  was  yet  one 
more  interesting  story  that  preceded  the 
“acceptance”  by  Russia  of  the  Hay  pro- 
posals. It  was  said  that  when  Mr.  Tow- 
er, American  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, called  at  the  Russian  Foreign  Of- 
fice to  present  the  proposals  of  the 
United  States,  he  was  given  to  under- 
stand, directly  or  indirectly,  that  the  Rus- 
sian Government  would  not  make  any 
121 


formal  declarations  as  requested.  In- 
deed, on  those  three  proposals  which  Hay 
formulated,  the  Russian  Government 
would  make  no  declaration  at  all.  Count 
Mouraview,  the  Russian  Foreign  Min- 
ister, gave,  however,  “an  oral  promise  to 
do  what  France  would  do.”  * From  the 
standpoint  of  diplomacy,  this  answer  was 
admittedly  an  ingenious  one.  France  was 
an  ally  of  Russia,  and  it  was  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  what  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment had  declined  the  French  Gov- 
ernment would  not  accept.  By  promising 
to  do  what  France  would  do,  therefore, 
the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  was  turn- 
ing down,  or  thought  he  was,  the  pro- 
posals of  the  United  States  and,  at  the 
same  time,  shifting  the  responsibility  of 
the  refusal  upon  the  shoulders  of  the 
French  Government.  No  sooner,  how- 
ever, was  this  promise  made  by  the  For- 
eign Minister  than  he  learned  that  the 
French  Government  had,  on  December 
16,  1899,  already  replied  to  the  Amer- 
ican proposals,  and  declared  itself  to  be 
in  favor  of  “equal  treatment  (in  the 
French  leased  territories  in  China)  to  the 
citizens  and  subjects  of  all  nations,  espe- 
cially in  the  matter  of  customs  duties 
and  navigation  dues,  as  well  as  transpor- 
tation tariff  on  railways.”  Because  of 
this  favorable  reply  by  the  French  Gov- 
ernment, which  was  apparently  un- 
suspected by  the  Foreign  Minister,  “he 
flew  into  a passion,  and  insisted  upon  it 
that  Russia  would  never  bind  herself  in 
that  way ; that  whatever  she  did  she 
would  do  alone  and  without  the  concur- 
rence of  France.”  “Still,”  Mr.  Hay 
pointed  out  in  a letter  to  Henry  White, 
under  the  date  of  April  2,  1900,  “he  did 
say  it,  he  did  promise,  and  he  did  enter 
into  just  that  engagement.  It  is  pos- 
sible that  he  did  so  thinking  that  France 

‘William  R.  Thayer,  Life  of  John  Hay, 
Vol.  II,  p.  243. 

122 


would  not  come  in,  and  that  other  Pow- 
ers would  not.” ' The  mistake  which 
Count  Mouraview  had  made  in  promising 
to  do  what  France  would  do,  was,  how- 
ever, easily  retrieved.  After  a lapse  of 
more  than  three  months,®  the  Russian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  gracefully 
and  no  less  graciously,  “complied  with 
the  wishes  of  the  American  Government” 
in  a note  which  we  have  quoted  in  the 
above  and  which  we  have  just  analyzed 
in  all  its  evasive  aspects. 

It  was  to  Italy,  however,  that  the 
honor  of  an  unconditional  and  unquali- 
fied acceptance  was  due.  And  this  not 
without  reason.  As  the  governments  of 
the  other  countries,  the  Government  of 
Italy,  whose  commercial  interests  in 
China  were  said  to  be  “important  and 
growing,”  was  requested  to  “give  formal 
assurances”  that  perfect  equality  of 
treatment  in  matters  of  commerce  and  in- 
dustry should  be  observed.  Secretary 
John  Hay,  “animated  with  a sincere  de- 
sire to  insure  to  the  commerce  and  indus- 
try of  the  United  States  and  of  all  other 
nations  perfect  equality  of  treatment 
within  the  limits  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
for  their  trade  and  navigation,  especially 
within  the  so-called  ‘spheres  of  influence 
or  interest’  claimed  by  certain  European 
Powers  in  China,”  decided,  apparently 
in  a moment  of  enthusiasm,  to  invite  the 
acceptance  by  the  Italian  Government  of 
the  same  proposals  made  to  the  other 
Powers,  quite  oblivious  of  the  fact  that 
Italy,  unlike  the  other  Powers,  had  not 
had  any  spheres  of  interest  or  leased 
territories  in  China.  Italy,  as  we  can 
recall,  did  make  a claim  for  the  Sammen 


° W.  R.  Thayer,  ibid. 

“ The  American  proposals  were  sent  to  Mr. 
Tower  at  St.  Petersburg  on  September  6, 
1899,  and  were  communicated  by  him  to  the 
Russian  Foreign  Office,  September  20.  It  was 
not  until  December  30,  that  Count  Mouraview 
sent  the  foregoing  note  in  reply. 

123 


Bay,  which,  though  strongly  supported 
by  the  British  Government,  was  not  ac- 
ceded to  by  the  Chinese  Government.  The 
failure  of  obtaining  a territorial  base  of 
operation  on  the  Chinese  coast  was  not 
at  all  a disappointment  to  Italy,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  her  commercial  interests 
in  China,  though  said  to  be  “important 
and  growing,”  were,  for  practical  pur- 
pose, very  little  and  comparatively  insig- 
nificant. And  now  she  was  honored  with 
the  request  to  accede  to  the  three  pro- 
posals of  the  United  States — proposals 
which,  as  a matter  of  fact,  should  not 
have  been  submitted  to  her  at  all,  inas- 
much as  they  were  all  concerned  with  the 
trade  rights  in  the  leased  territories  and 
spheres  of  interest  or  influence  in  China, 
of  which  she  had  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other.  She  would  be  pleased,  of  course, 
to  do  this  little  courtesy  to  the  United 
States.  Thus,  on  January  7,  1900,  the 
Marquis  Visconti  Venosta,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  Italy,  accepted  un- 
conditionally and  unreservedly  the  Amer- 
ican proposals. 

The  last  one  to  reply  to  the  Hay  note, 
though  among  the  first  ones  communicat- 
ed with,  was  Germany,  who  virtually 
took  no  notice  of  the  matter  until  she 
was  told  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  had  received  “satisfactory 
written  replies”  from  all  the  other  Pow- 
ers and  was  once  more  requested  to  give 
an  answer  in  writing.  On  February  19, 
1900,  Count  von  Bulow  sent  to  the 
American  Embassy  in  Berlin  the  follow- 
ing note  in  reply,  which  was  as  significant 
and  as  evasive  as  that  of  Russia,  though 
not  quite  as  obscure  and  ambiguous  in 
language : 

“As  recognized  by  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  of  America,”  the  Ger- 
man reply  read,  “the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment has,  from  the  beginning,  not  only 
asserted,  but  also  practically  carried  out 
124 


to  the  fullest  extent,  in  its  Chinese  pos- 
sessions, absolute  equality  of  treatment 
gation,  and  commerce.  The  Imperial 
Government  entertains  no  thought  of  de- 
of  all  nations  with  regard  to  trade,  navi- 
parting  in  the  future  from  this  prin- 
ciple, which  at  once  excludes  any  preju- 
dicial or  disadvantageous  commercial 
treatment  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  so  long  as  it  is  not 
forced  to  do  so,  on  account  of  consider- 
ations of  reciprocity,  by  a divergence 
from  it  by  other  governments.  If,  there- 
fore, the  other  Powers  interested  in  the 
industrial  development  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  are  willing  to  recognize  the  same 
principles,  this  can  only  be  desired  by 
the  Imperial  Government,  which  in  this 
case  upon  being  requested  will  gladly  be 
ready  to  participate  with  the  United 
States  of  America  and  the  other  Powers 
in  an  agreement  made  upon  these  lines, 
by  which  the  same  rights  are  reciprocally 
secured.”  ’ 

Here  we  have  before  us  all  the  replies 
from  Japan  and  from  the  European  Pow- 
ers to  the  proposals  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  striking  to  see  that  but  one  Power 
expressed  her  adhesion  to  them  uncon- 
ditionally and  unreservedly,  and  that  not 
a single  Power  made  the  “formal  decla- 
ration” which  Secretary  Hay  suggested. 
Not  dismayed  by  the  vagueness  of  lan- 
guage in  which  some  of  the  Powers  ex- 
pressed their  readiness  to  adhere  to  his 
proposals,  and  encouraged  by  the  fact 
that  all  Powers,  in  spite  of  the  apparent 
difference  in  their  respective  policies  and 
interests  in  China,  professed,  one  and  all, 
for  the  principle  of  the  Open  Door,  Sec- 

’ For  the  entire  correspondence  between  the 
United  States  on  the  one  side  and  Japan  and 
the  European  Powers  on  the  other,  see  either 

U.  S.  For.  Rel.  1899,  pp.  128-140;  or  J.  B. 
Moore,  A Digest  of  International  Law,  Vol. 

V,  pp.  534-546.  Passages  quoted  in  the  above 
pages  where  the  sources  are  not  indicated 
are  taken  from  Moore’s  Digest. 

125 


retary  Hay  announced,  on  March  20, 
1900,  that  he  considered  the  “acceptance” 
by  the  various  Powers  concerned  as 
“final  and  definitive.”  He  was,  appar- 
ently, willing  to  take  conditional  replies, 
with  definite  reservations  in  some  cases, 
as  sufficient  equivalent  to  the  “formal 
declaration”  which  he  had  at  first  eagerly 
suggested.  There  could  be  no  doubt  that, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  Italy,  not 
one  of  the  Powers  concerned  wished  to 
agree  to  the  proposals  of  the  United 
States.  Each  saw  more  profit  to  herself 
in  exploiting  what  she  had  already  se- 
cured from  China  and  in  joining  in  the 
scramble  for  more.  But  the  proposals 
which  the  United  States  had  the  cour- 
age to  put  forward,  though  influenced 
largely  by  considerations  of  her  own 
commercial  interests  and  treaty  rights 
in  China,  were  of  such  a nature  that  an 
open  refusal  to  accept  by  any  one  of  the 
Powers  interested  would  be  tantamount 
to  an  admission  of  the  desire  to  deny  to 
the  United  States  the  right  to  equal 
treatment  that  she  could  claim  under  the 
existing  treaties  with  China.  Such  a de- 
nial would  be  most  fruitful  of  serious 
consequences,  if  the  United  States  were 
determined  to  use  the  extreme  means  to 
have  her  rights  and  interests  safeguard- 
ed. It  would  bring  on  troubles,  not  only 
between  China  and  the  United  States, 
but  also  between  the  latter  and  the  Pow- 
er or  Powers  who  should  openly  decline. 
That  Russia,  Germany,  and  the  other 
Powers  were  not  unmindful  of  this  pos- 
sible serious  situation  was  responsible  for 
the  conditional  acceptance  they  each 
gave.  No  one  dared  openly  oppose,  and 
every  one  was  afraid  of  serious  compli- 
cations with  her  in  case  of  refusal.  “It 
was  as  if,  in  a meeting,  he  had  asked  all 
those  who  believed  in  telling  the  truth  to 
126 


stand  up,  the  liars  would  not  have  kept 
their  seats.”  ® 

The  outbreak  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion 
was  responsible  for  another  note,  which 
Secretary  Hay  sent  out  on  July  3,  1900, 
in  which  he  came  forward  with  a decla- 
ration of  the  American  policy  vis-a-vis 
China,  and  to  which  he  invited  the  ad- 
hesion of  the  European  Powers  and  Ja- 
pan. “In  this  critical  posture  of  affairs 
in  China  it  is  deemed  appropriate  to 
define  the  attitude  of  the  United  States 
as  far  as  present  circumstances  permit 
this  to  be  done.  We  adhere  to  the  policy 
initiated  by  us  in  1857  of  peace  with  the 
Chinese  nation,  of  furtherance  of  lawful 
commerce,  and  of  protection  of  lives  and 
property  of  our  citizens  by  all  means 
guaranteed  under  extraterritorial  treaty 
rights  and  by  the  law  of  nations.  If 
wrong  be  done  to  our  citizens  we  propose 
to  hold  the  responsible  authors  to  the  ut- 
termost accountability.  We  regard  the 
condition  at  Peking  as  one  of  virtual  an- 
archy, whereby  power  and  responsibility 
are  practically  devolved  upon  the  local 
provincial  authorities.  So  long  as  they 
are  not  in  overt  collusion  with  rebellion 
and  use  their  power  to  protect  foreign 
life  and  property  we  regard  them  as  rep- 
resenting the  Chinese  people,  with  whom 
we  seek  to  remain  in  peace  and  friend- 
ship. The  purpose  of  the  President  is, 
as  it  has  been  heretofore,  to  act  concur- 
rently with  the  other  Powers  ; first,  in 
opening  up  communication  with  Peking 
and  rescuing  the  American  officials,  mis- 
sionaries, and  other  Americans  who  are 
in  danger ; secondly,  in  affording  all  pos- 
sible protection  everywhere  in  China  to 
American  life  and  property ; thirdly,  in 
guarding  and  protecting  all  legitimate 
American  interests ; and,  fourthly,  in  aid- 
ing to  prevent  a spread  of  the  disorders 
to  the  other  provinces  of  the  Empire  and 

* W.  R.  Thayer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  243. 

127 


a recurrence  of  such  disorders.  It  is,  of 
course,  too  early  to  forecast  the  means 
of  attaining  this  last  result ; but  the  pol- 
icy of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  to  seek  a solution  which  may 
bring  about  permanent  safety  and  peace 
to  China,  preserve  Chinese  territorial  and 
administrative  entity,  protect  all  rights 
guaranteed  to  friendly  Powers  by  treaty 
and  international  law,  and  safeguard  for 
the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and  im- 
partial trade  with  all  parts  of  the  Chi- 
nese Empire.”  ” 

It  should  be  noted  that  his  was  the  first 
time  that  the  United  States  came  out 
with  the  proposal  of  maintaining  China’s 
“administrative  and  territorial  entity”  as 
a necessary  means  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  Open  Door  policy.  According  to  an 
authority  who  was  personally  acquainted 
with  the  author  of  the  phrase,  “adminis- 
trative entity’’  means  the  administrative 
independence  of  China,  and  “territorial 
entity”  meant  her  territorial  integrity. 
Being  a man  of  letters,  Secretary  John 
Hay,  who  penned  the  circular  note  July 
3,  was  very  particular  in  the  choice  of 
words.  “What  he  sought  to  prevent  was 
the  dismemberment  of  China  either  by 
avowed  cessions  of  territory,  or  by  ar- 
rangements which,  under  the  guise  of 
leases  or  otherwise,  left  her  a nominal 
title  to  her  domain,  without  administra- 
tive power  or  control.  When  we  wish  to 
convey  the  antithesis  of  territorial  dis- 
memberment, we  usually  speak  of  ‘terri- 
torial integrity but  the  word  ‘integrity,’ 
when  used  in  connection  with  public  ad- 
ministration, suggests  rather  a correct 
standard  of  official  conduct.  Mr.  Hay, 
before  he  achieved  distinction  as  a states- 
man, was  a man  of  letters,  famous  for 
his  wit  and  humor  and  for  a nice  dis- 
crimination in  the  use  of  words.  He  evi- 
dently had  no  wish  to  pose  as  a diplo- 

»U.  S.  For.  Rel.  1900,  p.  299. 

128 


matic  knight,  anxious  to  break  a lance  in 
the  cause  of  China’s  ‘administrative  in- 
tegrity.’ He,  therefore,  said  ‘territorial 
and  administrative  entity.’  ” Accord- 
ing to  another  authority,  the  word  “en- 
tity” was  used  in  place  of  “independ- 
ence” and  “integrity”  for  the  simple  rea- 
son that  it  was  very  doubtful  whether 
these  words  could  be  applied  with  ac- 
curacy to  the  situation  existing  in  China 
then.”  That  Mr.  Hay  did  mean  by  “en- 
tity” the  independence  and  integrity  of 
China  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  the 
later  documents  he  spoke  of  them  with- 
out further  regard  for  the  nicety  of  lan- 
guage. The  attention  should  also  be 
called  to  the  fact  that,  in  presenting  the 
note  to  the  British  Government,  Mr.  J. 
H.  Choate,  the  American  Ambassador 
at  London,  made  a little  variation  of  the 
language  used.  He  said  in  his  note  that 
the  policy  of  the  United  States  was  to 
“preserve  Chinese  territory  and  admin- 
istrative entity.”  At  any  rate,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  inquire  into  the  deeper 
meanings  of  these  words.  It  is  sufficient 
to  say  that,  if  the  Open  Door  policy  is 
ever  to  be  maintained  in  China  at  all, 
then  it  is  neces.sary  to  maintain  her  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  first.  Without  an 
independent  and  integral  China,  where 
and  how  can  the  Open  Door  policy  oper- 
ate ? 


J.  B.  Moore,  ‘‘Mr.  Hay’s  Work  in  Diplo- 
macy, The  American  Review  of  Reviews, 
August,  1905,  p.  174. 

China.  No.  1,  1901,  No.  7. 

“ “Great  Britain  has  been  obliged  to  aban- 
don the  policy  of  endeavoring  to  preserve  in- 
tact the  full  territorial  integrity  of  China,  to 
recognize  the  rights  of  Germany  in  Shantung 
and  of  Russia  in  Manchuria,  and  even  to  par- 
ticipate herself  in  the  partial  dismemberment 
of  China  by  taking  Wei-hai-wei.  ...  So 
that  Secretary  Hay  is  obliged  to  speak  of 
preserving  the  ‘entity’  of  China,  her  integrity 
being  already  gone.” — Josiah  Quincy,  The 
Contemporary  Review,  July,  1900,  p.  191. 


129 


CHAPTER  VII 


The  Open  Door  Policy  Defined 

AS  has  been  pointed  out  at  the  very 
outset  of  our  discussion  of  the  sub- 
ject, the  meaning  of  the  Open  Door 
is  somewhat  enigmatical.  Like  a cut  dia- 
mond, it  has  different  facets,  each  of 
which  reflects  a certain  amount  of 
truth,  and  the  interested  governments 
have  used  it  in  whatever  way  best 
suited  their  ambitions  and  designs  in 
China.  They  do  not  care  to  know,  and 
far  much  less  to  define,  what  the  Open 
Door  policy  is,  what  it  means  and  what 
it  does  not  mean.  A clear  definition  of 
the  policy  will  undoubtedly  tie  the  hands 
of  the  Powers  that  are  ready  to  play 
fast  and  loose  with  it,  and  those  Powers 
who  have  ambitious  designs  in  China  will 
never  allow  their  hands  tied.  On  the 
other  hand,  individual  writers,  and  inter- 
national partisans  in  particular,  who 
have  special  interest  to  serve,  cannot,  of 
course,  give  an  impartial  view  of  the 
exact  meaning  of  the  policy.  Their  views 
and  opinions,  be  they  honest  or  not,  are, 
therefore,  equally  divergent  as  to  what 
the  principle  of  the  Open  Door  actually 
implies  and  what  it  does  not  imply.  It 
is  precisely  because  of  this  reason — this 
lack  of  a clear  and  accepted  definition, 
that  the  Open  Door  policy  is  virtually  at 
the  mercy  of  the  governments  who 
choose, for  their  own  convenience  and  in- 
terests, to  interpret  it  in  their  own  ways. 
It  is  because  of  this  reason  that  the  Open 
Door  policy  has  never  been  clearly  de- 
fined that  partisan  writers,  imposing 
upon  the  proverbial  ignorance  of  the  gen- 
eral public  and  having  a special  axe  to 
130 


grind,  do  not  hesitate  to  place  it  in  ab- 
solutely false  light. 

In  the  last  few  years,  the  talk  has  at- 
tained a sort  of  epidemic  recurrence  that 
this  or  that  Power  has  violated  the  Open 
Door  policy  in  China,  and  this  or  that 
arrangement  will  help  preserve  the  pol- 
icy. On  the  surface  of  the  matter, it  seems 
idle  to  speak  of  violations  of  the  Open 
Door  policy,  without  knowing,  in  the 
first  place,  what  the  policy  is,  or  to  speak 
of  its  preservation  without  first  ascer- 
taining what  it  is  that  is  to  be  preserved. 
What  is  the  Open  Door  policy?  What  does 
it  seek  to  establish  ? “It  is  a remarkable 
fact,”  said  a Japanese  scholar,  “that  the 
Powers  have  never  openly  discussed  what 
constitutes  a violation  of  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunity.  The  establishment  of 
a clear  definition  of  this  point  is  a mat- 
ter of  the  highest  importance  for  the 
peaceful  development  of  China.”  ^ It 
may  be  added  that  if  the  Powers  have 
never  openly  discussed  what  constitutes 
a violation  of  the  Open  Door  policy,  it 
is  because  they  have  never  openly  defined 
what  the  policy  is  or  is  not.  The  re- 
peated diplomatic  notes  exchanged 
among  the  interested  Powers  on  the  sub- 
ject, and  the  numerous  international 
agreements  concluded  among  themselves, 
each  with  the  maintenance  of  the  Open 
Door  in  China  as  its  ostensible  object, 
are  significant,  not  for  their  commissions, 
but  for  their  omissions.  The  language 
in  official  documents  is  uniformly  too 
general  either  to  nail  down  all  the  gov- 
ernments actually  pledged  to  the  policy, 
or  to  enable  any  one  to  place  his  finger 
on  the  exact  infractions  of  it.  Besides, 
it  is  a notorious  fact  that  the  Power  who 
is  really  guilty  of  any  infraction  or  viola- 
tion of  the  principle  of  the  policy  will, 
very  naturally,  endeavor  to  interpret  her 

* K.  Asakawa,  Japan  in  Manchuria,  Yale 
Review,  November,  i909,  p.  167. 

131 


action  in  such  a way  and  the  principle  of 
the  policy  in  such  a light  as  to  serve  a 
convenient  defence  for  herself.  On  the 
other  hand,  one  who  points  his  accusing 
finger  to  any  violation  of  the  policy,  real 
or  imaginary,  by  any  particular  Power  or 
Powers  is  apt  to  exaggerate  the  case  and 
to  read  into  the  policy  meanings  which  it 
does  not  contain  or  which  it  does  not 
seek  to  establish.  In  consequence,  the 
Open  Door  policy  is  but  little  understood 
today.  And  this  is  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  it  has  been  made  the  subject  of  many 
diplomatic  conversations,  notes,  and  un- 
derstandings, and  that  it  has  been  regard- 
ed as  the  scarce,  but  in  this  case  none  too 
valuable,  touchstone  of  the  American, 
Japanese,  and  European  diplomacy  in 
China.  A vague  idea  of  the  policy  is 
generally  assumed,  but  its  precise  mean- 
ing is  often  obscure.  It  is  with  the  pur- 
pose of  throwing  more  light  on  the  sub- 
ject that  we  make  an  attempt  here  at  a 
definition  of  the  Open  Door  policy  in  all 
its  aspects.  It  is  nothing  more  than  an 
attempt — one  which  has  never  been  made 
before,  for  it  remains  for  the  govern- 
ments pledged  to  the  policy  to  give  an  of- 
ficial and  therefore  authoritative  defini- 
tion of  it.  This  will  not  be  done  yet  for 
some  time,  and  possibly  it  will  never  be 
done  at  all. 

What  is  the  Open  Door  policy,  then? 
What  fundamental  principle  underlies 
the  policy?  What  does  it  seek  to  estab- 
lish ? How  wide  is  the  scope  in  its  ap- 
plication? Is  it  commercial,  or  political, 
or  both?  These  are  legitimate  questions 
to  be  considered  in  order  to  under- 
stand the  policy  in  its  true  sense.  An 
adequate  answer  to  any  or  all  of  these 
questions  would  naturally  call  for  a 
retrospect  of  the  events  of  the  past  and 
an  anticipation  of  those  of  the  future. 
That  is  to  say,  a correct  and  adequate 
definition  of  the  Open  Door  policy  can 
132 


be  arrived  at  only  by  taking  into  careful 
consideration  its  early  history,  which  we 
have  already  recounted,  and  its  future 
development,  which  we  must  anticipate 
at  this  stage  of  our  narrative.  Before 
proceeding,  however,  to  define  what  the 
Open  Door  policy  is,  it  may  seem  better, 
in  the  interest  of  clearness,  to  point  out 
first  what  it  is  not. 

In  the  first  place,  let  us  emphasize  the 
point  once  again  that  the  so-called  Open 
Door  policy  of  today  is  not  of  American 
origin.  It  is  wrong  to  think,  as  many 
do,  that  John  Hay,  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  United  States,  from  September 
20,  1898,  to  July  1,  1905,  had  originated 
the  policy  in  his  two  diplomatic  circu- 
lars which  we  have  discussed  and  ana- 
lyzed in  the  previous  chapter.  It  is 
equally  erroneous  to  assume  that  the 
term  “Open  Door”  was  of  American 
coinage,  with  an  American  stamp  on  it. 
It  has  been  most  authoritatively  stated 
that,  “although  the  institution  of  that 
policy  is  popularly  associated  in  the 
United  States  with  Mr.  Hay’s  circular 
of  September  6,  1899,  neither  the  phrase 
nor  the  principle  denoted  by  it  in  any 
sense  originated  with  that  measure.”  ’ 
And  no  less  an  authority  than  his  own 
biographer  pointed  out  that  Mr.  Hay 
“did  not  originate  the  phrase.” *  * As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  term  “Open  Door” 
was,  in  1897  and  1898,  on  the  lips  of 
every  British  resident  in  China.  It  was  a 
catch-phrase,  used  at  the  time  by  British 
merchants  in  China  to  mean  that,  if  they 
were  to  continue  to  enjoy  their  com- 
mercial profits  in  China,  they  should  en- 
joy equal  trade  facilities  and  privileges 
with  the  nationals  of  other  Powers.  When 
Lord  Charles  Beresford  was  sent,  in  the 
fall  of  1898,  on  a mission  to  investigate 

* John  Bassett  Moore,  The  Principles  of 
American  Diplomacy,  p.  179. 

• William  Roscoe  Thayer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II, 

p.  242. 


133 


and  to  report  to  the  Associated  Chambers 
of  Commerce  in  London  the  economic 
and  political  conditions  in  China,  he  was 
confronted  with  practically  a unanimous 
opinion  of  the  British  merchants  in  the 
Far  East  that  the  policy  of  the  Open 
Door,  or  equal  opportunity  of  trade,  was 
the  only  policy  under  which  it  was  pos- 
sible to  develop  British  commerce  with 
China.  Lord  Charles  was  the  recipi- 
ent of  numerous  petitions,  recommenda- 
tions, and  resolutions,  which  the  British 
communities  in  the  Far  East  presented 
to  him  with  the  purpose  that  through 
him  the  attention  of  their  Government  at 
home  should  be  called  to  the  necessity  of 
maintaining  the  traditional  principle  of 
equal  treatment  and  equal  opportunity, 
for  which  they  had  adopted  a new 
name,  the  Open  Door  policy.  At  Can- 
ton he  was  requested  to  assure  the 
Associated  Chambers  of  Commerce  in 
London  that  “the  policy  of  the  Open 
Door  was  absolutely  essential  for  the 
continuance  of  British  trade  in  the  South 
of  China.”  At  Amoy,  Hankow,  Shang- 
hai, Tien-tsin,  Newchwang,  Foochow, 
and  other  commercial  ports  in  China, 
similar  resolutions  were  passed  and  pre- 
sented to  him  with  the  hope  that,  upon 
his  return  to  England,  the  attention  of 
the  people  and  the  Government  at  home 
might  be  alike  called  to  the  danger  with 
which  the  Open  Door  was  confronted, 
and  to  the  necessity  of  the  maintenance 
of  the  policy  for  the  development  of  the 
British  trade  in  China  in  the  future.'* 

* The  British  Chamber  of  Commerce  at 
Tien-tsin,  for  instance,  passed,  on  October  24, 
1898,  the  following  resolution;  “That  this 
meeting  of  the  Tien-tsin  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce welcomes  the  mission  of  Rear-Admiral 
Lord  Charles  Beresford,  from  the  Associated 
Chambers  of  Commerce  of  Great  Britain,  and 
unanimously  desires  to  record  its  conviction 
that  the  policy  of  preserving  the  integrity  of 
China,  wilii  a guarantee,  of  an  ‘Open  Door,’  a 
fair  field,  and  increased  trading  facilities 
for  all  countries,  is  the  hest  and  most  sound 
for  all  foreign  trading  communities  in  China, 
and  hereby  desires  Lord  Charles  Beresford 
134 


This  cry  for  the  Open  Door,  by  the 
British  merchants  in  Chinese  treaty 
ports  in  particular  and  in  the  Far  East 
in  general,  was  immediately  taken  up  by 
politicians  at  home  and  by  diplomatic 
and  consular  representatives  abroad.  In 
both  houses  of  the  British  Parliament, 
for  instance,  the  cry  was  echoed  and  re* 
echoed,  amidst  the  debates  on  the  Chi- 
nese affairs  at  the  time,  when  the  polit- 
ical future  of  China  was  seriously  at 
stake.  Lord  Curzon,  Lord  Balfour, 
Lord  Salisbury,  and  other  men  of  polit- 
ical prominence  were  among  the  first 
government  officials  in  Great  Britain  to 
use  the  term,  which  they  found  to  be  a 
summary  and  very  convenient  expression 
of  her  intended  policy  in  China. 

Thus,  in  a very  short  time,  the  “Open 
Door”  policy  became  an  accepted  term. 
Politicians  and  government  officials 
used  it:  merchants  employed  it,  and 
finally,  the  press  of  Great  Britain  re- 
echoed it  daily.  Indeed,  in  a short  time 
the  American  press  joined  in  the  cry 
for  the  “Open  Door”  with  as  much 
vigor  as  the  English  merchants  in  treaty 
ports  in  China  had  shown.  It  was 
pointed  out  that  even  the  American 
Commissioners  at  Paris,  negotiating 
peace  with  Spain  at  the  end  of  the 
American-Spanish  War,  could  not  resist 


to  convey  the  resolution  of  this  Chamber.” 
(Italics  are  the  author’s.)  The  Foochow 
Chamber  of  Commerce  passed,  on  December 
22,  1898,  a still  more  significant  resolution: 
“That  the  General  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
Foochow  desires  to  avail  itself  of  the  oppor- 
tunity of  your  Lordship's  visit  to  place  be- 
fore you  its  endorsement  of  the  views  already 
expressed  by  the  other  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce in  China,  viz.:  (1)  That  the  ‘sphere  of 
influence’  policy,  so  called,  would  be  fatal  to 
the  interests  of  British  trade  and  commerce 
in  China;  (2)  That  we  earnestly  hope  that  the 
declaration  of  Her  Majesty’s  Government 
with  regard  to  the  maintenance  of  the  ‘Open 
Door’  will  be  strictly  adhered  to;  (3)  That  in 
order  to  keep  the  ‘Open  Door’  for  the  trade  of 
all  nations,  it  is  necessary  that  the  integrity  of 
China  should  he  preserved.” — Lord  Charles 
Beresford,  The  Break-up  of  China,  pp.  470, 
479. 


135 


the  piquancy  of  the  term.  “The  phrase 
was  used,  as  a current  form  of  expres- 
sion, by  the  American  Peace  Commis- 
sion at  Paris  in  1898,  in  the  demand,  un- 
der instruction  from  their  Government, 
for  the  cession  of  Philippines.  In  that 
demand  they  expressly  declared  it  to  be 
the  purpose  of  the  United  States  to 
maintain  in  the  islands  ‘an  open  door  to 
the  world’s  commerce.’  ” ° And  later,  in 
an  eloquent  speech  at  the  dinner  given 
on  February  23,  1899,  by  the  American 
Asiatic  Association  in  honor  of  Lord 
Charles  Beresford,  who  was  then  pass- 
ing through  the  United  States  en  route 
to  England,  Mr.  Whitelaw  Reid,  one  of 
the  American  Peace  Commissioners  at 
Paris,  declared  that  the  “Open  Door” 
policy  was  the  best  policy  for  American 
trade  in  the  Philippines  and  in  China, 
and  that  the  American  Government  in- 
tended to  commit  itself  to  this  policy  as 
far  as  the  Philippines  were  concerned.” 

* The  New  York  Tribune,  February  24,  1899. 

It  is  thus  evident  that  the  Open  Door  had 
been  a current  expression  long  before 
John  Hay  was  called  to  head  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  at  Washington. 

In  this  connection,  it  may  be  also  inter- 
esting to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that, 
when  practically  whole  England  was  agi- 
tating for  the  maintenance  of  the  Open 
Door  in  China,  and  when  British  states- 
men were  almost  daily  eulogizing  upon 
the  virtues  of  the  policy  and  predicting 
the  evils  and  disadvantage  that  would 
follow  its  abandonment,  Mr.  Hay  was 
serving  as  American  Ambassador  at  Lon- 
don— the  listening  post  of  political  whis- 
perings of  the  entire  world.  It  would  be 
unreasonable  to  suppose  that  he  did  not 
take  notice  of  the  debates  in  the  parlia- 
ment or  of  the  agitations  in  the  press.  It 
would  be  absurd  to  assume  that,  as  the 

''John  Bassett  Moore,  The  Principles  of 
American  Diplomacy,  p.  179. 

136 


representative  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment, he  was  unaware  of  or  unacquainted 
with  the  views  of  the  statesmen  in  Eng- 
land who  were  guiding  the  course  of  her 
foreign  policy.  To  him,  therefore,  the  term 
“Open  Door”  was  indeed  a very  familiar 
one,  and  to  him  the  necessity  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  traditional  practice 
of  equal  treatment  in  China  and  by  China 
was  more  than  obvious.  When  Mr. 
Hay  was  recalled  from  the  Court  of  St. 
James  to  take  charge  of  the  Department 
of  State  in  September,  1898,  it  was  very 
natural  that  he  should  have  carried  out 
a policy,  which  he  had  honestly  believed 
to  be  the  best  for  the  development  of 
American  trade  and  commerce  in  China 
in  the  time  to  come.  What  was  strange 
was  the  fact  that  he  did  not  use  the 
term  “Open  Door”  at  all  in  his  circular 
note  of  September  6,  1899,  to  which  the 
origin  of  the  policy  has  been  popularly, 
but  very  erroneously  attributed  ever 
since. 

Another  interesting  fact  in  this  con- 
nection— one  which  has  been  very  little 
taken  notice  of,  was  that  Mr.  Hay  did 
not  take  any  action  in  regard  to  the 
Open  Door  until  almost  a year  after  his 
assumption  of  office.  He  was  appointed 
Secretary  of  State  on  September  20, 

1898,  and  it  was  not  until  September  6, 

1899,  almost  a year,  that  he  sent  out  his 
first  circular  note  that  has  since  become 
so  famous.  His  inaction  was  ex- 
plainable on  two  grounds.  In  the  first 
place,  the  prevalent  anti-British  senti- 
ment at  that  time  was  almost  morbid  in 
the  United  States.  He  was  frankly  afraid 
of  taking  any  step  in  defense  of  the 
American  interests  in  China,  which  close- 
ly resembled,  or  practically  coincided 
with  the  British  cry  for  the  Open  Door 
policy.  “What  can  be  done  in  the  pres- 
ent diseased  state  of  the  public  mind?”, 
he  inquired  in  a letter  to  John  W.  Foster. 

137 


“There  is  such  a mad-dog  hatred  of 
England  prevalent  among  newspapers 
and  polticians  that  anything  we  now 
should  do  in  China  to  take  care  of  our 
imperilled  interests,  would  be  set  down 
to  ‘subservience  to  Great  Britain’.”  ^ It 
was  apparently  due  to  this  reason  that 
Mr.  Hay  took  no  action  to  safeguard 
the  American  interests  in  China  until  al- 
most a year  after  his  coming  to  office ; 
and  it  may  be  ventured,  the  same  reason 
would  account  for  the  fact  that,  when  he 
gathered  enough  courage  to  send  his  first 
diplomatic  circular  to  Japan  and  to  the 
European  Powers,  he  did  not  use,  nor 
did  he  refer  to,  the  Open  Door  policy  in 
the  note,  which  was  distinctly  a British 
invention  and  a British  cry.  Like 
other  people,  the  American.®-  desired,  of 
course,  to  have  their  commercial  inter- 
ests in  China  protected,  and  if  the  so- 
called  “Open  Door”  could  in  any  way 
serve  their  purpose,  they  would  have  it 
as  well  as  not.  They  were,  however, 
anxious  to  take  the  lead  themselves,  in- 
stead of  following  that  of  Great  Britain, 
which  would  be  the  most  unpopular  and 
most  distasteful  thing  to  do,  in  view  of 
the  morbid  anti-British  sentiment  then 
prevalent  in  the  country. 

There  was  another  ground  on  which 
the  hesitation  on  the  part  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  to  take  any  decisive  step 
was  explainable.  The  commercial  classes 
in  the  United  States,  while  fully  realizing 
the  necessity  of  keeping  the  door  open  in 
China  if  American  trade  there  was  to 
be  developed  at  all,  made  no  practical 
effort  for  the  attaining  of  their  purpose, 
nor  did  they  urge  upon  the  Government 
to  do  so  for  them.  Of  this  significant 
sentiment.  Lord  Beresford  was  a per- 
sonal witness.  He  said : 

“The  principle  of  the  ‘Open  Door’  is 
unanimously  held  to  be  the  policy  neces- 

’ W.  R.  Thayer,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  234. 

138 


sary  for  the  increase  of  the  United 
States  trade  with  China ; but  there  the 
matter  rests.  I heard  no  sentiments  ex- 
pressed which  conveyed  to  me  any  opin- 
ion on  the  part  of  any  of  the  American 
Chambers  of  Commerce  as  to  how  the 
‘Open  Door’  principle  was  to  be  insured, 
although  I did  hear  many  opinions  ex- 
pressed that  the  time  could  not  be  far  dis- 
tant when  the  Chinese  Empire  would  be 
added  to  the  list  of  those  countries  which 
had  fallen  to  pieces  from  internal  de- 
cay. Though  the  great  trading  classes 
of  the  United  States,  as  far  as  I could 
gather,  are  keenly  alive  to  the  necessity 
of  safeguarding  the  future  of  the  United 
States’  commercial  interests,  it  was  quite 
apparent  to  me  that  those  in  authority, 
and  indeed  the  people  as  a whole,  are, 
for  the  present,  at  any  rate,  going  to  al- 
low Chinese  affairs  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves. It  was  very  satisfactory  to  me  to 
be  frequently  told  that  the  fact  of  the 
British  Associated  Chambers  having  sent 
a Mission  of  Inquiry  to  China,  would 
provoke  an  interest  among  the  commer- 
cial classes  of  the  United  States  with 
regard  to  the  future  of  China.  The  at- 
titude taken  up  by  the  commercial  classes 
in  Japan  was  totally  different  from  that 
which  I found  in  the  United  States. 
Both  saw  the  necessity  of  keeping  the 
Door  open  in  China  if  full  advantage  was 
to  be  taken  of  the  possible  development 
of  American  or  Japanese  trade;  but 
while  on  the  Japanese  side  there  was 
every  indication  of  a desire  to  act  in  some 
practical  manner  in  order  to  secure  the 
Open  Door,  I could  discover  no  desire 
on  the  part  of  the  commercial  com- 
munities in  the  United  States  to  en- 
gage in  any  practical  effort  for  pre- 
serving what  to  them  might  become  in 
the  future  a trade,  the  extent  of  which 
no  mortal  can  conjecture.  On  many  oc- 
casions I suggested  that  some  sort  of 
139 


understanding  should  exist  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  for 
the  mutual  benefit  of  the  two  countries 
with  regard  to  the  future  development  of 
trade  in  China ; but  while  receiving  the 
most  cordial  support  to  this  proposal, 
nothing  of  a definite  character  was  sug- 
gested to  me  that  I could  present  to  the 
Associated  Chambers.”  ® 

Now,  as  to  the  principle  which  the 
Open  Door  policy  involves,  it  must  be 
said,  as  has  been  said  before,  that  it  is  no 
more  American  in  origin  than  the  term 
itself.  Before  the  arrival  of  the  satur- 
nalia of  the  battle  for  concessions,  all 
Powers  trading  in  or  with  China  had 
uniformly  enjoyed  equal  treatment  and 
equal  opportunity.  The  most  favored 
nation  clause  which  can  be  found  in  all 
the  commercial  treaties  between  China 
and  the  foreign  Powers  left  her  no 
choice  but  to  give  them  equal  treatment 
and  equal  opportunity.  “She  has  treaty 
relations  with  all  the  European  Powers, 
together  with  the  United  States,  Brazil, 
Peru,  Mexico,  Japan,  and  Korea.  All 
these  are  equally  favored  nations  in  every 
sense  of  the  term.  The  Swede  and  the 
Dane  enjoy  the  same  rights,  privileges, 
immunities,  and  exemptions  with  respect 
to  commerce,  navigation,  travel,  and 
residence  throughout  the  length  and 
breadth  of  the  Empire  as  are  accorded 
to  the  Russian  or  to  the  Englishman.  Any 
favor  that  may  be  granted  to  Japan,  for 
instance,  at  once  inures  to  the  benefit  of 
the  United  States.”  “ And  this  equal 
treatment,  be  it  noted,  was  much  more 
comprehensive  than  the  principle  enun- 
ciated by  Mr.  Hay  in  his  first  circular 
was  ever  intended  to  be.  The  equal  treat- 
ment as  guaranteed  by  the  most  favored 

s Lord  Charles  Beresford,  The  Break-up  of 
China,  pp.  442-444. 

* Dr.  Wu  Ting-fang,  Mutual  Helpfulness 
Between  China  and  the  United  States,  The 
North  American  Review,  July,  1900. 

140 


nation  clauses  was  universal,  applicable 
throughout  “the  length  and  breadth  of 
the  Empire,”  as  Dr.  Wu  observed.  The 
equal  treatment  which  Mr.  Hay  sought 
to  establish  or  to  be  assured  of  by  the 
European  Powers  and  Japan  was  appli- 
cable, as  far  as  it  could  be  discerned  from 
the  language  of  the  note,  to  leased  terri- 
tories and  spheres  of  interest  only.  It 
was  obvious,  therefore,  that  the  so- 
called  Open  Door  principle  embodied  in 
the  Hay  note  of  September  6,  1899,  was 
nothing  more,  so  to  speak,  than  a sort  of 
diluted  old  wine  with  a new  label  on  it. 
The  name,  the  Open  Door  policy,  be  it 
applied  to  the  Hay  principle  of  1899  or 
not,  is  indeed  new,  but  the  principle 
which  underlies  the  policy  is  as  old  as  the 
story  of  the  Opium  War.  It  has  been 
well  said  that  “the  United  States,  in 
espousing  the  cause  of  the  ‘Open  Door’ 
in  China  in  1899,  sought,  not  to  estab- 
lish a new  principle  there,  but  to  prevent 
the  abandonment  of  the  old  for  the  policy 
of  leases  and  spheres  of  influence  which 
the  European  Powers,  whether  with  a 
view  to  self-aggrandizement  or  to  the 
avoidance  of  war  with  one  another, 
seemed  ready  to  adopt.”  The  best  and 
most  that  can  be  said  about  the  Hay 
principle  as  embodied  in  his  circular  note 
of  three  proposals,  from  which  nothing 
of  a definite  and  binding  nature  resulted 
as  judged  from  tbe  Powers’  replies  there- 
to (and  it  was  therefore  far  from  estab- 
lishing the  Open  Door  policy)  was  that 
the  note  served  to  awaken  the  Powers’ 
consciousness  of  the  grim  fact  that  the 
traditional  practice  of  equal  treatment 
was  being  cut  from  under  its  feet  by 
the  erection  of  territorial  spheres.  The 
Golden  Rule,  that  had  hitherto  under- 
lain China’s  commercial  dealings  with 
the  foreign  Powers,  was  being  gradually 
cast  into  oblivion  not  because  of  her  fail- 

“ J.  B.  Moore,  op.  cit.,  pp.  179-180. 

141 


lire  to  observe  it,  but  because  of  her  in- 
ability to  observe  it  under  force  majeure, 
exerted  on  her  by  the  foreign  Powers. 

Now,  the  question  may  again  be 
raised : To  whom  should  be  attributed 
the  origination  of  the  Open  Door  policy  ? 
As  a matter  of  fact,  the  question  has  been 
raised  and  already  answered  in  a previ- 
ous article,  in  which  we  have  dealt  with 
the  early  practice  of  the  principle.  It  is 
pertinent,  however,  to  repeat  here  that, 
if  it  is  admissible  that  the  most  favored 
nation  treatment  was  an  early  expression 
of  the  Open  Door  principle,  it  was  Great 
Britain  who  had  first  introduced  the 
principle  of  equal  treatment  in  China.  It 
was  also  Great  Britain  who  first  coined 
the  phrase,  “the  Open  Door,”  as  we  have 
just  shown.  Much  of  the  agitation  for 
the  “Open  Door”  was  carried  on  by  the 
British  merchants  in  the  treaty  ports  in 
China,  and  British  press  at  home.  On 
November  16,  1898,  the  British  mer- 
chants in  China  passed  a resolution,  re- 
questing the  Government  in  England  to 
enter  into  “a  general  agreement”  with 
the  interested  Powers  in  order  to  guar- 
antee for  all  nations  the  equality  of  com- 
mercial rights  and  privileges  in  China.” 
When  Lord  Beresford  was  passing 
through  the  United  States  after  his  trip 
to  China,  he  suggested  on  many  occa- 
sions that  “some  sort  of  understanding 
should  exist  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  for  the  mutual  benefit 
of  the  two  countries  with  regard  to  the 
future  development  of  trade  in  China.” 


“ Lord  Charles  Beresford,  The  Break-up  of 
China,  p.  473. 

“The  problems  connected  with  the  future 
development  of  trade  in  China  will  be  solved 
more  easily  if  the  powerful  Anglo-Saxon 
races  can  come  to  some  mutual  understand- 
ing regarding  them.  As  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  are  abso- 
lutely identical  in  China,  an  understanding 
must  conduce  to  the  benefit  of  both  great 
nations,  and  certainly  make  for  the  peaceful 
solution  of  the  difficulties.  Both  nations  are 
essentially  trading  nations,  neither  want  ter- 

142 


These  proposals  were  made  long  before 
Secretary  Hay  dispatched  his  circular 
note,  and  must,  therefore,  have  influ- 
enced him,  it  may  be  fairly  inferred,  in 
endeavoring  to  secure  the  adhesion  of 
the  other  Powers  to  the  policy  that  he 
enunciated  in  the  note. 

It  is  now  quite  evident  that  the  Open 
Door  policy  was  British  in  origin.  Un- 
fortunately, however.  Great  Britain  sur- 
rendered her  leadership  in  the  matter,  as 
she,  like  all  the  voracious  Powers  in 
Europe  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, marked  out  portions  of  Chinese  ter- 
ritory as  her  own  preserves.  Her  guid- 
ing statesmen,  who  had  hitherto  been 
anxious  for  the  Open  Door  and  the 
integrity  of  China,  succumbed,  in  a 
moment  of  weakness,  to  the  temptations 
of  a leasehold  from  China  and  to  the  re- 
gime of  territorial  spheres.  It  is  fortu- 
nate that,  at  this  crisis,  the  policy  found  a 
new  champion  in  the  United  States,  who 
made  it  as  her  own  by  adoption,  and  has 
since  fought  with  unusual  vigor  for  its 
maintenance.  It  is  perhaps  due  to  this 
readiness  and  enthusiasm  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  to  take  upon  herself 
the  task  of  reviving  the  principle,  when 
it  was  being  abandoned,  and  of  defend- 
ing it,  when  it  was  menaced,  that  not  in- 
frequently she  has  been  acclaimed  as  the 
Power  who  had  originated  the  Open 
Door  policy.'® 

The  next  point  we  should  consider  is 
whether  or  not  it  is  correct  to  take  the 

ritory,  they  both  wish  to  increase  their  trade. 
With  an  equal  opportunity  throug'hout  China, 
they  would  not  only  increase  their  trade  but 
do  much  towards  increasing-  the  prosperity  of 
the  whole  world.” — Lord  Charles  Beresford, 
The  Break-Up  of  China,  pp.  446-447. 

‘Tf  the  doctrine  of  the  Open  Door  for 
commerce  in  China  was  British  in  its  origin. 
Lord  Salisbury’s  Government  none  the  less 
acted  wisely  in  allowing  the  American  Gov- 
ernment to  make  it  their  own  by  adoption — ■ 
particularly  as  it  had  been  seriously  compro- 
mised while  in  charge  of  its  original  spon- 
sors.”— Josiah  Joyce,  The  Contemporary  Re- 
view, August,  1900,  p.  183. 

143 


Open  Door  policy  as  one  designed  for 
the  opening  up  of  China.  It  cannot  be 
too  emphatically  stated  that  the  Open 
Door  policy  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
actual  opening  of  the  country.  It  does 
not  mean,  and  it  has  never  been  intended 
to  mean,  that  it  is  a policy  which  has  as 
its  object  the  throwing  open  of  the  en- 
tire country  to  foreign  commerce,  trade, 
residence,  etc.,  without  discrimination,  or 
without  limitation.  Although  the  idea  is 
frequently  assumed,  even  by  students  of 
international  affairs,  who  have  made 
no  special  study  of  the  subject,  noth- 
ing is  farther  from  the  truth.  If 
the  assumption  were  true,  the  Open 
Door  would  be  nothing  less  than  a 
concerted  policy  among  the  Pow- 
ers to  demand  the  opening  of  China 
to  their  ruthless  exploitation.  While,  as 
a matter  of  fact,  the  Open  Door  has  been 
recognized,  as  we  shall  see,  as  a diplo- 
matic and  economic  policy  of  the  foreign 
Powers  in  China,  which  does  not  call  for 
the  opening  of  the  country,  but  calls  upon 
themselves  not  to  close,  in  their  respect- 
ive territorial  and  economic  spheres,  the 
doors  which  China  herself  has,  by  treaty 
or  otherwise,  thrown  open  to  foreign 
trade  and  commerce,  and  other  legitimate 
forms  of  industrial  and  economic  under- 
taking. In  other  words,  the  Open  Door 
policy  is  an  injunction,  so  to  speak, 
against  any  sharp  and  discriminatory 
practice  by  any  of  the  foreign  Powers  in 
China,  who  might  close  the  field  of  trade 
and  commerce,  in  her  own  spheres,  to  her 
own  nationals,  to  the  exclusion  of  those 
of  the  other  Powers.  A Japanese  stu- 
dent of  Chinese  questions  has  keenly  ob- 
served that  the  “Open  Door  merely  nega- 
tives a differential  treatment  in  favor  of 
one  or  more  foreign  nations  at  the  ex- 
pense of  all  the  others.”  “It  does  not 
necessarily  imply  a wide  opening”  of 
China,  but  it  demands  “an  impartial. 


even  if  narrow,  opening  for  all 
nations.”  “ 


’■*  K.  Asakawa,  The  Russo-Japanese  Conflict, 
p.  10.  In  an  article  in  Yale  Review,  August,  1908 
(p.  186).  The  same  writer  also  said:  “From 
the  form  of  the  phrase  ‘open  door,’  it  is  no 
wonder  that  its  meaning  is  frequently  mis- 
understood as  a wide  opening  of  a country 
to  foreign  enterprise.  Such  a policy  would  be 
disastrous  to  China.  The  width  of  the  open- 
ing, however,  does  not  enter  into  the  tech- 
nical definition  of  the  term.  So  long  as  the 
opening  of  the  country  is,  however  narrow, 
equally  wide  to  all  foreign  nations  without 
discrimination,  the  ‘open  door’  is  maintained, 
even  where  there  is  a discrimination  between 
her  own  citizens  and  those  of  other  coun- 
tries.” 


146 


CHAPTER  VIII 


The  Open  Door  Policy  Defined 
(Continued) 

Having  made  dear  what  the  Open 
Door  policy  is  not,  we  are  now  in 
a position  to  proceed  to  consider 
what  it  is.  In  proceeding  to  do  so,  how- 
ever, we  must,  first  of  all,  take  into  con- 
sideration a few  important  factors  or 
aspects  of  the  policy,  about  which  there 
has  been  a good  deal  of  difference  of 
opinion.  Does  the  Open  Door  policy 
seek  to  preserve  the  territorial  integrity 
of  China?  Is  the  policy  compatible  with 
the  regime  of  spheres  of  interest?  Is 
it  compatible  with  special  economic  and 
industrial  concessions  given  to  some 
Powers  in  China  and  not  to  the  others? 
Is  the  policy  an  economic  policy  only,  or 
does  it  involve  also  political  elements? 
For  a clear  understanding  of  the  Open 
Door  principle,  of  what  it  means  and 
what  it  does  not  mean,  of  what  it  implies 
and  what  it  does  not  imply — in  short,  for 
a clear  definition  of  the  scope  of  the 
policy,  it  is  best  to  answer  these  ques- 
tions. 

First  of  all,  does  the  Open  Door  policy 
seek  to  preserve  the  territorial  integrity 
of  China?  This  question  may  be  best  an- 
swered by  asking  another : Is  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  China  necessary  to  the 
execution  of  the  Open  Door  policy?  To 
this  second  question  there  can  be  one 
and  only  one  answer  compatible  with  the 
spirit  of  the  policy  and  with  the  ways  in 
which  the  policy  must  be  practically  car- 
ried out.  This  answer  is  that  the  main- 
tenance of  China’s  territorial  integrity  is 
absolutely  essential  to  the  carrying 
out  of  the  Open  Door  policy.  On 
146 


this  point,  however,  opinions  widely  dif- 
fer, and  the  negative  side  has  been  most 
eloquently  defended  by  British  statesmen 
and  diplomatists.  They  argued,  as  it  has 
been  argued  ever  since,  that  the  Open 
Door  policy  was  synonymous  with  the 
policy  of  “open  ports.”  And  this  policy 
of  “open  ports,”  as  Sir  William  Harcourt 
pointed  out,  was  not  “a  policy  which  in- 
volves or  secures  the  integrity  of  China.” 
“The  policy  of  ‘open  ports,’  as  applied  to 
Germany  and  to  Russia  is  this : Y ou  may 
go  and  take  Kiao-chow  and  Talienwan 
or  Port  Arthur  if  you  like ; so  long  as 
you  leave  it  open  to  us,  and  to  all  the 
rest  of  the  world,  we  do  not  care  whether 
you  take  it  from  China  or  not.  That  is 
the  policy  of  ‘open  ports’  as  enunciated 
by  Her  Majesty’s  Government.  It  has 
no  connection  whatever  with  the  integrity 
of  China.”  “ This  was  the  typical  opin- 
ion of  the  British  statesmen  some  twen- 
ty or  more  years  ago.  Though  it  might 
be  a valid  view  at  the  time  when  it  was 
given,  it  is  doubtful  that  it  can  hold  good 
today. 

What  is  the  accepted  interpretation  of 
the  Open  Door  policy  in  respect  to  the 
territorial  integrity  of  China  today?  It 
is  now  generally  believed  and  held  to  be 
true  that  only  by  the  maintenance  of 
China’s  territorial  integrity  can  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  Open  Door  policy  be 
assured.  As  far  back  as  December 
22,  1898,  the  British  merchants  in 

Foochow  were  far-sighted  enough  to 
see  that  “in  order  to  keep  the 

“The  Parliamentary  Debates,  April  5,  1898, 
p.  243.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
British  Government  was  then  agitating  for 
the  Open  Door;  and  in  the  same  breath,  it 
was  also  reserving  the  Yangtze  Valley  as  the 
British  sphere  of  interest,  and  leasing  Wei- 
hai-wei  as  a setoff  to  Russia  in  Port  Arthur 
and  Talienwan.  In  order  to  carry  water  on 
both  shoulders,  there  was  but  one  possible 
position  for  the  British  statesmen  of  responsi- 
bility to  take:  that  the  maintenance  of  the 
Open  Door  did  not  involve  the  maintenance 
of  the  integrity  of  China. 

147 


Open  Door  for  the  trade  of  all  nations, 
it  is  necessary  that  the  integrity  of  China 
should  be  preserved.”  And  Secretary 
Hay  -was  also  careful  to  add,  though  in 
somewhat  ambiguous  language,  that 
China’s  integrity  was  a necessary  condi- 
tion to  the  upholding  of  the  Open  Door 
principle.  And  then,  in  all  the  interna- 
tional agreements  which  have  been  en- 
tered into  by  Japan,  the  United  States, 
and  the  European  Powers,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  maintaining  the  Open  Door  pol- 
icy in  China — ^the  Anglo-German  Agree- 
ment, the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 
treaties,  the  Franco- Japanese  Conven- 
tion, the  Russo-Japanese  Agreements, 
and  the  Root-Takahira  and  Eansing- 
Ishii  “agreements”  — the  Contracting 
Parties  took  good  care  to  place  the 
preservation  of  China’s  territorial  in- 
tegrity side  by  side  with  the  maintenance 
of  the  Open  Door  policy.  Admiral  Ma- 
han held  the  opinion  that  while  “the  ap- 
proximate aim  of  the  Open  Door”  was 
to  preserve  the  external  control  over  the 
Chinese  markets,  its  real  object  was  to 
arrest  territorial  encroachments  in  China. 
“To  this  (policy  of  the  Open  Door)  the 
integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  is  a 
corollary.  That  integrity  is  the  concern 
of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  country 
asserting  the  Open  Door,  not  as  a mat- 
ter of  benevolence,  but  it  is  essential  to 
free  access  to  Chinese  markets.”  ” 

This  is  very  well  said,  indeed.  For, 
after  all,  the  preservation  of  China’s  ter- 
ritorial integrity  is  a problem  that  touches 
the  vital  interests  of  all  Powers.  There 
can  be  no  denying  that  the  Powers  hav- 
ing the  largest  volume  of  trade  with 
China  will  depend  for  their  commercial 
interests  upon  the  maintenance  of  the 

Resolution  by  Foochow  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  December  22,  1898.  The  Break-up 
of  China,  p.  479. 

” A.  T.  Mahan,  The  Interest  of  America  in 
International  Conditions,  pp.  183-184. 

148 


open  Door,  and  yet  it  ought  to  be  plain 
even  to  the  merest  tyro  of  international 
politics  that  successful  application  of  the 
policy  must  require  the  preservation  of 
China’s  territorial  integrity.  It  is  evident 
that  if  China  were  partitioned,  the  leased 
territories  would  be  virtually  annexed 
by  the  Powers  now  holding  them, 
and  would  pass  from  the  ownership 
of  China  to  the  ownership  of  the 
annexing  Powers.  These  Powers  would 
ipso  facto  become  legal  owners  of  the 
territories,  and  would  assume  all  sov- 
ereign rights  over  them.  They  would 
entertain  no  foreign  interference,  no  con- 
sideration for  the  trade  rights  or  privi- 
leges which  the  other  nations  might  have 
had  therein.  The  principle  of  the  Open 
Door,  in  such  a case,  could  no  longer  be 
applicable.  Korea  is  the  case  in  point. 
The  Open  Door  was  maintained,  claimed 
to  have  been  maintained,  in  Korea  before 
the  annexation  by  Japan  in  1910.  After 
the  annexation,  every  door  is  closed 
— closed  to  merchants  from  the  West, 
from  China,  and  from  all  countries 
in  the  world,  except  Japan.  If  Japan 
should  one  day  annex  Manchuria,  which 
she  has  claimed  to  be  her  sphere  of 
interest,  would  there  be  any  guarantee 
that  she  would  not  erect  special  tariff 
walls  in  protection  of  her  own  interests 
and  in  discrimination  against  those  of  the 
other  Powers?  If  France  should  one 
day  seize  Yunnan  Province  and  place  it 
under  her  own  administration,  would 
she  not  make  full  use  of  her  sov- 
ereign rights  over  the  province  and 
set  up  economic  barriers  favorable 
to  her  own  interests  and  detrimental 
to  those  of  the  others  ? Indeed,  it 
has  been  very  well  said,  that  ‘‘there  is 
a marked  difference  between  China 
establishing  a tariff,  and  Japan  or  Russia 
establishing  a tariff  over  a portion  of 
China.”  “However  high  the  Chinese 
149 


tariff  may  become,  it  will  apply  to  all 
foreign  nations  alike.  It  will  not,  there- 
fore, prove  a barrier  to  American  trade 
with  China,  any  more  than  to  Japanese, 
Russian,  or  German  trade  with  China. 
Hence  a tariff  established  by  China  her- 
self equally  applying  to  all  nations  alike 
will  not  shut  the  door  to  America  any 
more  than  to  any  other  country.  But 
if  China  should  be  divided  between  na- 
tions, each  nation  would  establish  free 
trade  within  its  colonies  and  then  charge 
a tariff  upon  goods  of  other  nations,  and 
the  trade  of  the  United  States  with 
China  would  be  destroyed.”  **  It  can, 
therefore,  be  laid  down  almost  as  an 
axiom  that  the  territorial  integrity  of 
China  must  be  maintained  in  order  to 
preserve  the  Open  Door.  Else,  where 
could  the  policy  be  applied? 

Having  understood  that  China’s  terri- 
torial integrity  is  an  absolute  requisite 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  Open  Door 
policy,  we  may  now  ask  if  the  regime  of 
the  spheres  of  influence  or  interest  (the 
two  terms  being  used  here  interchange- 
ably) is  at  all  compatible  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  Open  Door.  On  this  ques- 
tion there  is  a wide  difference  of  opin- 
ion. One  view  is  that  the  two  are  totally 
incompatible  with  each  other.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  is  quite  an  array  of  au- 
thorities who  hold,  or  held,  that  just  the 
opposite  ought  to  be  true.  “The  policy 
of  ‘spheres  of  influence’  is  not  necessarily 
opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  ‘open 

James  W.  Bashford,  China:  An  Interpreta- 
tion, pp.  439-440. 

Another  authority  takes  a similar  view.  The 
maintenance  of  the  Open  Door  policy  in  turn 
“involves,  as  a means  to  that  end,  the  preser- 
vation of  the  territorial  sovereignty  or  in- 
tegrity of  China;  for  if  that  country  be  dis- 
membered or  partitioned  into  ‘spheres  of  in- 
terest’ or  ‘influence,’  it  might  eventually  fall 
a prey  of  the  systematic  commercial  exploi- 
tation and  exclusive  protective  systems  of  the 
several  Powers  exercising  political  influence 
or  control  in  the  regions  acquired  by  them.” 
Amos  S.  Hershey,  The  International  Law  and 
Diplomacy  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  p.  Z. 

150 


door,’  ” said  Dr.  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  in  his 
book,  World  Politics,  which  was  pub- 
lished some  twenty  or  more  years  ago. 
“At  present  (that  is,  1900),  if  we  may  in- 
terpret the  declarations  of  the  great  Pow- 
ers by  their  course  of  action,  the  term 
'sphere  of  influence’  in  its  most  extended 
meaning  refers  to  a region  where  a Pow- 
er holds  itself  specially  responsible  for 
security  of  life  and  investment,  and  uses 
its  poltical  influence  for  the  furthering 
of  economic  development.  As  long  as 
freedom  of  opportunity  is  preserved 
within  these  spheres,  as  long  as  treaty 
ports  are  kept  open  and  their  number  is 
gradually  increased,  the  policy  designated 
by  the  term  ‘open  door’  is  practically  in 
force,  even  though  the  policing  of  the 
empire  may  have  been  divided  up  among 
the  Powers.”  ” 

This  is  a view  to-  which  we  cannot 
subscribe,  despite  our  profound  regard 
for  its  author.  In  the  very  nature  of 
things,  the  Open  Door  policy  and  the  re- 
gime of  spheres  of  interest  or  influence 
are  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other, 
for  the  simple  reason  that  each  seeks  to 
create  a status,  commercial  or  political, 
which  is  opposed  to  that  of  the  other. 
One  has  as  its  object  the  establishment 
of  equal  opportunity,  while  the  other  has 
as  its  object  the  creation  of  exclusive 
privileges.  The  very  fact  that  a Power 
is  interested  in  certain  portions  of  China 
to  the  extent  of  marking  them  out  as  her 
sphere  of  influence  or  interest  is  clear 
indication  that  that  Power  means  to  ex- 
clude other  Powers  from  participation  in 
enterprises  within  such  territories.  The 
Frenchman  cannot  hope  to  have  as  much 
opportunity  for  economic  enterprises  in 
the  Yangtze  valley  as  the  British,  nor  can 
the  American  ever  expect  “equal  opportu- 
nity” in  the  genuine  sense  of  the  term  in 
South  Manchuria  with  the  Japanese.  The 


**  Paul  S.  Reinsch,  World  Politics,  p.  184. 
151 


course  of  events  in  China  in  the  last 
twenty  years  has  given  too  many  proofs 
of  industrial  and  economic  discrimina- 
tions in  such  spheres  to  believe  that  the 
Open  Door  policy  can  be  anything  more 
than  a mere  fiction  where  the  regime  of 
territorial  or  economic  spheres  is  main- 
tained. Why  were  the  Americans  at  one 
time  debarred  from  building  for  the  Chi- 
nese Govenment  a ship-yard  in  Fukien 
province?  Because  Fukien  has  been 
marked  out  as  a Japanese  sphere  of  in- 
terest. Why  should  the  Tien-tsin  Pukow 
Railway  be  built  as  an  Anglo-German 
joint  enterprise?  Because  the  northern 
end  of  the  line  traverses  the  former  Ger- 
man sphere  in  China,  while  the  south- 
ern end  of  the  line  enters  into  the  Brit- 
ish sphere.  In  order  that  neither  one 
should  trespass  upon  the  preserve  of  the 
other,  they  decided  upon  the  plan  of  joint 
enterprise,  but  separate  engineering  work 
in  the  construction  of  the  railway.  And, 
then,  again,  why  did  the  magnificent 
scheme  of  neutralizing  the  Manchurian 
railways  as  proposed  in  1910  by  Secre- 
tary Knox  of  the  United  States,  complete- 
ly fail?  Because  the  railway  lines  pro- 
posed for  “neutralization”  were  found  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  spheres  of  interest  in 
North  and  South  Manchuria,  from 
which  both  Russia  and  Japan  were 
anxious  to  exclude  every  foreign  inter- 
est other  than  their  own.  Apparently, 
therefore,  the  Open  Door  policy  and  the 
spheres  of  interest  or  influence  cannot 
exist  side  by  side.  The  one  or  the  other 
must  give  way.  They  are  inconsistent 
terms,  and  they  produce  diametrically 
opposite  effects  and  results.  Dr.  Reinsch 
was  of  the  opinion  that  “as  long  as  free- 
dom of  opportunity  is  preserved  within 
these  spheres,  as  long  as  treaty  ports  are 
kept  open  and  their  number  is  gradually 
increased,  the  policy  designated  by  the 
term  ‘open  door’  is  practically  in  force.” 

152 


It  is  our  opinion  that  in  these  spheres  the 
treaty  ports  are  kept  open  just  because 
they  are  “treaty  ports.”  The  freedom  of 
opportunity  is  not  preserved,  for  there  is 
none  to  preserve.  Wherever  there  is  a 
special  sphere  claimed  by  this  or  that 
Power,  there  is  no  equality  of  oppor- 
tunity, either  in  name  or  in  fact.  Wher- 
ever there  is  no  equality  of  opportunity, 
there  is  no  Open  Door.  Each  and  every 
portion  of  Chinese  territory,  which  is 
earmarked  as  a sphere  of  interest  or  in- 
fluence of  this  or  that  Power  is  a denial 
of  the  Open  Door  and  a limitation  of  the 
operation  of  the  principle  of  equal  op- 
portunity. There  can  be  no  getting  away 
from  this  obvious  fact. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  not  over- 
look the  fact,  which  we  have  emphasized 
before,  that  the  Open  Door  policy,  as  it 
was  generally  understood  at  the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  or  at  the  beginning  of  the 
twentieth  century,  was  practically  sy- 
nonymous with  the  three  proposals, 
which  Secretary  Hay  announced  in  his 
circular  of  September  6,  1899  ; and  inas- 
much as  Mr.  Hay  applied  these  proposals 
only  to  the  leased  territories  and  the 
economic  spheres  of  the  foreign  Pow- 
ers in  China,  it  was  a natural  conclusion 
that  the  principle  of  Open  Door  was 
quite  compatible  with  the  existence  of 
the  spheres  of  interest.  Besides,  it  was 
the  contention  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, then,  that  the  maintenance  of  the 
Open  Door  policy  had  nothing  to  do  with 
China’s  integrity.  The  very  fact  that 
Great  Britain  was  agitating  for  the  Open 
Door  and  taking  territorial  leases  and 
demarcating  economic  spheres  in  China 
at  one  and  the  .same  time  would  lend 
strength  to  the  opinion,  then  current 
among  students  of  international  affairs, 
that  the  principle  of  the  former  was  not 
opposed  to  the  creation  of  the  latter.  In 
his  interpretation  of  the  Open  Door, how- 
153 


ever,  Dr.  Reinsch  qualified  his  meaning 
by  saying  that  he  was  considering  “the 
declarations  of  the  great  Powers  by  their 
course  of  action.”  The  declaration  of 
the  British  Government  was  for  one 
thing,  and  its  course  of  action  was  for 
another.  Dr.  Reinsch,  and  others  who 
had  held  similar  views  were,  therefore, 
quite  right  at  the  time,  so  far  as  their 
interpretation  of  the  Hay  proposals  and 
of  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain,  and  pos- 
sibly of  the  other  European  Powers 
then  was  concerned.  It  must  also  be 
confessed,  however,  that  such  an  inter- 
pretation tends  to  limit  the  Open  Door 
policy  to  the  Hay  proposals  of  1899.  For 
our  purpose,  we  must  interpret  the 
Open  Door  policy  in  its  latest  and  larger 
aspects,  taking  into  consideration  all  the 
phases  of  development  which  it  has  ap- 
parently undergone. 

Now,  going  still  one  step  further,  we 
may  ask  whether  or  not  the  possession  by 
any  one  foreign  Power,  or  group  of  Pow- 
ers, or  by  their  own  nationals,  of  spe- 
cial interests  and  exclusive  concessions  in 
China  is  compatible  with  the  Open  Door 
policy,  which,  as  has  been  generally 
known,  aims  at  the  establishment  of  real 
equality  of  opportunity  for  all  nations. 
Tliis  question  is  one,  which  is  closely  re- 
lated to  that  of  spheres  of  interest  or  in- 
fluence, and  about  which  there  is  no 
unanimity  of  opinion.  This  lack  of 
unanimous  opinion  on  such  a vital  matter 
is,  again,  as  is  always  the  case,  due  to  the 
lack  of  a clear  and  uniform  understand- 
ing or  definition  of  the  scope  of  the  Open 
Door  policy.  One  group  of  authorities 
may  maintain  that  the  Open  Door  policy 
operates  only  in  the  field  of  foreign  com- 
merce and  navigation  in  China,  and  an- 
other group  hold  the  opinion  that  it  is 
applicable  to  all  economic  undertakings 
by  the  foreign  Powers  or  their  nationals 
in  China.  Between  the  opinions  of  the 
154 


two  groups,  one  can  easily  recognize  the 
fact  that  the  difference  is  one  of  interpre- 
tation as  to  the  scope  of  the  policy,  or  as 
to  the  spheres  in  which  it  is  supposed  to 
operate.  The  first  group  holds  to  a nar- 
rower view  and  confines  the  principles 
of  the  policy  to  those  proposals  which 
Mr.  Hay  made  in  his  first  diplomatic  cir- 
cular, and  which,  as  we  have  seen  before, 
have  nothing  to  do  but  with  trade  and 
commerce,  navigation,  transportation, 
and  tariff  dues,  in  the  leased  terri- 
tories and  in  the  spheres  of  interest.  A 
broader  view  is  held  by  the  second  group 
of  the  Open  Door  policy,  and  it  is  quite 
clear  that  this  group  recognizes  the  fact 
that  the  Open  Door  of  today  is  something 
more  than  the  Hay  proposals  ever  im- 
plied, and  is  applicable  to  all  forms  of 
economic  activity  by  the  foreign  Powers 
in  China.  With  this  wide  difference  of 
opinion,  it  is  apparently  difficult  to  ar- 
rive at  a uniform  understanding  as  to 
the  scope  of  the  policy,  the  absence  of 
which  is  largely  responsible  for  its  nu- 
merous infractions. 

But  the  question  which  we  have  raised 
remains  yet  unanswered.  Is  the  posses- 
sion by  any  one  Power,  or  group  of  Pow- 
ers, or  by  their  nationals,  of  special  inter- 
ests and  exclusive  concessions  in  China 
consistent  and  compatible  with  the  Open 
Door  policy?  The  question  is  not  so 
easy  to  answer  as  to  ask.  On  the  one 
hand  it  seems  to  us  almost  a truism  to 
say  that  each  and  every  concession,  that 
is  exclusive  and  therefore  monopolistic 
in  nature,  is  a limitation,  a relinquish- 
ment pro  tanto,  of  the  principles  of  the 
Open  Door.  In  its  simplest  terms,  the 
Open  Door  demands  equal  opportunity 
for  trade,  commerce,  and  other  legitimate 
forms  of  economic  activity,  for  all  for- 
eign Powers  in  China,  while  an  exclusive 
concession — say,  the  concession  for  the 
construction  of  a certain  railway  line — 
155 


gives  monopolistic,  or  at  least  preferen- 
tial rights  to  the  concessionaire,  especial- 
ly in  the  matters  of  engineering  and  sup- 
plying of  materials.  If  a line  is  to  be 
built  under  French  supervision,  by 
French  money,  and  by  French  engineers, 
is  it  likely  or  unlikely  that  nothing  but 
French  materials  and  rolling  stocks  will 
be  used?  If  the  concession  of  a line  is 
held  by  the  British,  or  by  the  Americans, 
or  by  both  jointly,  is  it  thinkable  that  the 
British  or  the  Americans  would  use  Ger- 
man materials  and  employ  German  en- 
gineers in  the  construction?  In  such  a 
case,  there  can  be  no  room  for  the  Open 
Door,  for  there  is  no  equal  opportunity 
to  speak  of.  Equal  opportunity,  in  all 
cases  of  exclusive  concessions,  will  be  a 
gift  of  generosity  of  each  particular  con- 
cessionaire, which  is,  however,  a rather 
rare  thing  to  find  in  international  eco- 
nomic strife.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
opinion  is  generally  held  that  the  Open 
Door  policy,  as  has  heretofore  been 
seen,  relates  to  matters  of  trade,  tariff, 
and  navigation  only.  “As  thus  defined  it 
has  nothing  to  do  with  non-alienation 
agreements  with  respect  to  particular 
areas,  with  the  making  of  loans  to  China, 
or  the  obtaining  of  concessions  for  min- 
ing or  for  the  building  of  railways  or 
the  construction  and  operation  of  other 
public  works.  Nor  does  it  stand  in  the 
way  of  agreements  with  China  that  ma- 
terial for  these  works  shall  be  imported 
from  particular  countries.”  “ It  is  in 
this  way  that  the  inequality  of  oppor- 
tunity inherent  in  the  possession  of 
“vested  rights,”  “special  interests,”  and 
“exclusive  concessions”  by  one  Power  or 


Westel  W.  Willoughby,  Foreign  Rights  in 
China,  p.  260.  The  same  authority  is  of  the 
opinion,  however,  that  the  Open  Door  prin- 
ciple is  inconsistent  with  “special  interests’" 
and  the  establishment  of  spheres  of  interest. 
“Upon  their  face  it  would  appear  that  these 
are  contradictory  ideas,  and  in  fact,  the' 
have,  in  practice,  proved  to  be  such.” — Ibia. 

156 


a few  Powers  in  China  is  made  to  har- 
monize with  the  supposed  operation  of 
the  Open  Door  principle.  And  right  here 
we  may  add  that  it  is  largely  due  to  this 
sort  of  attempt  to  reconcile  the  theory 
and  the  practice,  which  are  obviously  ir- 
reconcilable, that  the  Open  Door  polic}) 
has  been  reduced  to  a mere  fiction. 

Apropos  of  the  incompatibility  of  spe- 
cial rights  and  concessions  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Open  Door,  there  is  yet  one 
peculiar  view  that  remains  to  be  care- 
fully considered.  It  is  pointed  out 
that  every  concession  must  be  granted 
by  the  Chinese  Government,  be  it  exclu- 
sive or  otherwise.  Being  bound  by  the 
most  favored  nation  clauses  provided  for 
in  all  her  commercial  treaties  and  con- 
ventions with  the  foreign  Powers,  China 
cannot  favor  any  particular  nation  or 
nations  without  violating  the  spirit,  as 
well  as  the  letter,  of  these  provisions. 
And  the  Power  or  Powers,  who  are  de- 
nied “equal  opportunity”  in  an  exclusive 
concession  given  to  any  particular  Pow- 
er, may  on  the  strength  of  these  most 
favored  nation  provisions  demand  from 
China  concessions  equally  favorable  and 
equally  exclusive  for  themselves.  In 
other  words,  in  the  tug-of-war  of  wring- 
ing concessions  from  China,  each  and 
every  Power  is  on  the  same  favorable 
ground  to  start  out.  As  soon  as  the 
game  is  commenced,  one  Power  is  not 
supposed  to  have  any  opportunity  for 
equal  treatment  in  what  the  others  have 
obtained  from  China.  But,  it  is  claimed 
that,  even  in  such  cases,  the  Open  Door 
is  maintained.  What  Open  Door  ? it  may 
be  asked.  The  answer  is  that  the  Open 
Door  in  this  case  means,  if  it  means  any- 
thing at  all,  that  the  door  is  still  open 
for  the  Powers  to  demand  similar  exclu- 
sive concessions  from  China  ! It  was  due 
to  this  erroneous  notion  that  Count  Ser- 
gius Witte,  at  the  Portsmouth  Peace 
157 


Conference,  said  that  “no  rights  which 
were  acquired  lawfully  from  China  with- 
in a limited  space  of  territory,  and  which 
did  not  exclude  a third  party  from  secur- 
ing similar  advantages  from  her,  could 
be  considered  a monopoly,  or  a violation 
of  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity”  — 
the  principle,  it  may  be  added,  as  Russia 
understood  it.  Paraphrased  in  plain  lan- 
guage, what  Count  Witte  said  means,  and 
can  only  mean,  that  so  long  as  no  one 
Power  gets  the  monopoly  of  securing 
rights  and  concessions  from  China,  and 
so  long  as  the  other  Powers  are  free  to 
do  the  same  thing,  there  can  be  no  viola- 
tion of  the  Open  Door  policy ! 

That  this  is  a dangerous  view,  though 
tacitly  held  by  quite  a few  Powers  in  their 
dealings  with  and  in  China,  is  obvious.  It 
will  be  seen  at  once  that  if  the  Open 
Door  is  made  to  mean  “equal  oppor- 
tunity” for  the  Powers  to  demand  con- 
cessions from  China,  which  do  not  ex- 
clude others  from  securing  similar  ad- 
vantages from  her,  then  the  policy  is  in- 
deed a sinister  one — so  much  so  that  it 
is  worthy  the  condemnation  of  all  hon- 
est people.  Such  a policy  is  sure  to  be 
disastrous  to  China,  and  to  work  ulti- 
mately for  her  dismemberment.  It  is 
tantamount  to  one  of  securing  compensa- 
tion for  disadvantages  or  of  setting  up 
rival  claims  by  one  Power  to  counteract 
adverse  demands  on  China  by  the  other. 
It  may  revive  once  again,  if  it  has  ever 
been  dead,  the  battle  for  concessions, 
which  it  is  the  very  object  of  the  Open 
Door  policy,  when  truly  interpreted, 
to  prevent.  It  will  contribute  to 
the  setting  up  of  an  infinite  number 
of  new  spheres  of  interest  or  influence, 
if  China  still  has  more  room  for  them. 
And  finally,  it  would  logically  lead  to 
the  break-up  of  China,  for,  if  one  Power 
annexes  some  particular  portion  of  the 
Supra,  Chapter  I. 

158 


Chinese  territory,  leaving  at  the  same 
time  enough  for  the  others  to  seize  upon, 
such  annexation,  if  Count  Witte’s  idea 
of  the  Open  Door  were  carried  to  its 
logical  conclusion,  could  not  be  consid- 
ered as  “a  monopoly  or  a violation  of  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity.”  That 
such  a conception  of  the  Open  Door 
is  self-destruction  can  admit  of  no 
doubt.  If  the  worthy  Count  had  said 
that  “rights  lawfully  acquired  from 
China  within  a limited  space  of  her  ter- 
ritory could  not  exclude  third  parties 
from  securing  similar  advantages  from 
her  within  the  same  limited  space,  it 
would  be  more  in  accord  with  the  true 
spirit  of  the  Open  Door  policy.  But  the 
Count  failed  to  specify,  in  the  first  place, 
whether  these  “rights”  he  had  in  mind 
were  political,  economic,  or  merely  com- 
mercial ; whether  these  “rights”  acquired 
from  China  “within  a limited  space  of 
her  territory”  would  or  would  not  ex- 
clude third  parties  from  securing  similar 
rights  from  her  within  the  same  limited 
space.  The  point  cannot  be  too  often  or 
too  strongly  emphasized  that  the  Open 
Door  policy  does  not  demand  the  throw- 
ing open  of  the  whole  or  part  of  China 
to  ruthless  exploitation  by  the  foreign 
Powers.  Nor  can  the  policy  be  made  to 
mean  that  the  Powers  are  to  have  “equal 
opportunity”  to  scramble  for  concessions 
in  China,  be  they  political,  economic,  or 
purely  commercial. 

In  further  elucidation  of  the  questions 
which  we  have  so  far  discussed,  it  may 
not  be  out  of  place  to  produce  here  ex- 
tracts of  a notable  speech  which  Mr. 
Arthur  J.  Balfour  made  in  the  House  of 
Commons  more  than  twenty  years  ago, 
and  in  which  he  ventilated,  in  terms  not 
likely  to  be  misunderstood,  what  he 
thought  of  the  Open  Door  policy  vis-a- 
vis  the  questions  of  special  concessions 
and  economic  spheres. 

159 


“In  that  embracing  phrase,”  said  Bal- 
four, when  he  was  speaking  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  Open  Door  and  equal  treat- 
ment, “are  contained,  in  my  opinion,  two 
sets  of  considerations  dealing  with  two 
matters  entirely  separate — so  separate 
that  they  cannot  be  dealt  with  by  the 
same  formulae  or  pursued  by  the  same 
policy.  There  is,  in  the  first  place,  the 
question  of  what  may  be  called  equal 
trade  opportunities,  the  right,  that  is  to 
say,  of  importing  goods  (into  China)  at 
the  same  rate  as  any  other  nation  im- 
ports goods,  the  same  right  of  using  rail- 
ways as  any  other  nation  has.  That  evi- 
dently has  nothing  to  do  whatever  with 
spheres  of  interest  or  influences.  It  is, 
or  it  ought  to  be,  of  universal  application. 
We  ought  to  have  all  over  China  the 
same  right  of  importing  and  transporting 
goods  that  the  French,  the  Germans,  the 
Belgians,  or  the  Americans  have.  There 
is  a wholly  different  set  of  questions  con- 
nected with  concessions,  and  they  cannot 
be  treated  in  the  same  simple  and  obvious 
manner.  Here  it  must  be  perfectly  mani- 
fest to  every  one  that  the  laws  of  nature 
themselves  prevent  us  from  having  abso- 
lute equality  of  treatment  between  the 
different  nationalities,  because  a conces- 
sion must  be  given  to  some  one,  and  when 
the  some  one  got  it,  other  people  must 
be  excluded.  We  have  many  concessions 
which  are  worked  for  the  benefit  of 
British  interests.  We  have  an  enormous 
mineral  concession  in  the  north  of 
China,  which  will  be  worked  for  the 
benefit  of  British  interests.  That  is  not 
equality  of  treatment.  It  is  inequality 
inseperable  from  the  nature  of  the  con- 
cessions. Whenever  concessions  are 
made  they  must  be  given  to  somebody, 
and  everybody  else  must  be  excluded. 
That  inequality  is  inevitable,  and  it  can- 


not  be  avoided,  and  no  complaint  can  be 
made  of  it.”  “ 

In  other  words,  Mr.  Balfour  believed, 
as  so  many  others  have  believed  since, 
that  the  Open  Door  policy  had  nothing 
to  do  with  concessions,  be  they  exclusive 
or  not,  political  or  otherwise : the  policy 
merely  dealt  with  equal  treatment  in  the 
exportation,  importation,  and  transporta- 
tion of  goods.  Or,  to  use  his  own  words 
once  again,  the  policy  sought  to  maintain 
“markets  for  British  manufactures  which 
should  be  under  no  disadvantage  from 
hostile  tariffs,  or  anything  equivalent  to 
hostile  tariff.”  In  close  resemblance  to 
the  views  which  we  have  already  shown 
to  be  untenable  was  this  of  Mr.  Balfour’s. 
That  his  official  position  might  have  in- 
vested his  words  with  authority  could 
make  no  difference  as  to  the  principle  of 
the  Open  Door  policy  as  it  is  or  should  be 
understood  today.  In  fact,,  what  Mr. 
Balfour  said  about  concessions  and 
equal  treatment  in  China  is  of  a na- 
ture to  strengthen  our  contention  rather 
than  to  weaken  it.  For,  did  he  not 
point  out  that,  as  soon  as  some  one 
got  a concession  from  China,  the 
others  must  be  excluded?  Did  he  not 
admit  that  Great  Britain  herself  had  a 
number  of  concessions  in  China,  which 
were  worked  for  British  interests  only? 
Did  he  not  recognize  that  such  conces- 
sions and  the  manner  in  which  they  were 
made  to  materialize  were  “not  equality 
of  treatment,”  but  “inequality  inseparable 
from  the  nature  of  the  concessions?” 
Did  he  not  maintain  that  whenever  con- 
cessions were  made  to  some  one,  every- 
body else  would  be  excluded,  and  that 
“that  inequality  is  inevitable?”  For  our 
part,  we  must  say  that  it  is  just  because 
of  this  inequality  of  treatment,  “inevi- 
tabe  and  “inseparable”  from  the  nature 

“ The  Parliamentary  Debates,  August  10, 
1898,  pp.  828-829. 

lei 


of  concessions — especially  those  which 
are  monopolistic,  that  they  are  incom- 
patible with  the  principle  of  the  Open 
Door. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  go  further  into 
arguments  such  as  these,  falsely  rea- 
soned as  they  are.  But  for  the  sake 
of  further  elucidation  of  the  true 
meaning  of  the  Open  Door  policy  of 
today,  it  may  not  be  useless  to  add  that 
what  Mr.  Balfour  had  conceived  to  be 
the  Open  Door  was  nothing  more  than 
what  Mr.  Hay  had  proposed  in  his  first 
diplomatic  circular  on  the  subject.  In 
other  words,  the  statesmen  of  those  days 
conceived  the  Open  Door  policy  to  be 
nothing  more  than  a tariff  regime  in 
China,  under  which  the  foreign  Powers 
were  to  enjoy  equal  treatment  in  matters 
of  trade  and  navigation.  For  our  pur- 
pose, however,  we  must  emphasize  the 
fact  once  again  that  we  must  not  look 
at  the  Open  Door  policy  from  a parochial 
standpoint  of  the  Hay  proposals,  con- 
fining its  application  to  matters  of  tariff, 
navigation,  and  transportation  only,  but 
from  the  standpoint  where  we  can  take 
into  consideration  all  the  latest  develop- 
ments of  the  principle.  In  the  course  of 
events,  the  Open  Door  policy,  like  every- 
thing else  in  the  world,  has  developed 
and  grown ; and  it  has  thus  disclosed 
new  and  significant  meanings  which 
were  not  at  first  discerned.  In  con- 
sidering the  true  meaning  of  the  pol- 
icy, we  must  keep  in  view  its  past  as 
well  as  its  present,  and  its  future,  if  pos- 
sible. To  define  the  policy  according  to 
the  nineteenth  century  notions  would  be 
to  set  back  the  hand  of  the  clock  which 
has  timed  every  step  of  its  development, 
and  to  ignore  the  most  important  inter- 
national events  of  the  last  twenty  or  more 
years  that  have  had  the  greatest  bearing 
upon  the  policy.  If  the  Open  Door  pol- 
icy of  today  means  nothing  more  than  a 
162 


tariif  regime,  such  as  Mr.  Hay’s  pro- 
posals and  Mr.  Balfour’s  viws  seemed  to 
have  implied,  then  the  policy  is  entirely 
superfluous,  for  China,  in  her  tariff  ad- 
ministration, is  bound  to  a fixed  rate 
by  her  existing  treaties  with  all  Powers, 
and  it  is  therefore  impossible  for  her  to 
discriminate  against  the  one  or  the  other. 
Her  tariff  is  uniform,  as  it  has  been,  to 
all ; and  except  Germany  and  Austria, 
whose  commercial  treaties  have  been 
abrogated  and  not  yet  renewed,  China 
must  accord  equal  treatment  in  matters  of 
tariff  duties  to  all  countries  in  the  world. 
If  the  Open  Door  policy  means  a uni- 
form tariff  only  in  the  spheres  of  inter- 
est and  in  the  leased  territories,  then  it 
is  again  superfluous,  for,  throughout 
China,  the  administration  of  the  customs 
tariff,  though  handled  by  foreign  nations 
largely,  is  under  the  control  of  the  Chi- 
nese Government.  The  foreign  Powers, 
in  spite  of  their  imaginary  walls  of 
spheres  of  interest  or  influence  and  more 
tangible  lines  of  leased  territories,  have 
neither  the  Power  nor  the  right  to  use 
the  Chinese  tariff  as  a weapon  of  dis- 
crimination. If  the  Open  Door  aims  at 
equal  treatment  in  matters  or  transpor- 
tation, then  the  policy  is  a complete  fail- 
ure, for  it  is  a notorious  fact  that,  except 
on  the  Chinese-owned  and  Chinese-con- 
trolled  lines,  of  which  the  number  is  sur- 
prisingly small,  discrimination  on  the  for- 
eign-controlled  railways  and  steamers  is 
a recognized  practice.  During  the  pre- 
war days,  when  Germany  still  enjoyed 
the  most-favored-nation  treatment  in 
China,  she  was  loath  to  accord  the  same 
treatment  to  the  other  Powers  in  her  own 
spheres.  German  goods  had  prior  right 
of  transportation  on  the  Shantung  rail- 
ways, and  at  cheaper  rates  too.  And  to- 
day, as  ever,  the  Japanese,  posing  them- 
selves as  masters  of  Manchuria,  do  not 
hesitate  to  arrogate  to  themselves  such 
163 


preferential  treatment  on  the  South  Man- 
churian railways  as  will  best  serve  their 
own  interests  in  frank  and  open  discrimi- 
nation against  those  of  the  other  Pow- 
ers. Why  is  this  discrimination  possible? 
It  is  because  of  the  special  and  exclusive 
concessions  which  the  Germans  had  for- 
merly enjoyed  in  Shantung,  and  those 
that  Japan  has  been  enjoying  in  Man- 
churia. Here,  as  nowhere  else,  the  sin- 
ister character  of  the  exclusive  conces- 
sions, special  interests,  and  economic 
spheres,  and  their  obvious  incompatibility 
with  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
Open  Door  come  into  broad  daylight. 
It  is  a sad  misfortune  that  the  Pow- 
ers, in  the  absence  of  a clear  defini- 
tion of  the  Open  Door,  have  been 
contending  for  railway  concessions,  min- 
ing rights,  or  other  industrial  and  eco- 
nomic privileges  in  China.  It  is  a still 
greater  misfortune  that,  while  professing 
lip  service  to  the  Open  Door  policy,  the 
Powers  are  not  willing  to  surrender  their 
rights  and  concessions  of  that  nature.  On 
July  13,  1898,  in  a telegraphic  despatch 
of  the  British  Minister  in  Peking,  Lord 
Salisbury  observed,  apparently  not  with- 
out premonition,  that  in  case  should 
Great  Britain  come  out  second  best  in 
the  battle  of  concessions  then  going  on 
in  China,  she  would  be  confronted  with 
the  serious  danger  of  losing  her  tradi- 
tional claim  to  equal  treatment.  “It 
does  not  seem,”  he  said,  “that  the  battle 
of  concessions  is  going  well  for  us,  and 
that  the  mass  of  Chinese  railways,  if  they 
are  ever  built,  will  be  in  foreign  hands, 
is  a possibility  that  we  must  face.  One 
evil  of  this  is  a possibility  that  no  orders 
for  materials  will  come  to  this  country. 
That  we  cannot  help.  The  other  evil  is 
that  by  diffeerntial  rates  and  privileges 
the  managers  of  the  railways  may 
strangle  our  trade.  This  we  ought  to  be 
able  to  prevent,  by  pressing  that  proper 
164 


provision  for  equal  treatment  be  inserted 
in  every  concession.”  Apparently,  the 
British  Foreign  Minister  foresaw  all  the 
attendant  evils  of  special  concessions. 
Whether  the  remedy  he  suggested  was 
adequate  for  the  disease  was  best  shown 
by  the  fact  that  in  none  of  the  railway 
concessions  granted  to  Great  Britain  her- 
self was  equal  treatment  ever  provided 
for. 

Now,  we  have  seen  that  the  Open  Door 
policy  is  not  an  American  policy,  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  not  of  American  origin ; 
we  have  seen  that  it  is  not  a policy  which 
demands  the  wide  opening  of  China  to 
ruthless  exploitation  by  foreign  Pow- 
ers ; we  have  seen  that  the  equality 
of  opportunity  which  the  policy  calls  for 
does  not  mean  equality  of  opportunity 
for  foreign  Powers  to  wring  concessions 
from  China ; and  we  have  also  seen  that 
the  policy  is  incompatible  with  the  regime 
of  spheres  of  influence  or  interest,  but 
that  it  presupposes  and  seeks  to  preserve 
the  integrity  of  China.  A definition  of 
the  policy  is  comparatively  easy,  when  it 
is  given  in  the  negative  terms.  But  when 
we  come  to  define  the  policy  in  positive 
terms  and  to  say  what  it  is  rather 
than  what  it  is  not,  we  must  not  only 
remember  its  genesis,  which  we  have 
already  dealt  with,  but  also  keep  in 
mind  its  further  developments  which 
we  cannot  take  up.  Keeping  in  mind 
what  has  been  said  before,  we  may, 
however,  lay  down  here  a simple  and 
concise  definition,  which  may  serve 
as  a working  principle,  with  which  we 
may  test  the  infractions  and  violations  of 
the  policy,  real  or  imaginary. 

What  then  is  the  Open  Door  policy? 
This  is  our  final  question.  The  Open 
Door  policy  is,  in  a broad  sense,  an  eco- 
nomic and  diplomatic  policy,  officially 
agreed  upon  % the  European  Powers, 
Japan,  and  the  United  States,  and  has 
165 


as  its  object  the  maintenance  of  the  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  China  and  of  equal 
opportunity  in  the  country  for  commerce, 
trade  investment,  and  all  legitimate  forms 
of  economic  and  industrial  enterprises 
for  all  nations  in  the  world.  The  main- 
tenance of  China’s  territorial  integrity  is 
necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
Open  Door  policy.  Without  the  one  the 
other  can  not  operate.  Inasmuch  as  the 
policy  seeks  to  establish  real  equality  of 
opportunity  and  treatment  for  all  Pow- 
ers in  China,  any  exclusive  concession, 
any  special  right,  or  any  special  sphere,  is 
a limitation  and  relinquishment  pro  tanto 
of  the  Open  Door.  This  is  more  so,  in 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  policy  today 
means  equal  opportunity  and  treatment 
for  all  'nations,  not  only  in  matters  of 
trade  and  transportation,  but  also  in  those 
regarding  investment  and  other  forms  of 
economic  and  industrial  enterprise. 
This  is  clearly  borne  out  by  the  instances 
found  later  in  the  Hsinmintun  and  Fa- 
kuman  Railway  dispute,  in  the  Hukuang 
Railway  Loan,  in  the  Six-Power  Re- 
organization Loan,  in  the  new  banking 
consortium,  and  in  many  other  events  of 
international  importance  in  the  Far  East. 
And  it  is  safe  to  say  here  that,  if  the 
principle  of  the  Open  Door  were  not  in- 
volved in  any  of  the  above-mentioned 
events,  the  policy  would  be  relatively  in- 
consequential and  practically  meaningless 
today. 


166 


VITA 

Prepared  for  college  at  Nanyang  Middle 
School,  Shanghai,  China,  1910-1913; 

Graduated  from  Tsing-hwa  College,  Peking, 
China,  June,  1915; 

Arrived  in  the  United  States,  August,  1915; 

Admitted  as  a Junior  at  Yale,  September, 
1915,  and  graduated,  June,  1917; 

Awarded  the  Charles  Washburn  Clarke  Prize 
at  Yale,  June,  1917,  “for  the  best  essay 
on  the  diplomatic  and  consular  service 
of  the  United  States  as  compared  with 
that  of  at  least  five  oter  countries;” 

Graduated  from  Harvard  with  M.A.,  June, 
1918; 

Studied,  as  a graduate  student,  international 
law  and  diplomacy  under  Professor  John 
Bassett  Moore,  Columbia  University, 
1918-1921; 

Appointed  Curtis  Fellow  in  International 
Law  and  Diplomacy,  Columbia  Univer- 
sity, 1919-1921; 

Served  as  the  Editor  of  the  Far  Eastern  Re- 
public, Secretary  of  the  Chinese  Patri- 
otic Committee,  President  of  the  Chinese 
Political  Science  Association,  Correspon- 
dent for  papers  at  Canton  and  Shanghai, 
China,  etc.,  etc. 


167 


